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SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates how materialism is related to personal well-being, as 
well as to environmental behaviour. I tested key assumptions in the field, both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally, in two samples of adults from two different cultures, the 
UK – an established mass consumer society – and Chile –  a fast-growing economy. 
Results are presented in the form of three papers. Using a cross-sectional analysis, I 
showed in Paper 1 that materialism was associated with lower levels of well-being in 
both countries. Importantly, both need satisfaction and need frustration mediated the 
link between materialism and well-being. Notably, need frustration played an 
incremental explanatory role, above and beyond the role of need satisfaction. In Paper 2, 
I explored the hypothesized link between need satisfaction/frustration and well-being in 
greater depth. Employing a cross-lagged longitudinal design over 3 years, I found that 
in both countries, higher total need satisfaction (versus frustration) was a significant 
prospective predictor of higher well-being. However, when separate needs for autonomy, 
competence and relatedness were distinguished, only relatedness reached statistical 
significance in the UK, and none of the three needs individually predicted well-being in 
Chile. In both countries, need satisfaction prospectively predicted positive well-being, 
and in the UK, need frustration prospectively predicted negative well-being. Finally, I 
found a bi-directional link between total need satisfaction and subjective well-being in 
both countries. These results point towards a better integration of research into hedonic 
and eudaimonic well-being. In Paper 3, I showed, both cross-sectionally and 
longitudinally, that a higher relative importance placed on extrinsic (versus intrinsic) 
life goals was a negative antecedent of environmentally responsible behaviour, even 
while controlling for effects of environmental worldviews and environmental 
identification. Taken together, these results show the negative effects of materialistic 
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values and life goals in both people’s well-being and in the future of our the natural 
environment.  
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The State of the World’s Well-being: An Urgent Need for a New Model of 
Development  
The world is making unbelievable economic progress as well as producing 
incredibly sophisticated technology (Sachs, 2012). Our current  model of development  
has increased income and consumption and created prosperity (SNDP, 2013). However, 
we are living in times of enormous contradictions, and the world is now at a crossroads 
(Sachs, 2012; SNDP, 2013). Our current model of development, mainly based on 
economic growth and income, has reached its limits. The excessive focus on Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and consumption has led the world to unsustainable ecological, 
social and economic crises. Thus, it has been argued that humanity is currently facing 
four major challenges: 
 First, despite the fact that the world has experienced tremendous economic, 
social and technological development during the last few decades, there was only a 
small drop in the number of people living in poverty between 1981 and 2008. The 
number of people living on less than US $2 per day only fell from 2.59 billion to 2.47 
billion. Moreover, more than 1 billion people still remain living in extreme poverty, 
surviving on less than US $1.25 per day (Sachs, 2012; SNDP, 2013; World Bank, 2012a, 
2012b).  
Second, we live in a world of growing  inequalities, both intra-national and 
international. Research has consistently shown that higher income inequalities are 
associated with a whole range of health and social problems such as higher rates of 
homicide, teenage births, obesity and mental illness, as well as lower rates of trust, 
children’s well-being and life expectancies (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2011). Unfortunately, 
as measured through the Gini Index, the richest 8% of the world's population owns one 
half of all economic resources, whereas the remaining 92% of the population owns the 
other half (OECD, 2011a). Moreover, the richest 20% of the world’s population 
consume 86% of its resources, whereas the poorest 20% consume only 1.3% (SNDP, 
2013). Notably, these inequalities have remained extremely high and almost unchanged 
between 1980 and 2010 (Milanovic, 2012). 
Third, economic progress and affluence have created their own disorders, 
increasing the prevalence of several mental and physical health problems, such as 
depression, anxiety and obesity (OECD, 2011b; Sachs, 2012). Currently, depression 
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affects approximately 350 million people around the world (Marcus, Yasamy, van 
Ommeren, Chisholm, & Saxena, 2012). Depressive disorders have become the leading 
cause of disability, and the need for treatments is rising globally (Bromet et al., 2011; 
The Huffington Post, 2011). Moreover, the overall prevalence of anxiety is shown to be 
extremely high (Kessler, Ruscio, Shear, & Wittchen. 2010) with lifetime prevalence 
rates between 13.6% and 28.8% in Western countries (Michael, Zetsche, & Margraf, 
2007). Teenagers have been shown to be particularly at risk of having these mental 
illnesses. A dramatic increase has been observed in the rates of anxiety, depression and 
behavioural problems in young populations. For example, over the last 30 years, the 
proportion of 15-16 year olds with frequent symptoms of anxiety or depression has 
doubled (Nuffield Foundation, 2012). In terms of physical problems, obesity has shown 
an alarming rise in recent decades, not only in developed countries, but also in 
developing ones (OECD, 2011b). All of these illnesses and disorders have been 
attributed to our current model of development (Sachs, 2012). 
Fourth, climate change and global warming have become the hardest challenge 
for the 21
st
 century. As stated by the World Bank (2013): 
Its effects—higher temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, rising 
sea levels, and more frequent weather-related disasters—pose risks for 
agriculture, food, and water supplies. At stake are recent gains in the fight 
against poverty, hunger and disease, and the lives and livelihoods of 
billions of people in developing countries. Addressing climate change 
requires unprecedented global cooperation across borders.  
Overconsumption and overproduction have played a key role in this negative 
process, causing massive environmental damage, and reducing the potential well-being 
of future generations (Sachs, 2012).  
The above-mentioned four problems are putting at risk the future of all 
humankind and the Earth. Fortunately, there is a growing consensus on the need and 
urgency for a new model of development which will help to protect the future of our 
natural environment, as well as reduce poverty and inequalities, decrease mental and 
physical health problems and enable people to flourish (Diener, Lucas, Schimmack, & 
Helliwell, 2009; Seligman, 2011; Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitousi, 2010; United Nations, 2011).  
In fact, as stated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, “The old model 
is broken. We need to create a new one. … It is time to recognize that human capital 
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and natural capital are every bit as important as financial capital” (Ki-moon, 2012). 
Further, we need to change our lifestyles in order to move toward a model of 
Sustainable Development (Sachs, 2012).  
Sustainable development is closely linked to the search for happiness (Layard, 
2011; Layard, Clark, & Senik, 2012; Sachs, 2012; United Nations, 2011). In fact, there 
has been a growing consensus that happiness may be part of the solution for the current 
four dilemmas the world is facing. The link between happiness and sustainable 
development was demonstrated in a remarkable recent review (Diener & Tay, 2012). 
Through an extensive review of correlational, longitudinal and experimental studies into 
the link between subjective well-being – the most universally accepted standard 
framework for assessing happiness (Diener, 1984, 1994) – and several individual and 
societal outcomes, the authors concluded that higher levels of happiness lead 
individuals to become healthier, to live longer, to follow good health practices and to 
function better. In addition, higher of levels of subjective well-being (SWB) would also 
lead people to become more sociable, friendlier, and more cooperative. Moreover, 
people scoring higher in SWB would have better social relationships, higher levels of 
trust and community involvement, and greater willingness to support people in need. 
Therefore, happier people are more likely to fight harder against poverty and 
inequalities, to have better physical and mental health and to protect their communities. 
In addition, individuals higher in SWB tend to report higher environmentally  
responsible behaviour, which shows that happiness and sustainability may actually be 
complementary (Brown & Kasser, 2005). 
Several well-known institutions have supported these claims (OECD, 2013; 
Stiglitz et al., 2010; United Nations, 2011). For example, a recent UN General 
Assembly Resolution (United Nations, 2011) adopted by consensus, and co-sponsored 
by 68 countries, invited to the governments “to pursue the elaboration of additional 
measures that better capture the importance of the pursuit of happiness and well-being 
in development with a view to guiding their public policies” (p.2). Moreover, the 
Stiglitz Commission, led by two Nobel Laureates in Economics, recommended that the 
statistical offices of the world should “incorporate questions to capture people’s life 
evaluations, hedonic experiences and priorities in their own surveys” (Stiglitz et al., 
2010, p. 18) in order to advise countries and policy makers.  
The Rationale for the Present Thesis 
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As shown above, the world is facing four serious dilemmas that are putting at 
risk the future of humankind and the natural environment. Therefore, we urgently need 
to learn how to tackle these challenges. Fortunately, research has shown that people’s 
happiness may be part of the solution (Diener & Tay, 2012). Therefore, a better 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms that lead people to be happier and to be 
more environmentally friendly is a key issue for research and for public policies. This is 
the main reason why I decided to start the research that is reported in this thesis. 
There are several factors that influence happiness and well-being. Among them, 
values and life goals play a key role (Layard, 2011; Layard et al., 2012). For example, 
Self-determination Theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000) states that the relative 
importance attached to intrinsic (versus extrinsic) values and life goals may play a key 
role. Intrinsic values (e.g., self-development, community involvement, relatedness) are 
those values that are pursued because they are intrinsically motivating. In contrast, 
extrinsic values (e.g., money, fame, image) are those values that are pursued because of 
external rewards. 
A substantive body of research has shown that, other things being equal, a 
greater relative pursuit of extrinsic values  is associated with lower level of happiness 
and SWB, as well as with higher amount of mental and physical health problems 
(Dittmar 2008; Dittmar, Bond, Kasser, & Hurst, in press; Kasser & Kanner, 2004).  In 
contrast, a higher relative importance attached to intrinsic values may produce the 
opposite effect: increase happiness and well-being and protect people’s mental health. 
Moreover, it has been shown that a higher pursuit of intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life 
goals and values is associated with higher levels of environmentally responsible 
behaviour (Brown & Kasser, 2005).  These are the main reasons why I decided to 
explore in detail the effects of materialistic and extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals on 
personal well-being, as well as on environmental behaviour. A better understanding of 
these processes may have at least two positive effects: First, it would be beneficial to 
increase the scientific knowledge in this area and fill several research gaps still present 
in the field. Second, this new knowledge may be used by governments and societies to 
design and implement new public policies aiming to move towards a sustainable 
development model.  
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Materialism 
Recent research has shown an increase in the desire for money, financial success 
and material possessions during the last decades. For example, Generation X and 
Millennials (younger generations) tend to attach a higher relative importance to 
extrinsic (versus intrinsic) values and life goals than older generations such as Baby 
Boomers (Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012). Mass media and advertising have 
played a key role in this process, showing us every day that money, fame and image are 
the pathways to happiness and well-being, thus reinforcing the adoption of the 
materialistic values promoted by consumer culture (Dittmar, 2008; Kasser & Kanner, 
2004). 
Materialism has been always a matter of great interest for people and societies. 
However, the way that different scientific disciplines have conceptualised this construct 
tends to differ significantly.  
 
For example, the ancient world used to focus on seeing their negative 
consequences such as over consumption (Rudmin & Kilbourne, 1996). In fact, the 
Greek philosophers (especially Pythagoras) “required that students relinquish their 
personal possessions before entering his school” (Kilbourne, Grünhagen, & Foley, 
2005, p. 625). 
 
From a psychological perspective, past work on materialism has operationalized 
this construct in diverging ways, including personal attitudes and beliefs towards money 
(e.g., Tang, Kim, & Tang, 2002; Tang, Tang, & Luna-Arocas, 2005); measures of 
power values (e.g., Schwartz, 1992); and measures of personality traits such as envy, 
non-generosity and possessiveness linked to material possessions (e.g. Belk, 1985). 
However, as noted in a recent meta-analysis (Dittmar et al., in press), the most common 
approaches in recent research have focused on personally internalized materialist values 
and beliefs (Banerjee & Dittmar, 2008; Richins & Dawson, 1992), and extrinsic (versus 
intrinsic) life goals and aspirations (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996). These approaches 
understand materialism as “individual differences in people’s long-term endorsement of 
values, goals, and beliefs that center on the importance of acquiring money and 
possessions that convey status” (Dittmar et al. in press, p. 5). Therefore, from these 
perspectives, materialism would reside at the individual level. 
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From a philosophical approach, materialism is “a theoretical system where 
matter is seen as the only reality in the world, as opposed to spiritualism and idealism” 
(Popkin & Stroll, 1993, cited in Dittmar, 2008, p.74). 
 
From a socio-political perspective, materialistic (or post-materialistic) values are 
understood as the goals that a society may pursue. For example, Inglehart’s work 
(Inglehart, 2000, 2008; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) has explored societal values asking 
people what they think should be the aims of their nation (Kasser, 2002). Such approach 
assesses the extent to which citizens in a nation care about certain sets of aims, 
reflecting a particular nation’s orientation towards particular values.  
 
From a sociological perspective, research argues that values (including 
materialistic values) may reside not only at the individual level, but also at the societal 
level. That is because “the social environment created by a temporal era shapes 
individuals similarly to the way geographical areas do” (Twenge & Kasser, 2013, p. 
884). In fact, our social environment may influence individuals through “the dominant 
social ideologies, family structures, economic situations, media, and political and 
business messages and institutions during the time period in which they live” (Twenge 
& Kasser, 2013, p. 884). Therefore, individual values are definitely influenced by 
cultural changes over time (Twenge & Kasser, 2013). Further, materialistic aspirations 
and goals are a socially constructed phenomenon and its meanings are shared within a 
society/nation (Dittmar, 2008). Therefore, materialistic values reflect an intimate 
relationship with consumer goods and aspirations, expressed by both individuals and 
society (Dittmar, 2008). What happens in cultures, communities and nations – 
socialising units – clearly influence the values we adopt (Kasser, 2002). Following this 
reasoning, for some scholars materialism would be the negative consequence of 
industrialism (Kassiola, 1990, Tawney, 1920), the reason why they have characterised it 
as the “dark side” of consumption (Kilbourne, Grünhagen, & Foley, 2005).  
 
What the later paragraphs suggest is that materialism is a complex phenomenon 
that may be understood from multiple perspectives (Kilbourne, Grünhagen, & Foley, 
2005).  
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In my research, following Dittmar et al. (in press), I decided to conceptualise 
materialism from a psychological approach, measuring it at the individual level — as is 
presupposed by measuring it at the level of individual differences. I used the current two 
main approaches to define and measure materialism, the Materialistic Values 
Orientation informed by consumer psychology (Richins & Dawson, 1992) and the 
Aspirations Index informed by SDT (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996). Therefore,  I 
understand—and measure—materialism in terms of a personal internalized value 
system that prioritizes striving for expensive consumer goods, wealth, image, and 
fame—where wealth is seen as a desirable end in itself, rather than a means to security 
or survival. Therefore, my focus is on personal, internalized values (i.e. a dimension of 
individual-level differences) and not on society-level differences in normative beliefs 
about the goals that a society should pursue (i.e. a dimension of society-level 
differences). It is important to notice that despite that fact that the scales I used in my 
research do not directly measure materialism at a societal level, the advantage of my 
approach is that my scales fully capture the influence of the consumer culture, the 
shared meaning of materialism, and the differences in the extent to which individuals 
endorse materialistic values in a nation or in a society (Dittmar, 2008).  
Materialistic values. The Materialistic Values Orientation conceptualizes 
materialism as a “set of centrally held beliefs about the importance of possessions in 
one’s life” (Richins & Dawson, 1992, p. 308). This approach measures materialism 
through the Materialistic Values Scale (Richins & Dawson, 1992) which is the most 
widely used materialism instrument in consumer research (Dittmar, 2008). Materialism 
is conceptualized in terms of three key components: acquisition centrality, success and 
happiness. According to this perspective, the more people value material rewards as a 
central life goal and as a pathway for success, happiness and identity, the more 
materialistic they are (Richins & Dawson, 1992)
1
.  
                                                 
1
 A possible limitation of the MVS is that the items tend to ask if people would be better off with 
more money or possessions. This may create bias in the responses of poor and less affluent people. If less 
affluent people do not have enough money and material resources for living the life they want, this may 
lead them to agree with the scale items. 
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Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals. The Aspirations Index was developed by 
Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) and is the most influential approach within mainstream 
personality and social psychology to measure materialism (Dittmar, 2008). Following 
SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000), the Aspiration Index assesses the relative importance that a 
person gives to extrinsic life goals (fame, image and wealth) versus intrinsic ones (self-
acceptance, affiliation, community involvement and health). According to this 
perspective, the higher people rate the relative importance of extrinsic life goals, 
compared to intrinsic life goals, the more materialistic they are.  
In my research I decided to use the two most validated and accepted measures of 
materialism in the field, the AI and the MVS. Both measures are absolute and relative 
measures for assessing materialistic values. In their meta-analysis, Dittmar et al. (in 
press) discussed extensively how measuring materialism through an absolute measure 
(e.g. ratings of the importance of money) or a relative measure (e.g. assessing how 
important materialistic goals are in comparison to a variety of other types of goals, such 
as personal relationships, community involvement, or spirituality) may lead to different 
results. They consistently found that absolute measures focused on the acquisition of 
money and possessions alone may not capture the full meaning of materialism. In 
contrast, they showed that relative goal measures were more strongly related to well-
being. Based on these findings, Dittmar et al. (in press) strongly recommended that 
researchers in the field should employ not only absolute measures (such as the MVS), 
but also relative measures (such as the AI) in order to capture the full meaning of the 
construct. That is the main reason why I employed the two scales in my thesis. 
Well-being 
The study of well-being has been characterized by two traditions: the hedonic 
approach and the eudaimonic one (Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002).  
To date, hedonic well-being theories have formed the more extensively studied 
approach (Gallagher, Lopez, & Preacher, 2009). The hedonic view defines well-being in 
terms of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain (Ryan & Deci, 2001). SWB is the most 
studied construct of hedonic well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001) and reflects what would 
normally be called “happiness” in normal daily life (Diener & Tay, 2012). SWB “refers 
to people’s sense of wellness in their lives, in both thoughts and feelings” (Diener & 
Tay, 2012, p.1) and includes satisfaction with life as well as higher positive affect and 
lower negative affect (Diener, 1984, 1994). 
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However, according the eudaimonic point of view, well-being does not consist 
only of happiness and pleasure, or the absence of pain. True well-being should reflect 
the actualization of human potentials, meaning and self-realization (Ryan & Deci, 2001). 
Following this reasoning, the eudaimonic approach defines well-being in terms of being 
humanly fully functioning (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Seligman, 2011). 
Although the two above-mentioned traditions of well-being research have 
evolved separately, increasing attention is being given to how both approaches are 
connected (Keyes et al., 2002). However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no 
consensus in the literature regarding the causal direction of the link between hedonic 
and eudaimonic well-being. Therefore, longitudinal designs are needed (Keyes et al., 
2002) in order to clarify the causal relationships between the two constructs and thus 
illuminate the processes underlying the results of numerous previous correlational 
studies (Gallagher et al., 2009). 
The Link between Materialism and Well-being 
Although our current consumer culture tells us every day that money, fame and 
image are the pathways to happiness and well-being (Kasser & Kanner, 2004), several 
studies have reported a negative link between these two constructs (Kasser, 2002). For 
example, materialism has been associated with lower positive well-being, indexed as 
less life satisfaction (e.g., Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002; Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & 
Duriez, 2008), less self-actualization (e.g., Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996), less positive 
affect (e.g., Christopher & Schlenker, 2004), less vitality (e.g., Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002), 
and less happiness (e.g., Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002). Moreover, materialism has 
also been found to be positively related to ill-being, indexed by higher negative affect 
(e.g., Christopher, Kuo, Abraham, Noel, & Linz, 2004), higher alcohol and substance 
use (e.g., Williams, Cox, Hedberg, & Deci, 2000), higher physical symptoms (e.g., 
Kasser & Ryan, 1996), higher depressive symptoms (e.g., Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 
2006), and higher unhappiness (e.g., Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002). Notably, this negative 
link between materialism and well-being has been found not only in developed and 
industrialized countries characterized by a long-established mass consumer society, but 
also in developing societies (Dittmar et al., in press).  
The main theoretical explanation for the negative link between materialism and 
well-being has been proposed by SDT. According to SDT, a higher pursuit on extrinsic 
(versus intrinsic) life goals will take time and energy away from fulfilling basic 
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psychological needs, which in turn may lead people to experience lower well-being 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kasser, 2002). This hypothesized mediational role has been tested 
in several correlational studies and explored in detail in a recent meta-analysis (Dittmar 
et al., in press)
2
. 
The possible role of basic psychological needs 
Psychological need satisfaction and well-being. According to SDT, human 
beings have three basic psychological needs – autonomy, competence and relatedness – 
which function as psychological nutrients and enhance well-being. Autonomy refers to 
the feeling that our behaviour is volitional and meaningful; competence refers to feeling 
effective and efficient in our behaviour; and relatedness refers to feeling that we are 
connected through meaningful and intimate relationships to others who are important to 
us (Reinboth & Duda, 1996; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006).  
SDT argues that, just as plants need essential nutrients – such as water and 
minerals – for survival and healthy growth, so people need psychological nutrients (Reis, 
Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000). According to SDT, experiences of autonomy, 
competence and relatedness would be these key nutrients.  
Consistent with SDT, these three needs have been shown to have unique 
additive effects on personal well-being. These results have been found by using 
different research designs (Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006). For example, people tend to 
report more positive affect, less negative affect, and more vitality on days when these 
                                                 
2
 It is important to mention that several studies suggest that the link between materialism and 
well-being is not restricted to wealthy samples. For example, in a sample of very poor Chinese rural-to-
urban migrant workers, Chen, Van Assche, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, and Beyers (2013) showed that even 
the attainment of materialistic strivings related negatively to well-being. Yet, in this same poor sample, 
the experience of financial security, which was argued to stand in the service of basic survival, related 
positively to well-being. In addition, in a recent meta-analysis across 216 independent samples, Dittmar et 
al. (in press) found that, although the association between materialism and personal well-being was 
stronger in wealthier nations, it was not moderated by personal income. I should reiterate that my 
materialism measures tap into a worldview that material possessions represent a pathway to self-worth, 
success, and life satisfaction, instead of seeing materialism as a relatively broad cluster of “survival 
values” some of which may be important for financial security. Thus, the exact meaning attached to 
financial aspirations may determine their impact on subsequent well-being.  
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needs are fulfilled (Reis et al., 2000; Ryan, Bernstein, & Brown, 2010; Sheldon, Ryan, 
& Reis, 1996; Verstuyf, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, Boone, & Mouratidis, 2013), as well 
as experiencing events that satisfy these needs as more satisfying (Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, 
& Kasser, 2001; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006). These results have been obtained in 
different domains such in sport contexts (e.g., Gagné, Ryan, & Bargmann, 2003; 
Reinboth & Duda, 2006), in law schools (Sheldon & Krieguer, 2007), in the health 
domain (Williams, McGregor, Zeldman, Freedman, & Deci, 2004), in the workplace 
(Ryan et al., 2010; Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste, De Witte, Soenens, & Lens, 2010), 
and in the education field (e.g., Vlachopoulos, Katartzi, & Kontou, 2011), as well across 
the life span (Kasser & Ryan, 1999; Niemiec, Lynch, Vansteenkiste, Bernstein, Deci, & 
Ryan, 2006). Notably, the link between need satisfaction and well-being has been found 
in several different cultures (e.g., Chirkov, Ryan, & Willness, 2005; Deci, Ryan, Gagné, 
Leone, Usunov, & Kornazheva, 2001; Sheldon et al., 2001; Taylor & Lonsdale, 2010).  
Despite the substantial amount of research showing the link between need 
satisfaction and well-being, previous studies still present the following research gaps: 
First, the great majority of previous studies have employed correlational designs, which 
do not allow inferences about cause-effect relations. Only a few studies have tried to 
tackle this important problem through longitudinal designs, but most of these have still 
not used designs that are sensitive to establishing causal precedence. Second, almost all 
previous longitudinal studies used students and other young people in the Western 
world. To the best of my knowledge, there are no previous longitudinal studies 
exploring the link between need satisfaction and well-being in non-Western countries. 
Third, most of the studies have assessed only a few measures of well-being, and to the 
best of my knowledge, there are no comprehensive models exploring longitudinally 
how both hedonic and eudaimonic well-being are related. Fourth, and finally, according 
to Sheldon and Hilpert (2012), an appropriate need satisfaction scale needs to be 
balanced in terms of the number of questions for each of the three needs, as well as 
requiring the inclusion of a similar number of satisfaction and frustration items; yet in 
most of the previous studies, need-satisfaction has been measured in a variety of 
different ways and contexts without paying attention to the methodological 
shortcomings.  
The additional role played by need frustration. Over the last few years, some 
scholars have argued that people’s tendencies towards both well-being and ill-being 
may not be explained by basic psychological need satisfaction alone. Importantly, 
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research has shown that need satisfaction and need frustration represent distinct factors 
(Cordeiro, Paixão, Lenes, & Silva, 2013; Sheldon, 2011; Sheldon, Abad, & Hinsch, 
2011; Sheldon & Gunz, 2009; Sheldon & Hilpert, 2012). Therefore, need frustration 
could also play a key role in this process, because the lack of need fulfilment may differ 
from need frustration (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). Need frustration implies that the 
satisfaction of needs is blocked due to an active obstruction of the psychological needs. 
Therefore, it seems that whereas need satisfaction may predict positive well-being, it 
does not always predict negative well-being.  
Hence, increasing empirical attention has been given recently to exploring the 
additional role that need frustration may play (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). For 
example, Sheldon and Gunz (2009) explored need satisfaction and need frustration in 
relation to need-relevant motivations. The authors found that the frustration of the 
psychological needs is associated with a higher desire to reduce need frustration, but 
that need satisfaction is not related to the desire to satisfy the needs . Sheldon et al. 
(2011) studied the association between the use of Facebook, and the satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction of the basic psychological needs. It was found  that more frequent 
Facebook usage correlated with more relatedness satisfaction and with more relatedness 
frustration. Sheldon (2011) explored the role of need satisfaction and need frustration on 
the behavioural-motive and experiential-reward aspects of needs. The authors found that 
need satisfaction and need frustration tap into two different constructs and correspond to 
the separable behavioural-motive and experiential-reward aspects of needs. 
Bartholomew, Ntoumanis, Ryan, & Thogersen-Ntoumani (2011) found that need 
satisfaction related especially to positive outcomes whereas need frustration related to 
maladaptive ones. Stebbings, Taylor, Spray, & Ntoumanis (2012) replicated these 
findings among sports coaches. Employing an objective marker of psychobiological 
functioning, Bartholomew, Ntoumanis, Ryan, Bosch, & Thøgersen-Ntoumani, (2011) 
found that need frustration (but not need satisfaction) was related to higher levels of 
immunological problems. Verstuyf, Vansteenkiste, and Soenens (2012) showed that 
need frustration could account for the link between dieting to achieve physical 
attractiveness and bulimic symptoms. Finally, Verstuyf et al. (2013) showed that the 
daily fluctuation in psychological need frustration but not in need satisfaction was 
associated with daily variation in negative well-being (assessed in terms of bulimic 
symptoms), but not with positive outcomes.  
Thus, this still small but growing body of literature seems to show that need 
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satisfaction would be associated with more positive outcomes and need frustration with 
more negative outcomes (Verstuyf et al., 2013). However, to the best of my knowledge, 
there are no longitudinal studies exploring the unique and differential roles played by 
both need satisfaction and need frustration in positive and negative well-being. 
Can Psychological Needs Explain the Link between Materialism and Well-Being?  
As mentioned previously, one of the most prominent theoretical explanations for 
the negative link between materialism and well-being has been developed by SDT 
through the hypothesized mediation of the three basic psychological needs. For example, 
Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) distinguished between intrinsic aspirations (e.g., 
affiliation, personal growth, community contribution and health) and extrinsic 
aspirations (e.g., wealth, fame, and image), proposing that a higher relative pursuit of 
intrinsic goals helps to fulfill the three intrinsic needs and thus increases individuals’ 
well-being, whereas a higher relative pursuit of external goals undermines people’s 
happiness and well-being. Furthermore, seeking relatively more extrinsic than intrinsic 
rewards takes time and energy away from fulfilling basic needs, leading to lower 
personal well-being (Dittmar, 2008). Thus, whereas intrinsic goal pursuit may relate to 
greater opportunities for need satisfaction, the pursuit of extrinsic goals may interfere 
with need satisfaction and even elicit experiences of need frustration.    
A few previous studies have explored the potential mediating role of basic 
psychological need satisfaction in the link between intrinsic (versus extrinsic) goals and 
well-being, but only in specific life domains such as work, eating regulation, and sports 
(Sebire, Standage, & Vansteenkiste, 2009). Nonetheless, there are still four important 
gaps in the research in this field. First, previous studies on materialism, need 
satisfaction and well-being have failed to take the potential mediational role of need 
frustration explicitly into account. Second, all the studies presented above were 
grounded in the SDT tradition, and thus were limited by relying on intrinsic-extrinsic 
goal measures. Further on this point, it would be important to explore whether need 
satisfaction and need frustration can also account for the link between scores on the 
Materialistic Values Scale and well-being. Third, most of the studies have been focused 
on specific contexts (e.g., work, sports, eating behaviour). Indeed, it remains to be 
demonstrated whether need satisfaction and need frustration can account for the 
materialism – well-being association in more general terms. Fourth, there is a lack of 
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research into these constructs and processes in South American countries (Dittmar et al., 
in press). 
Alternative Explanations of the Link between Materialism and Well-being 
Although higher materialism may produce lower well-being due to the 
mediating role of need satisfaction and need frustration (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kasser & 
Ryan, 1993, 1996), it is also possible that unhappy people may seek extrinsic rewards in 
order to improve and overcome their problems (Dittmar, 2008). For example, Terror 
Management Theory states that, when people are reminded of their own mortality, they 
often seek out mechanisms for enhancing their self-esteem (Solomon, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 1991). As a result of this threat, a common strategy for self-protection 
may be to endorse self-enhancing, materialistic values (Crompton & Kasser, 2009). 
Following these arguments, Sheldon & Kasser (2008) have found that psychological 
threats do increase the search for extrinsic life goals, which in turn negatively affect 
people’s well-being. In other words, when people’s well-being is diminished, a strategy 
could be to engage in a materialistic value orientation.  
Understanding Environmental Behaviour 
In recent years, social psychologists have tried to understand the determinants of 
environmental behaviour (Bamberg & Möser, 2007). Among the most important factors, 
research has consistently shown that a pro-environmental worldview is a good predictor 
(Gatersleben, Murtagh, & Abrahamse, 2012; Gatersleben, White, Abrahamse, Jackson, 
& Uzzell, 2010; Steg & Vlek, 2009).  These findings have been confirmed through 
meta-analyses (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1987) and 
longitudinal research (Kaiser, Wölfing, & Fuhrer, 1999).  
Recently, it has been also stated that social identification processes may play a 
key role in people’s environmental behaviour. Social identity refers to the groups to 
which a person feels she/he belongs to. It includes, for example, membership of 
particular groups based on gender, race, nationality, profession or religion (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1986). The idea of social identification has been expanded to consider people’s 
sense of belonging to the non-human environment (Crompton & Kasser, 2009).  As a 
result, the concept of environmental identification – an example of an extended self – 
has emerged, reflecting a person’s sense of connection to nature that affects the ways in 
which he/she acts and perceives the world (Clayton, 2003).  
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Researchers have shown that the ways in which people perceive the natural 
world (Crompton & Kasser, 2009) may relate to environmental behavior (Gatersleben, 
Murtagh, et al., 2012; Nigbur, Lyons, & Uzzell, 2010; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). For 
example, for people with a high degree of inclusion of the environment in their self, 
nature has inherent value because it is interconnected with their identities (Schultz, 
2001). This kind of people tends to behave more environmentally friendly. Research has 
supported these claims, showing that environmental identification may be positively 
correlated with different types of pro-environmental behaviour, such as waste, transport 
and buying behaviours (Gatersleben, Murtagh, et al., 2012) helping people to develop a 
close relationship with the environment (Schultz, 2000).  
It is important to notice that there is a growing interest in the study of a 
“connection to, engagement with, or identification with the natural environment” due its 
beneficial impact upon the natural environment (Sparks, Hinds, Curnock, & Pavey, 
2014, p. 167). However, as a consequence of this growing interest in the field – which 
has produced several important research findings – psychology and sociology has an 
enormous variety of measures assessing connection, engagement and identity (see 
Sparks et al. 2014 for a revision).  
For example, Mayer and Frantz (2004) assessed connectedness to nature and 
developed The Connectedness to Nature Scale as a measure of an “affective, 
experiential relationship to the natural world” (Mayer & Frantz, 2004, p. 504). Nisbet, 
Zelenski and Murphy (2009) assessed nature relatedness and created the Nature 
Relatedness Scale. Schultz (2002) developed the Inclusion of Nature in Self.  Stets and 
Biga (2003) assessed environment identification, but state that this measure should 
include a sense of connection as part of it. Finally, Hinds and Sparks (2008) used an 
environmental identity scale to assess some kind of identification with the natural 
environment. 
These different conceptualisations and measures (among others) have led to 
some degree of confusion when researchers have tried to explore environmental 
identification. Social psychology has tried to solve these problems and ambiguities, but 
it has not always been successful. For example, there is some evidence showing that 
environment-related identities are significantly associated with affective connections to 
the natural environment (Hinds & Sparks, 2008). Further, it is possible to expect the 
inclusion of nature within people’s cognitive representations of the self (Hinds & Sparks, 
2009). That is because people will identify with what they care about (Hinds & Sparks, 
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2009). Thus, an important question arises: to what extent should a measure of 
environmental identification include both emotional and cognitive dimensions? There is 
no final answer in the field. For instance, The Connectedness to Nature Scale is a 
measure of affective and experiential measure whereas the Inclusion of Nature in Self 
(Schultz, 2002) is a more cognitive construct (Sparks et al., 2014).  
Another ambiguity in terms of the environmental identification scales relates to 
what extent the measures should reflect either strong social associations with nature 
(such as actively participating with environmental groups and communities) or higher 
individual emotional connections with the natural environment, but with minimal social 
engagement (Hinds & Sparks, 2008). 
Therefore, because there is a variety of means by which identification with the 
natural environment may be conceptualised and measured, the approach that a 
particular study adopts is a key issue for understanding the research findings. In my 
thesis, I decided to use Hinds and Sparks’ (2008) scale which reflects a more personal 
than social form of identification with the natural environmental. 
Importantly, recent research has suggested that values and life goals might also 
play an important role in environmental behaviour, because they reflect what people 
think it is desirable and important in their lives (Schwartz, 1992, 2006). Values and life 
goals are high order cognitions that influence our attitudes, as well as high order 
motivations that drive our behaviours (Crompton & Kasser, 2009). 
Schwartz’s (1992, 2006) circumplex model of values may help to understand the 
relationship between materialistic values, and life goals and environmental behaviour. 
The author found that human values can be grouped into 10 motivational domains and 
two dimensions.  The 10 types of values (domains), which consistently emerged across 
nations and express different motivational goals were: benevolence, universalism, self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity and 
tradition. The two dimensions which emerged cross-culturally were self-enhancement 
(e.g., power) versus self-transcendence (e.g., universalism) and openness to change (e.g., 
tradition) versus conservatism. self-enhancement versus self-transcendence  and 
conservation versus openness to change (e.g., stimulation).  
Among the later dimension, a set of self-enhancing, materialistic values (e.g., 
power and achievement), emerged across cultures as opposed to a set of self-
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transcendent values (e.g. universalism and benevolence). It was also found that these 
different types of values are dynamically related. Strongly pursuing self-enhancing, 
materialistic values tends to conflict with universalism and benevolence values and vice 
versa. For example, the values unity with nature, protecting the environment and a 
world of beauty emerged consistently in the universalism region, which was opposed to 
the power and achievement region.  
Drawing on Schwartz’s classification of human values (1992), Stern & Dietz 
(1994) developed a value-basis theory to study the relationship between values and 
environmental concern, attitudes and behaviour. The authors suggested that three values 
underlie environmental concern: egoism, altruism and biospherism (Gatersleben, 
Murtagh,  & Abrahamse, 2012). Thus, people would value the environment because of 
three motives: an egoistic concern (focus on the individual); a social-altruistic concern 
(concern for all people); and a biospheric concern (awareness for all living species).  
Several papers have used Stern & Dietz’s classification (1994). For example, 
Schultz (2001) found in a sample of US students, that self-enhancement, materialistic 
values were positively associated with egoistic concerns and negatively with altruistic 
and biospheric concerns. Self-transcendent values showed the opposite pattern. 
Moreover, De Groot and Steg (2008) measured these three value orientations through a 
short scale created for the authors (Gatersleben, Murtagh,  & Abrahamse, 2012).The 
authors found that, for example, biospherism and altruism are positively related to 
environmental concern and behaviour (De Groot and Steg, 2008; Gatersleben, White, 
Abrahamse, Jackson, & Uzzell, 2009). 
In cross cultural research, drawing on Schwartz higher order value structures, 
Schultz et al. (2005) found a significant and negative association between biospheric 
concerns and self-enhancement, materialistic values among university students. Egoistic 
concern showed the opposite associations. 
Additional kinds of values relevant to pro-environmental behaviour are 
materialistic values (Gatersleben, Murtagh, & Abrahamse, 2012). Research has found 
negative associations between these constructs (e.g. Brown & Kasser, 2005; 
Gatersleben et al., 2010). For example, different studies have found that pro-
environmental behaviour is positively associated with self-transcendent values (e.g., De 
Groot and Steg 2008) whereas materialism is positively related to self-enhancement 
(e.g., Richins 2004). Thus, it seems that pro-environmental behaviour is motivated by 
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concern for others (and the natural world), rather than for selfish concern (Gatersleben, 
Jackson, Meadows, Soto, & Yan, 2012). 
Following Schwartz (1992), the hypothesis that materialism and pro-
environmental behaviour are opposites is based on the assumption that both are often 
inversely related to the same values. In support of this claim, a few studies have shown 
that materialism is positively related to self-enhancement values whereas pro-
environmental behaviour is related to self-transcendence values (Stern and Dietz, 1994; 
Schultz and Zelezny, 1999). Moreover, Richins (2004) found positive associations 
between materialism and self-enhancement values such as power and achievement, and 
negative associations between materialism and self-transcendence values such as 
universalism and benevolence (Gatersleben, White, Abrahamse, Jackson, & Uzzell, 
2010). Following these ideas, De Groot and Steg (2008) found that egoism is negatively 
related to pro-environmental behaviour whereas the opposite happens regarding 
biospherism (Gatersleben, White, Abrahamse, Jackson, & Uzzell, 2010).  
To sum up, research has shown that values are associated with environmental 
behaviour. However, the former approaches present two important limitations. First, the 
main explanations about the negative associations between materialistic values and 
environmental behaviour are often based on either Schwartz’s (1992) work on general 
values (Gatersleben, White, Abrahamse, Jackson, & Uzzell, 2010) or on Stern and 
Dietz’s (1994) underlying dimensions of environmental concern. However, Schwartz 
(1992) and Stern and Dietz (1994) did not measure materialism directly, because they 
assessed general values instead of more specific values. Researchers have tended to 
classify power and achievement as “materialistic values”, but they are not the same. 
Second, Schwartz (1992) and Stern and Dietz’s (1994) measures were not designed to 
capture the influences of our current consumer culture on the environment, which is an 
important element to study. Further, little research has been carried out on materialism 
literature using either the MVS or the AI scales from a social psychological approach, 
and from directly measuring the construct. Therefore, measuring materialistic values at 
the individual level from these theoretical approaches – which fully captures the 
influence of consumer culture – will help us to a better understanding of the underlying 
mechanism behind environmental behaviour. My research aims to tackle these research 
gaps. 
Therefore, following Schwartz’s (1992, 2006) ideas, it seems likely that people 
who strongly endorse self-enhancing, materialistic values and life goals may tend to 
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present lower pro-environmental worldviews and more ecologically unfriendly 
behaviour towards non-human nature. However, just some few studies have supported 
these claims form the materialism perspective. For instance, Richins & Dawson (1992) 
found that more materialistic people tend to be less likely to buy used goods, to use 
bicycles instead of cars, or to recycle or help ecological organizations. Gatersleben, 
White, Abrahamse, Jackson, & Uzzell (2009) found that people scoring higher in 
materialism attached less importance to energy-conserving processes, and showed less 
willingness to change a diverse range of ecologically irresponsible behaviours. Brown 
& Kasser (2005) found that ecologically responsible behaviour was positively 
associated with an intrinsic (versus extrinsic) value orientation. Sheldon & McGregor 
(2000) found that more extrinsically oriented individuals tend to consume limited 
ecological resources at more unsustainable rates. Banerjee & McKeage (1994) found 
that environmentally-friendly consumption was negatively related to materialism.  
Therefore, it seems that people who attach a higher importance to intrinsic 
values and life goals may tend to engage in less damaging environmental behaviour 
(Banerjee & McKeage, 2004; Brown & Kasser, 2005; Richins & Dawson, 1992; 
Sheldon & McGregor, 2000). This may be because people focused on intrinsic goals 
(which are intrinsically rewarding according to SDT), do not need a high amount of 
external rewards (such as high levels of consumption), to fulfill their physical and 
psychological needs (Brown & Kasser, 2005; Hurst, Dittmar, Bond, & Kasser, in press).  
Previous findings have been confirmed in a recent meta-analysis (Hurst et al., in 
press). However, there are still three important additional limitations in the field. First, 
the existing evidence has been limited to a relatively small number of cross-sectional 
studies, and it remains unclear to what extent intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals are 
causally implicated in environmentally responsible behaviour. Therefore, there is an 
urgent need for systematic longitudinal research to disentangle the causal relationship 
between people’s life goals and their everyday behaviour. Second, although research 
has suggested that environmental behaviour may be affected by life goals, 
environmental worldviews and environmental identification, these variables have never 
been studied together (Gatersleben, Murtagh, et al., 2012). Therefore, we know little 
about their combined impact on environmental behaviour, nor how these variable are 
related to each other. Crucially, it seems important to know whether life goals add 
variance to predictions of environmentally responsible behaviour, over and above the 
possible effects of these other predictors. Third, most of the research so far has been 
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conducted among students and other young people in Western nations. To date, there 
has still been very little research among adult samples, and, according to my knowledge, 
all published research studying this link has been conducted only in Western nations, 
which are a very small part of the world's population (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2010).  
Overview of the Research 
I have described how materialistic values and life goals are thought to be related 
to need satisfaction and need frustration, as well as to personal well-being and 
environmental behaviour. I decided to extend and empirically test some of the main 
theoretical ideas reviewed above, by means of a large-scale longitudinal on-line 
research project (see Appendix 1 for questionnaires) conducted over the last three years 
among adult participants in the UK and Chile. Selected results are presented here as 
three separate papers.  
I tested the main hypotheses both correlationally and longitudinally among 
samples of adult university graduates from two different cultures: one established mass 
consumer society (the UK) and one fast-growing new economy (Chile). The data were 
obtained from a three-wave longitudinal survey (T1 = 2010, T2 = 2011 and T3 = 2012). 
Among the British sample, 461 adults (48.12% of time 1; 59% female) ranging in age 
from 20 to 77 years (Mean = 45.14; SD = 14.06) completed all 3 waves. Nine-hundred 
and fifty eight UK participants completed Wave 1, 554 completed Wave 2, and 610 
completed Wave 3. Among the Chilean sample, seventy-six adults (29.6% of time 1; 47% 
female) ranging in age from 22 to 71 years (Mean = 36.87; SD = 10.21) completed all 3 
waves. Two hundred and fifty seven participants completed Wave 1, 115 completed 
Wave 2 and one 114 completed Wave 3. 
In Paper 1, I investigated the correlational associations between materialism, 
need satisfaction, need frustration and well-being at T1. Structural Equation Modelling 
analyses allowed me to complement previous findings into the link between materialism 
and well-being in the following ways. First, I found that a stronger materialistic value 
orientation was associated with lower levels of positive psychological well-being, as 
well as with higher levels of negative well-being. These findings replicated earlier ones 
and extended the results to Chile, a country which has never been studied before from 
this perspective. Second, I found that both need satisfaction and need frustration 
mediated the link between materialism and well-being. Moreover, need frustration 
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played an incremental explanatory role, above and beyond the role of need satisfaction. 
Therefore, these findings support recent claims stating that low need satisfaction may be 
different from need frustration (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). Third, I demonstrated 
that the negative link between materialism and well-being and the mediation of this link 
by need satisfaction and need frustration did not differ, in general, across the two 
national contexts, thus providing supportive evidence for the cross-cultural generality of 
these mechanisms proposed within the SDT perspective.  
The most prominent theoretical explanations for the negative link between 
materialism and well-being has been developed by SDT through the hypothesized 
mediation of the three basic psychological needs. However, most of previous studies on 
the link between need satisfaction and well-being have employed correlational designs, 
which do not allow inferences about cause-effect relations. Only a few studies have 
tried to tackle this important problem through longitudinal designs, but most of these 
have still not used designs that are sensitive to establishing causal precedence. 
Therefore, studying the correct direction of this link is a key issue for understanding the 
possible mediation role played by need satisfaction in the link between materialism and 
well-being. Paper 2 approach this issue and focused in more detail on one part of the 
broader structural model tested in Paper 1—namely the relationship between basic 
psychological needs and well-being. 
In Paper 2, I aimed to explore longitudinally the above-mentioned hypothesized 
link between need satisfaction and well-being, overcoming the above-mentioned 
limitations still present in the SDT field. Using data from all three time points, I 
extended previous research on the causal link between need satisfaction and well-being 
employing cross-lagged longitudinal models. Moreover, using a balanced need 
satisfaction/need frustration scale, I explored longitudinally the differential roles played 
by both need satisfaction and need frustration in predicting positive and negative well-
being. Paper 2 results showed that in both countries, total need satisfaction was a 
positive prospective predictor of well-being. Moreover, in the UK, higher well-being 
was a positive prospective predictor of total need satisfaction. When we split need 
satisfaction in its three needs, only relatedness reached statistical significance in the UK. 
In Chile, none of the three needs was an individually significant prospective predictor of 
well-being. We also found that need satisfaction was a significant prospective predictor 
of positive well-being in both countries, whereas need frustration was a significant 
prospective predictor of negative well-being in the UK. Finally, we found a bi-
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directional positive link between need satisfaction and subjective well-being. Our 
results point towards a better integration of research into hedonic and eudaimonic well-
being.  
In Paper 3, I explored whether intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals would 
predict environmentally responsible behaviour among graduate adults in the UK and 
Chile. I used both cross-sectional analyses of T1 data (Study 1) and longitudinal 
analyses of data from all three waves (Study 2), in order to provide evidence for the 
causal direction of the relationships observed. In Study 1, Structural Equation 
Modelling analyses showed that in both countries more extrinsically-oriented people 
tended to show lower levels of environmentally responsible behaviour. Importantly, 
these relationships were found while controlling for the effects of environmental 
worldviews and environmental identification. In Study 2, using cross-lagged models, I 
extended previous research by showing that a higher relative importance placed on 
external (versus intrinsic) rewards was a negative antecedent of environmentally 
responsible behaviour. Importantly, this predictive effect was found while controlling 
again for the effects of environmental worldviews and environmental identification. 
Similar results were found in both samples, thus suggesting that the negative 
environmental consequences of attaching a higher importance to material and external 
rewards are not limited to Western nations. 
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Abstract 
A growing body of evidence shows that materialistic values are linked to lower 
well-being. Self-Determination Theory offers an explanation through the low fulfilment 
of the basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. However, 
recent research suggests that frustration of these psychological needs may also play an 
additional role. Using Structural Equation Modelling in adult samples from an 
established mass consumer society (UK: N = 958) and a fast-developing new economy 
(Chile: N = 257), and employing more comprehensive measures to tap into a 
materialistic orientation than used in previous studies, we demonstrated that a 
materialistic value orientation related negatively to well-being and positively to ill-
being and that both psychological need satisfaction and psychological need frustration 
played an explanatory role herein. The model was found to be highly equivalent across 
both samples supporting the cross-cultural generality of the mechanisms central to Self-
Determination Theory.  
 
Introduction 
The endorsement of materialistic values in contemporary consumer cultures 
refers to the “the ownership and acquisition of material goods in achieving major life 
goals” (Richins, 2004, p. 210). Although the acquisition of more money and material 
goods is presented as a route to a successful and satisfying life, a growing body of 
research indicates that a materialistic value orientation associates negatively with well-
being (Dittmar, 2008; Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Kasser & Kanner, 2004). Materialistic 
values are known to be prevalent in developed and industrialized countries 
characterized by a long-established mass consumer society (e.g., UK, US). Yet, recent 
research has begun to document their prevalence in developing countries as well 
(Dittmar & Kapur, 2011). The current contribution aims to test the role of the 
satisfaction and frustration of the basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, 
and relatedness, as conceived within Self-Determination Theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 
2000), to account for the relationship between materialistic values and both well-being 
and ill-being among adults from two fairly different societal contexts: that is, an 
established mass consumer society (i.e., the UK) and a fast developing new economy 
(i.e., Chile). 
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Materialistic Values and Well-being 
Following initial work on materialism which conceptualized it as a triad of 
personality traits (i.e., envy, non-generosity, and possessiveness; Belk, 1985), 
contemporary research has focused on aspirations or values (Banerjee & Dittmar, 2008). 
There are two main approaches to define and measure materialistic values: the 
Materialistic Values Scale informed by consumer psychology (Richins & Dawson, 1992) 
and the Aspirations Index informed by SDT (Kasser & Ryan, 1993; Vansteenkiste, 
Soenens, & Duriez, 2008). The Materialistic Values Scale, widely used in consumer 
research, measures three key components: that is, acquisition centrality, success, and 
happiness. According to this perspective, the more people value material rewards as a 
central life goal, see them as a key route to achieve success and happiness, and use them 
to define their identities, the more materialistic they are (Richins & Dawson, 1992). The 
Aspirations Index (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996), which has been more influential within 
mainstream personality and social psychology, assesses the importance a person places 
on extrinsic life goals (e.g., fame, image, and wealth), compared to intrinsic life goals 
(e.g., self-acceptance, affiliation, community involvement, and health). According to 
this perspective, the higher people rate the importance of extrinsic goals in comparison 
to intrinsic goals, the more materialistic they are. Thus, this measure assesses the 
relative importance of a materialistic value orientation in a person’s overall value 
system, whereas the Materialistic Values Scale measures the endorsement of a 
materialistic value orientation as such (Dittmar, 2008).  
According to both perspectives, materialism is a value system at the heart of 
consumer culture, which places strong emphasis on the acquisition of money, fame, 
success and image, and which portrays a materialistic lifestyle as the ideal pathway to 
happiness and well-being (Kasser, 2002; Richins, 2004; Richins & Dawson, 1992). 
Recent research (Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012) indicates that younger 
generations (i.e., generation X and Y) have adopted more strongly this value orientation 
than older generations (i.e., Babyboomers), and the mass media has presumably played 
a crucial role herein. From early childhood, people receive messages about the value of 
pursuing money, fame and success, reinforcing the adoption of the ideals promoted by 
consumer culture (Dittmar, 2008). Although the pursuit of materialism is portrayed as 
promising, numerous studies have reported a negative link between materialism and 
well-being, as indexed by less life satisfaction (e.g., Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002, 
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Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & Duriez, 2008), less self-actualization (e.g., Kasser & Ryan, 
1993, 1996), less positive affect (e.g., Christopher, & Schlenker, 2004), less vitality 
(e.g., Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002), and less happiness (e.g., Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002). 
Apart from relating negatively to well-being, materialism has been found to relate 
positively to various indicators of ill-being, including negative affect (e.g., Christopher, 
Kuo, Abraham, Noel, & Linz, 2004), alcohol and substance use (e.g., Williams, Cox, 
Hedberg, & Deci, 2000), physical symptoms (e.g., Kasser & Ryan, 1996), depressive 
symptoms (e.g., Vansteenkiste Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006), and unhappiness 
(e.g., Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002). This pattern of correlates has been further confirmed in a 
recent meta-analysis (Dittmar et al., in press). Yet, it is striking that most of the included 
samples in the meta-analysis came from the developed world, leaving the question open 
whether the effects of materialism generalize to developing countries. 
 For this contribution, we collected data among adults in the UK and in Chile, 
which represents an interesting case to be studied. The UK and Chile vary in a number 
of respects (e.g., geography, economic wealth, and consumer culture penetration; 
United Nations Development Programme, 2010), providing an initial opportunity to test 
our hypothesized associations in a developing nation and to compare with an 
established mass consumer society (Grouzet et al., 2005). As such, we could examine 
whether the hypothesized correlates of materialism would generalize to Chile. This is a 
critical issue, as recent cross-national evidence (Gatersleben, Jackson, Meadows, Soto, 
& Yan, 2012; Schaefer, Hermans, & Parker, 2004) suggests that materialistic values 
may yield a different pattern of correlates across cultures. For instance, Gatersleben et al. 
(2012) studied to what extent materialism was associated with different environmental 
outcomes among 16-25 year olds in the UK, Spain and China. Despite the fact that the 
results were fairly similar in the UK and Spain, they were quite different for Chinese 
young adults. Such findings raise the question whether the adoption of materialistic 
values may yield the same results in the UK and Chile, for example in terms of 
maladjustments and non-optimal functioning. In fact, it could be argued that pursuit of 
materialistic ideals does not so much involve acquiring fame and prestige or boosting 
one’s ego in Chile, but stands more in the service of basic survival, thereby allowing 
one to sustain one’s family and daily living. Consistent with this argument, Grouzet et 
al. (2005) showed that the pursuit of financial success was somewhat more closely 
aligned with physical needs in developing compared to rich countries. Yet, there are, to 
the best of our knowledge, no cross-national studies on materialism available that 
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examine deeply whether materialism yields the same well-being correlates in 
developing and non-developing countries.   
 A second lacuna in the present materialism literature is that it is not well 
understood yet why materialism relates to ill-being. Therefore, grounded in SDT and 
more specifically in Goal-Content Theory, one of SDT’s five mini-theories (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Vansteenkiste, Niemiec, & Soenens, 2010), we 
examined whether the satisfaction and frustration of the psychological needs for 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness would intervene in this link.  
Psychological Need Satisfaction and Psychological Need Frustration 
Within SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000), it is maintained that human beings’ growth 
and well-being is fostered by the satisfaction of basic psychological needs for autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness.  Autonomy refers to the need to choose one’s own life 
direction and to experience a sense of psychological freedom in one’s behaviour; 
competence refers to the need to reach one’s goals and to effectively carry out one’s 
daily activities; relatedness refers to the need to develop intimate and close relationships 
with others and to feel part of a group. In line with this claim, previous studies have 
shown that the fulfilment of these psychological needs relates to well-being (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000; Vansteenkiste et al., 2010).  
More recently, increasing empirical attention (e.g., Bartholomew, Ntoumanis, 
Ryan, Bosch, & Thøgersen-Ntoumani, 2011) has been devoted to the topic of need 
frustration as the relation between need satisfaction and need frustration is said to be 
asymmetrical (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). That is, although the lack of need 
fulfilment does not necessarily entail the experience of need frustration, need frustration 
by definition implies that the fulfilment of the needs gets blocked. To illustrate, when an 
employee does not feel very connected to his colleagues, this does not imply he feels 
excluded by them. Yet, when he is excluded from a social event or meeting, his 
psychological needs get frustrated. Thus, different from low need fulfilment, need 
frustration involves the more active obstruction of the psychological needs. Whereas 
need satisfaction would especially be critical for growth to take place, need frustration 
would awaken our vulnerabilities and relate to maladjustment (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 
2013).  Past research has shown that need satisfaction and need frustration represent 
distinct factors (e.g., Sheldon & Gunz, 2009).  Further, in line with this distinction, 
Bartholomew et al. (2011) showed that need satisfaction related especially to positive 
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outcomes (i.e., vitality, positive affect), whereas need frustration related to maladaptive 
outcomes (i.e., burnout, disordered eating). Next, Verstuyf, Vansteenkiste, and Soenens 
(2012) showed that the daily fluctuation in psychological need frustration (and not need 
satisfaction) related to daily variation in bulimic symptoms.  
These psychological needs are thought to intervene in the materialism – well-
being association. Indeed, Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) argued that the pursuit of 
intrinsic, relative to more extrinsic and materialistic, goals would help to fulfil the three 
basic needs, thereby promoting individuals’ well-being. That is, being focused on 
intrinsic aspirations such as helping others in need, building good bonds, or developing 
one’s skills, promotes greater task absorption which, in turn, facilitates greater skill 
development (Mouratidis, Vansteenkiste, Lens, Michou, & Soenens, 2013; 
Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens, Soenens, Matos, & Lacante, 2004). In contrast, the pursuit 
of extrinsic goals prompts the engagement in social comparison processes, which can be 
stressful and socially alienating (Banarjee & Dittmar, 2008). Thus, whereas intrinsic 
goal pursuit may relate to greater opportunities for need satisfaction, the pursuit of 
extrinsic goals may interfere with need satisfaction and even elicit experiences of need 
frustration.    
A few previous studies have explored the potential mediating role of basic 
psychological need satisfaction in the link between intrinsic (versus extrinsic) goals and 
well-being, in specific life domains such as work (Vansteenkiste, Neyrinck, Niemiec, 
Soenens, Witte, & Broeck, 2007); eating regulation (Thøgersen-Ntoumani, Ntoumanis, 
& Nikitaras, 2010; Verstuyf et al., 2012); and sports (Sebire, Standage, & Vansteenkiste, 
2009). For example, Vansteenkiste et al. (2007) found that a higher intrinsic (versus 
extrinsic) work value orientation was associated positively with well-being, due to the 
fulfilment of psychological needs. In the exercise domain, Sebire et al. (2009) found 
that need satisfaction could partially account for the relation between intrinsic (versus 
extrinsic) exercise goals and psychological well-being. In addition, Thøgersen-
Ntoumani et al. (2010) found that a higher focus on intrinsic goals such as health and 
image was associated positively with basic need satisfaction, which in turn, was 
negatively associated with unhealthy weight-management behaviours. 
The present study aimed to extend this small body of literature in four ways. 
Past work on intrinsic and extrinsic goal-contents and needs failed to take explicitly the 
role of need frustration into account, as the items used to assess need satisfaction tapped 
into the experience of low satisfaction (e.g., “I often do not feel very capable”) rather 
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than the experience of active need frustration (e.g., “I often experience some kind of 
failure ”). Therefore, the present research examined the unique roles of psychological 
need satisfaction and need frustration in the relation between intrinsic, relative to 
extrinsic, aspirations and both well-being and ill-being. Preliminary evidence for the 
role of need frustration was provided by Verstuyf et al. (2012), who showed that need 
frustration could account for the link between dieting to achieve physical attractiveness 
and bulimic symptoms. Yet, these authors did not assess need satisfaction, leaving open 
the question whether both need satisfaction and need frustration play a critical role.   
Second, all studies presented above were grounded in the SDT-tradition, thus 
being limited by relying on intrinsic-extrinsic goal measures. Yet, it seems important to 
explore whether need satisfaction and need frustration can also account for the link 
between materialistic values or beliefs and well-being. Further, we believe it is 
unfortunate that the fields of materialism and SDT have been developed fairly 
independently in spite of their clear points of convergence. Only one previous study 
known to us (Van Hiel, Cornelis, & Roets, 2010) has attempted to bridge this gap, 
tapping into both adolescents’ materialistic value orientation (Richins & Dawson, 1992) 
as well as their intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996).  
A third novel aspect is that the present study focused on participants’ aspirations 
and materialistic strivings in their lives in general rather than vis-a-vis specific contexts 
(work, sports, eating behaviour), as was the case in the previously mentioned studies. 
Indeed, it remains to be demonstrated whether need satisfaction and need frustration can 
account for the materialism – well-being association in more general terms.  
The final novel aspect is that our study was the first to assess participants in 
Chile, either from the SDT or from the materialistic values framework. 
The Present Research  
Although the seminal papers on people’s materialistic strivings (Richins & 
Dawson, 1992) and their extrinsic, relative to, their intrinsic aspirations (Kasser & Ryan, 
1993) came out about two decades ago and have spurred dozens of studies over the 
years, few studies to date have made use of comprehensive measures, instead either 
making use of materialistic values orientation scale or the aspiration index.  In two 
relatively large samples of adults, we assessed both participants’ materialistic value 
orientations and their intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations. Further, although the 
materialism – well-being association is well-documented, the reasons why materialistic 
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strivings interfere with growth and even elicit ill-being remain less well understood. 
Consistent with recent developments within SDT (Bartholomew et al., 2011; 
Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013), we examined the separate and unique roles of need 
satisfaction and need frustration in the link from materialism to well-being and ill-being. 
Following Vansteenkiste and Ryan (2013), we predicted that need satisfaction would be 
primarily associated with growth and wellness, and need frustration primarily with 
malfunctioning and ill-being, but we also expected to observe weaker cross-paths: need 
satisfaction may play a protective role against malfunctioning and ill-being, and need 
frustration may lead to lower positive well-being since individuals have developed 
fewer resources for growth. Finally, we tested whether the paths in our model were 
moderated by national context, comparing adult samples in the UK—an established 
mass consumer society—with Chile—a fast-growing new economy, where no previous 
research to our knowledge has been conducted into materialistic values or into self-
determination theory.  
Based on the literature reviewed above, we sought to test the following 
hypotheses.  First, we predicted that a stronger materialistic value orientation (modelled 
by the Aspirations Index and the Materialistic Values Scale) would be linked negatively 
to well-being and positively to ill-being (Hypothesis 1). Next, we aimed to test the 
integrated model depicted in Figure 1.1, in which the link between materialism and 
well-being would be explained by both psychological need satisfaction and 
psychological need frustration. This model was tested in a gradual and stepwise fashion. 
Specifically, we began by examining whether relationships between materialism and 
well-being and ill-being could be partially explained by basic need satisfaction 
(Hypothesis 2). We expected only partial mediation as the contribution of materialism 
to ill-being may not just be accounted for by the absence of need satisfaction, but also 
requires the more active obstruction and, hence, frustration of the psychological needs. 
Therefore, in a next step, we examined whether the addition of basic need frustration to 
our model would help to fully account for the materialism – ill-being association and 
thus testify to the incremental role of need frustration (Hypothesis 3). Finally, given the 
claim of Self-Determination Theory to study universal psychological processes (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000), we expected to find comparable support for hypotheses H1 to H3 in 
samples drawn from both UK and Chilean contexts (Hypothesis 4).  
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Figure 1. 1: Theoretical model for the associations between materialism, basic psychological need 
satisfaction, basic psychological need frustration, positive well-being and negative well-being in the UK 
and Chile. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure  
The British sample consisted of 958 adults living in the UK, ranging in age from 
20 to 77 years (Mean = 44.68; SD = 13.98). Respondents (59% female) were former 
graduates, recruited through the alumni office of a university in the South East of 
England. The Chilean sample consisted of 257 adults living in Chile, ranging in age 
from 19 to 71 years (Mean = 34.81; SD = 10.54). Respondents (53% female) were also 
all former graduates, recruited mostly through the alumni office of a university in 
Santiago, but also through personal contacts of the first author. Using a sample that 
consists entirely of graduates has the advantage that educational level is controlled for.  
Statistical analyses revealed that the two samples differed significantly in age 
(F[1, 1214], p < .001), but not in gender distribution [χ²(1) = 2.94, p = .09]. However, 
controlling for these background characteristics did not change the substantive results 
reported in our structural models. 
In a first instance, participants were sent an introductory email containing a brief 
description of the study along with a web link to the survey. UK participants were 
invited to participate in a research project by completing an online survey and were 
offered entry into a prize draw for university memorabilia. In Chile, the same 
instructions were sent but participants were not offered entry into a prize draw. The 
study was approved by the University of Sussex Research Ethics and Governance 
Committee and was conducted according to BPS and APA guidelines. All participants 
44 
provided written consent and were informed that they could withdraw from the study at 
any point. The purpose of the research was described in broad terms (hence, no 
deception was involved), and respondents were given the opportunity to receive a 
summary of the research findings. Respondents were also asked whether they would be 
happy to participate in future research, as it was anticipated that the survey would be the 
first wave of a multi-wave project.  
The first page of the survey contained a brief description of the study, and the 
second page informed participants of their right to withdraw at any time, as well as 
assuring their anonymity and confidentiality with regards to their responses. Then, 
participants were asked to complete the core measures for the present research: well-
being, need satisfaction, need frustration, and materialism. Some other measures were 
collected that are not relevant to the present hypotheses (e.g. measures about 
environmental attitudes and behaviours). The final section of the survey assessed 
demographic details, including (among others) age, gender, and income. This project 
used various scales, the majority of which have been used in previous research, and are 
known to have good psychometric properties. The questionnaire was translated into 
Spanish for the Chilean participants, and equivalence of meaning with the English 
version was checked through established back-translation procedures (Brislin, 1970). 
In order to test for order effects, two versions of the survey were created. The 
first version asked participants first about well-being, need satisfaction and need 
frustration and then about materialism. The second version of the survey asked 
participants first about materialism, and then about well-being, need satisfaction and 
need frustration. MANOVAs were carried out in each sample with version as the 
independent variable and all core construct measures as dependent variables. In both the 
UK (F [10, 947] = 1.30, p = .23) and in Chile (F [10, 246] = 1.40, p = .18), the 
multivariate result was non-significant, indicating that the order in which respondents 
completed the measures did not have an impact on their responses. 
Measures 
Materialism. Materialism was modelled as a latent variable in the tested 
structural models, using indicators derived from the two most commonly used scales in 
the research literature: the Aspiration Index (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996) and the 
Materialistic Values Scale (Richins and Dawson, 1992).  
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The Aspiration Index. We used a shortened, 30-item version of the Aspiration 
Index developed by Kasser & Ryan (Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996) to assess the 
importance of different life goals.  We used 6 categories of aspirations with five specific 
items within each category. Aspirations are either extrinsic (money, fame, image) or 
intrinsic (affiliation, community involvement, self-development and health). We asked 
people to rate how important each goal is to them personally from not at all (1) to very 
(7). Example items are To be a very wealthy person (money), To have my name known 
by many people (fame), To successfully hide the signs of aging (image), To grow and 
learn new things (self-development), To have good friends that I can count on 
(affiliation), and To work for the betterment of society (community involvement). The 
internal reliability of the three intrinsic aspirations (self-development, community 
involvement and affiliation) ranged from acceptable to good in the UK (αs = .67, .91, 
and .85 respectively) and in Chile (αs = .76, .89, and .77). The internal reliability of the 
three extrinsic aspirations (money, fame and image) was good in the UK (αs = .86, .86, 
and .82) and in Chile (αs = .87, .90, and .85).  
The Materialistic Values Scale. We used the shortened, 9-item version 
developed by Richins and Dawson (1992) and revised by Richins (2004). Example 
items are I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes, Buying things 
gives me a lot of pleasure, and My life would be better if I owned certain things I don't 
have. Participants rated these statements on a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). The internal reliability of the scale was good, 
both in the UK (α = .83) and in Chile (α = .81).  
Need satisfaction and need frustration. To assess these constructs we used 
two scales: Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction Scale and Basic Need Frustration 
Scale. 
Basic psychological need satisfaction scale. This is a 9-item measure yielding a 
global score of individuals’ need satisfaction (Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001), 
including three items each to measure satisfaction of needs for autonomy, competence, 
and relatedness. Items are shown in Table 1.1. Participants rated these statements on a 
6-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). One 
item was deleted based on a factor analysis that we describe shortly. The internal 
reliability in this research was good, both in the UK (α = .84) and in Chile (α = .81). 
Basic psychological need frustration scale. To measure basic need frustration 
we used the nine items developed by Sheldon and Gunz (2009), including three items 
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each to measure frustration of needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Items 
are also shown in Table 1.1. Participants rated these statements on a 6-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). One item was deleted 
based on a factor analysis that we describe shortly. The final scale showed a good 
internal reliability, both in the UK (α = .80) and in Chile (α = .78). 
Well-being. We employed six scales assessing a wide array of well-being 
dimensions, including measures typically used to assess subjective well-being (life 
satisfaction, positive affect, negative affect), as well as mental health measures 
(depression and subjective vitality), and physical symptoms of ill-health.  
Satisfaction with life. We used the 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale developed 
by Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin (1985) to measure the cognitive component of 
subjective well-being. Examples items are In most ways my life is close to my ideal and 
The conditions of my life are excellent. Participants rated these statements in a 6-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6).  The internal 
reliability of the scale was good, both in the UK (α = .87) and in Chile (α = .87). 
Positive and negative affect. We used the 10-item measure International 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (I-PANAS-SF, Thompson, 2007), 
which includes separate subscales measuring positive affect (5 items) and negative 
affect (5 items). Example items asked participants how frequently they have felt 
inspired, alert, upset, and nervous during the last month. Participants rated these 
questions in a 5-point scale ranging from never (1) to always (5). The measure showed 
good internal reliability, both in the UK (positive affect: α = .79; negative affect: α = .77) 
and in Chile (positive affect: α = .72; negative affect: α= .72). 
Vitality. We employed the Subjective Vitality scale (Ryan & Frederick, 1997), a 
7-item measure developed to evaluate how alive and alert people have been feeling 
during the last month. Participants rated their agreement with statements such as I feel 
alive and vital and I don't feel very energetic, on a 7-point response scale from not at all 
true (1) to very true (7). Internal reliability was good, both in the UK (α = .91) and in 
Chile (α = .87). 
Depressive symptoms. We employed a slightly shortened version (16 items) of 
the Centre for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Inventory (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) 
measure, designed to obtain an individual global depression score in nonclinical 
samples. Example items are I did not feel like eating, My appetite was poor, and I felt 
that I couldn’t stop feeling down even with help from my family or friends. Participants 
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rated these statements on a 4-point scale ranging from rarely or none of the time (0) to 
most or all of the time (3).  The internal reliability of the scale was good, both in the UK 
(α = .89) and in Chile (α = .89).  
Physical symptoms of ill-health. We employed seven items from the General 
Health Questionnaire developed by Goldberg et al (1997) to obtain a measure of 
participants’ global health. For the purpose of this study, just part A (7 items) of the 
original scale was used, in order to focus on physical symptoms. Participants responded 
to questions such as how often they had recently been feeling in need of a good tonic or 
feeling run down and out of sorts on a 5-point scale from never (1) to always (5). The 
internal reliability of these 7 items was good, both in the UK (α = .84) and in Chile (α 
= .81). 
Table 1.1: Exploratory Factor Analysis of the items from the Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction and 
The Basic Psychological Need Frustration Scales in the UK 
 
 
 
Results 
Plan of Analysis 
We employed structural equation modelling (SEM, AMOS 18.0) to assess the 
hypothesized associations between materialism, basic psychological need satisfaction, 
basic psychological need frustration and positive and negative well-being. Descriptive 
statistics and inter-correlations for these study variables are shown in Table 1.2. In order 
Table 1.1. Exploratory Factor Analysis of the items from the Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction and The Basic Psychological Need Frustration Scales in the UK
`                  Loading on factor
                     EFA
a
 (N=479)  
Scale items Factor 1 Factor 2
Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction Scale (BPNS)
   I felt a sense of contact with people who care for me, and whom I care for .72 -.07
   I felt close and connected with other people who are important to me .71 -.01
   I felt a strong sense of intimacy with the people I spent time with .73 -.11
   I was successfully completing difficult tasks and projects .62 .04
   I took on and mastered hard challenges .64 -.06
   I did well even at the hard things .58 .06
   I was free to do things my own way .23 .38
   My choices expressed my “true self" .43 .27
   I was really doing what interests me .51 .26
Basic Psychological Need Frustration Scale (BPNF)
   I was lonely -.31 -.34
   I felt unappreciated by one or more important people -.06 -.45
   I had disagreements or conflicts with people I usually get along with .03 -.56
   I experienced some kind of failure, or was unable to do well at something -.07 -.60
   I did something stupid, that made me feel incompetent .00 -.50
   I struggled doing something I should be good at -.07 -.56
   I had a lot of pressures I could do without .12 -.66
   There were people telling me what I had to do .11 -.63
   I had to do things against my will -.05 -.63
a
 Exploratory Factor Analyses
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to proceed with the analysis we modelled all constructs as latent variables using three, 
four or six observed indicators per factor. Following the recommendations of Little, 
Cunningham, Shahar, and Widaman (2002), for most indicators, we created item parcels, 
as described below. 
Materialism. We modelled our materialism measure as a latent construct using 
six different indicators: three parcels provided by the Aspiration Index and three 
subscales of the Materialistic Values Scale. 
The Aspiration index. To obtain the relative importance placed on extrinsic 
aspirations compared to intrinsic ones, we followed Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, 
and De Witte (2007). First, an individual’s overall mean score was subtracted from each 
individual score. Second, the intrinsic items were reversed and an overall extrinsic 
versus intrinsic (E/I) value score was computed by averaging the extrinsic and the 
(reversed) intrinsic scales. Cronbach’s alpha range from acceptable in the UK (α = .73, 
Mean = -1.51, SD = .42) to good in Chile (α = .82, Mean = -1.40, SD = .36). Positive 
(negative) scores reflect a tendency to prefer extrinsic (intrinsic) rather than intrinsic 
(extrinsic) values. Finally, we randomly created three parcels employing one extrinsic 
and one (reversed) intrinsic scale to be used as indicators. 
The Materialistic Values Scale. The Materialistic Values Scale (Richins & 
Dawson, 1992) is based on the conceptualization of a value system with three 
interrelated dimensions: centrality, happiness, and success. Based on this, we created 
three indicators from the three subscales previously mentioned. 
Need satisfaction and need frustration. To date, only one paper (Sheldon and 
Gunz, 2009) has directly tested the distinguishability of need satisfaction and need 
frustration. Rather than being opposite ends of a single dimension, we expected that the 
two scales would measure two separate constructs. We checked this assumption through 
a two-stage process of exploratory factor analysis (EFA), followed by confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA: for a similar approach, see Dittmar, 2005). 
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Table 1. 2: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in the UK and Chile 
 
 
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
UK participants
1. Gender (% of female)   
2. Age 44.68 13.98 -.13***
3. Annual Incomea 2.48 1.39 -.31*** .20***
4. Materialism Values Scale (MVS) 2.66 0.85 -.01 -.28*** .07*
5. Relative extrinsic/ intrinsic life goals (E/I) -2.95 1.20 -.16*** -.12*** .14*** .52***
6. Basic Psychological Need satisfaction (BPNS) 4.34 0.80 .04 .16*** .11*** -.18*** -.24***
7. Basic Psychological Need Frustration (BPNF) 2.81 0.93 .04 -.19*** -.11*** .27*** .15*** -.42***
8. Life satisfaction (SLS) 4.10 1.03 .06* .10** .12*** -.17*** -.16*** .53*** -.44***
9. Depressive Symptoms (CES-D) 0.71 0.52 .02 -.19*** -.17*** .23*** .17*** -.55*** .67*** -.57***
10. Panas Positive Affect 3.59 0.61 .04 .19*** .12*** -.17*** -.22*** .64*** -.36*** .42*** -.51***
11. Panas Negative Affect 2.14 0.65 .09** -.22*** -.15*** .23*** .14*** -.38*** .59*** -.38*** .67*** -.31***
12. Vitality (SVS) 4.30 1.25 .01 .16*** .11*** -.20*** -.21*** .66*** -.48*** .50*** -.65*** .72*** -.43***
13. General Health (GHQ) 2.01 0.74 .13*** -.17*** -.13*** .19*** .08** -.34*** .50*** -.33*** .60*** -.34*** .48*** -.50***
Chilean participants
1. Gender (% of female)   
2. Age 34.81 10.54 -.09
3. Annual Incomea 2.58 1.49 -.27*** .46***
4. Materialism Values Scale (MVS) 2.76 0.86 -.01 -.12 -.12
5. Relative extrinsic/ intrinsic life goals (E/I) -2.68 1.33 -.19** -.11 .03 .59***
6. Basic Psychological Need satisfaction (BPNS) 4.60 0.75 .12* .08 .08 -.27*** -.25***
7. Basic Psychological Need Frustration (BPNF) 2.82 0.91 -.05 -.23*** -.21*** .32*** .30*** -.37***
8. Life satisfaction (SLS) 4.47 0.92 .17** .04 .17** -.22*** -.19** .53*** -.34***
9. Depressive Symptoms (CES-D) 0.70 0.51 .00 -.04 -.24*** .20** .15* -.56*** .55*** -.57***
10. Panas Positive Affect 3.66 0.63 -.04 .08 .18** -.09 -.03 .56*** -.23*** .37*** -.46***
11. Panas Negative Affect 2.32 0.62 .03 -.15* -.15* .25*** .19** -.32*** .55*** -.32*** .55*** -.17**
12. Vitality (SVS) 4.88 1.16 .02 .07 .14* -.18** -.15* .64*** -.31*** .49*** -.66*** .60*** -.38***
13. General Health (GHQ) 2.20 0.72 .11 -.03 -.08 .33*** .24*** -.28*** .36*** -.29*** .46*** -.17** .43*** -.43***
*
 p  < .05   
**
 p  < .01 
***
 p  < .001 
a
Income (British pounds): 1 =  < 20.000; 2 = 20.000 – 29.999; 3 = 30.000 – 39.999; 4 = 40.000 – 60.000; 5 = > 60.000
b
Income (Chilean pesos): 1 =  < 650.000; 2 = 650.000 – 999.999; 3 = 1000.000 – 1499.999; 4 = 1500.000 – 2000.000; 5 = > 2000.000
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We carried out an EFA within the first half of the UK sample (N = 479). The 
findings are summarized in Table 1.1, showing the factor loadings for items on their 
respective scales. The initial EFA stipulated two factors and allowed them to covary 
(principal axis factoring with oblimin rotation and Kaiser normalization), including all 
need satisfaction and need frustration items. The EFA on all items showed excellent 
sampling adequacy (KMO = .86, Bartlett’s X2 (153) = 3379.77, p < .001), and 
accounted for 36.97% of the variance. The two factors correlated negatively, as 
expected (r = -.41). Table 1.1 shows that all except two items loaded above .4 on their 
respective factor, and less than .3 on the other factor. Item 7 of the need satisfaction 
scale  (I was free to do things my own way) and item 1 of the need frustration scale (I 
was lonely) did not load cleanly on their respective factors. Hence, we decided to drop 
both items from their respective scales to avoid possible overlap. These results provide 
initial support for the distinctiveness of the need satisfaction and need frustration 
constructs.  
Next, we ran a CFA in both the second half of the UK sample (N = 479) and in 
the Chilean sample (N = 257). Fit statistics in the UK revealed some discrepancy 
between the specified model and the data, χ²(9) = 17.70, p < .001, which is to be 
expected, but showed indexes (CFI = .99, RMSEA = .05) that demonstrated good model 
fit (Kline, 2005). In Chile, fit indexes were also acceptable (χ²(9) = 28.49, p < .001, CFI 
= .97, RMSEA = .10). Chi-squared change shows that modelling need satisfaction and 
need frustration as different constructs fit significantly better than a single-factor model 
in the UK (Δχ2(1) = 177.58, p < .001) and in Chile (Δχ2(1) = 447.01, p < .001). 
Based on these findings, we built latent variables for the need satisfaction and 
the need frustration scales, using three item parcels as indicators of each construct 
(Little et al., 2002). In order to give equal importance in our measures to the three basic 
needs, each parcel included items referring to all three needs, except that one 
satisfaction parcel included items referring to relatedness and competence only, and one 
frustration parcel included items referring to autonomy and competence only. 
Well-being. Given our expectation that the need satisfaction scale would be 
more predictive of positive well-being outcomes whereas the need frustration scale 
would be more predictive of negative well-being outcomes, we initially tried to model 
positive and negative well-being as two latent constructs. However, initial analyses 
suggested that a two-factor model was too simple, and that the 6 well-being variables 
would be better represented as four latent factors, two positive and two negative. 
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Vitality and positive affect loaded together and were modelled as the first positive well-
being latent construct: we created four item parcels (two from each scale) and called this 
positive emotional well-being. The second positive well-being latent construct was life 
satisfaction, modelled using three item parcels. Negative affect and depressive 
symptoms loaded together and were modelled as the first negative well-being construct: 
we created four item parcels (two from each scale) and called this negative emotional 
well-being. The second negative well-being variable focused on physical symptoms of 
ill-health, using 3 item parcels from the General Health Questionnaire: we called this 
negative physiological symptoms.  
Measurement Model 
We developed a multigroup 7-factor measurement model for the British and 
Chilean samples. The results (Table 1.3) revealed some discrepancy between the 
specified model and the data, χ²(556) = 1746.64, p < .001, which is to be expected.  
Values of CFI = .93 and RMSEA = .04 demonstrated acceptable model fit (Kline, 2005).  
To test for metric invariance, we constrained all the factor loadings in our 
measurement model to be equal across the two groups, and then we compared this 
model to the baseline model where no constraints were imposed. As shown in Table 1.3, 
the model fit remained acceptable: χ²(575) = 1812.99, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA 
= .04. According to Cheung and Rensvold (2002), the assumption of invariance is 
tenable if the reduction in CFI when constraints are imposed is less than .01. Here, the 
reduction in CFI comfortably met this criterion (ΔCFI = -.003). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the pattern of factor loadings was invariant across countries. Hence, we 
maintained these constraints in all structural models reported below.  
Structural Models 
We now tested three structural equation models to examine our different 
hypotheses. In initial analyses, we controlled for age, gender and income in both 
samples. However, including these variables neither significantly affected the structural 
relationships between the latent constructs nor the results of the main predictions. 
Therefore, for simplicity, we report models without these additional variables. For 
testing model fit in all structural models, we followed Hu and Bentler’s (1999) and 
Kline’s (2005) criteria. 
52 
 
Table 1. 3: Fit Statistics for the models in the UK and Chile 
 
 
 
Model Description Comparative model χ
2
df Δχ
2
Δdf CFI ΔCFI RMSEA ΔRMSEA χ2 significance
Measurement Model 1746.64 556.00 0.93 0.04 ρ  < .001
Measurement Model all Factor Loading Constrained equals Measurement Model 1812.99 575.00 66.35 19.00 0.93 -0.003 0.04 0.00 ρ < .001
Model 1
Model 1.a. All factor loadings constrained equals Model 1 1310.43 335.00   0.92  0.05  ρ  < .001
Model 1.b. Factor loadings + all structural paths constrained equals Model 1a 1317.72 339.00 7.29 4.00 0.92 0.000 0.05 0.00 ρ  < .001
Model 2
Model 2.a. All factor loadings constrained equals Model 2 1577.62 447.00   0.93  0.05  ρ  < .001
Model 2.b. Factor loadings + all structural paths constrained equals Model 2a 1594.28 456.00 16.66 9.00 0.93 0.000 0.05 0.00 ρ  < .001
Model 3
Model 3.a. All factor loadings constrained equals Model 3 1812.92 575.00   0.93  0.04  ρ  < .001
Model 3.b. Factor loadings + all structural paths constrained equals Model 3a 1839.89 589.00 26.96 14.00 0.93 0.000 0.04 0.04 ρ  < .001
Model 3.c. Factor loadings + all paths (except paths from Model 3a 1831.99 587.00 19.06 12.00 0.94 0.010 0.04 0.00 ρ  < .001
materialism to PEWB and to NPS) constrained
Note. Δχ
2
 = difference in chi-square values between models; Δdf = difference in number of degrees of freedom betwen models; BPNF = basic psychological need frustration
NPS = negative physiological symptoms; PEWB = personal emotional well-being
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Model 1: Associations between materialism and positive and negative well-
being. To test our first hypothesis, we set up a multigroup model in which materialism 
was allowed to predict the four well-being outcomes (Figure 1.2). Initially, we 
estimated all structural paths freely across the two national samples (Model 1a, Table 
1.3). The model showed acceptable fit to the data, χ²(335) = 1310.43, p < .001, CFI 
= .92, RMSEA = .05. Then, to test whether the results differed significantly across the 
UK and Chilean samples, we constrained the paths from materialism to each of the four 
well-being constructs to be equal across the two samples. Fit statistics for this model are 
shown in Table 1.3, Model 1b. The model fit remained acceptable, χ²(339) = 1317.72, p 
< .001; CFI = .92; RMSEA = .05, and there was no significant loss of fit, Δ χ²(4) = 7.29, 
p = .12.  Therefore, there was no evidence that the relationship between materialism and 
well-being differed across the two samples. In both countries materialism was a 
significant predictor of all four well-being constructs. Materialism predicted lower 
positive emotional well-being, lower life-satisfaction, as well as higher negative 
emotional well-being and higher negative physiological symptoms. R-square values 
(Table 1.4) ranged from .04 to .06 in the UK and from .06 to .08 in Chile. In conclusion, 
our first hypothesis received empirical support in both countries: the endorsement of 
materialistic values is linked to lower positive well-being and to higher negative well-
being in the UK and Chile. 
Model 2: Need satisfaction as mediator. To test our second hypothesis, we 
added basic psychological needs satisfaction as a potential mediator in the link between 
materialism and personal well-being (Figure 1.3). Again, we initially estimated all 
structural paths freely across the two samples (Model 2a, Table 1.3). The model showed 
acceptable fit indices, χ²(447) = 1577.622, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .05.  
Then, to test whether the results differed significantly across the two samples, 
we tested a model with the structural paths constrained across samples. Fit statistics for 
this model are shown in Table 1.3, Model 2b. The model showed acceptable fit indices, 
χ²(456) = 1594.28, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .05, and model fit did not decrease, 
Δχ²(9) = 16.66, p = 05, suggesting that none of the paths differed significantly across 
countries. The explained variance for the well-being indicators showed a substantial 
improvement from Model 1a (see Table 1.4 for comparisons) ranging .14 to .58 in the 
UK and from .16 to .56 in Chile 
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Figure 1. 2: Model 1. Structural multigroup model for the associations between materialism and well-
being in the UK and Chile. Coefficients shown are standardized paths in the constrained model. 
Note: Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms are not shown to enhance visual clarity. MVS = Materialism 
Values Scale; E/I = relative extrinsic-intrinsic goals; WB = well-being; Pi = parcel i; PA = positive affect; Vit = 
vitality; NA = negative affect; Dep = depressive symptoms. * p < .05   ** p < .01 *** p < .001. Solid lines = 
significant paths in both countries 
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Table 1. 4: Modelled variance for all the constructs in the UK and Chile 
 
The predicted mediation through basic need fulfilment was supported in both 
countries: materialism was a significant predictor of basic need satisfaction, and need 
satisfaction, in turn, was a significant predictor of both positive and negative well-being. 
Need satisfaction related positively to  positive emotional well-being and  life-
satisfaction, while relating negatively to negative emotional well-being and 
physiological illness. The mediating role of need satisfaction was confirmed through the 
Sobel test for all indirect paths between materialism and the well-being indicators in the 
UK and Chile. The results showed that need satisfaction mediated the relationships 
between materialism and all the well-being indicators: materialism and positive 
emotional well-being, z = -7.61, p < .001; materialism and life-satisfaction, z = -7.40, p 
< .001; materialism and negative emotional well-being, z = 7.14, p < .001 and 
materialism and negative physiological symptoms, z = 6.39, p < .001.  
In this model, materialism becomes a non-significant predictor of positive 
emotional well-being and life-satisfaction, providing evidence for the explanatory role 
of need satisfaction. However, materialism remained a significant predictor of negative 
emotional well-being and negative physiological symptoms, consistent with our 
R
2 
R
2 
R
2 
model 1 model 2 model 3
UK
1. Positive affect and vitality 0.06 0.58 0.63
2. Satisfaction with life 0.04 0.33 0.39
3. Negative affect and depression 0.07 0.36 0.63
4. Symptoms of ill-health 0.04 0.14 0.29
5. BPNS 0.08 0.08
6. BPNF 0.09
Chile
1. Positive affect and vitality 0.08 0.56 0.56
2. Satisfaction with life 0.06 0.35 0.39
3. Negative affect and depression 0.09 0.37 0.61
4. Symptoms of ill-health 0.06 0.16 0.32
5. BPNS 0.11 0.11
6. BPNF 0.12
Note. BPNS = basic psychological need satisfaction
BPNF = basic psychological need frustration
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expectation that need frustration may need to be added to account for the remaining 
direct association, an issue we addressed in Model 3. 
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Figure 1.3: Model 2. Structural multigroup model for the associations between materialism, basic psychological need satisfaction (BPNS) and well-being in the UK 
and Chile. 
Note: Coefficients shown are standardized paths in the constrained model. Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms are not shown to enhance visual clarity. 
MVS = Materialism Values Scale; E/I = Extrinsic relative to Intrinsic life goals; WB = well-being; Pi = parcel i; PA = positive affect; Vit = vitality; NA = negative 
affect; Dep = depressive symptoms. * p < .05   ** p < .01 *** p < .001. Dotted lines = non-significant paths in both countries; solid lines = significant paths in both 
countries. 
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Model 3: Need satisfaction and need frustration as mediators. To test our 
third hypothesis, we added the basic psychological need frustration as an additional 
mediator, in parallel with need satisfaction (Figure 1.4). As before, we initially 
modelled all paths freely across both samples (Model 3a, Table 1.3). The model showed 
acceptable fit indices, χ²(575) = 1812.92, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .04. To test 
whether the results differed significantly across the two samples, we now tested a model 
with the structural possible paths constrained across samples (Model 3b, Table 1.3). 
This model showed acceptable fit indices, χ²(489) = 1839.89, p < .001; CFI = .93; 
RMSEA = .04. However, it showed a significant loss of fit compared to Model 3a, 
Δχ²(10) = 23.92, p < .05. Inspection of the specific paths revealed that when we 
constrained the path between materialism and negative physiological symptoms and the 
path between materialism and positive emotional well-being, the model showed 
significant lower fit under the χ2 criterion (Table 1.3). Therefore, we estimated these 
two paths freely in each nation. Nevertheless, as we describe below, neither path 
reached conventional levels of statistical significance in either sample. Further, the 
results showed that this partially constrained model (Model 3c, Table 1.3) showed no 
significant loss of fit in comparison with the model with all paths estimated freely 
(Model 3a, Table 1.3), Δχ²(12) = 19.06, p = .09. Thus, it may be assumed that the 
remaining structural paths are not significantly different across countries. Fit statistics 
are shown in Table 1.3, Model 3c. 
In our final model, materialism was a significant predictor of basic need 
satisfaction, which, in turn, was a significant predictor of both positive and negative 
well-being. In addition, materialism was a significant predictor of basic need frustration 
which, in turn, predicted both positive and negative well-being. The results showed that 
in the UK and Chile, need satisfaction (z = -7.56 p < .001) and need frustration (z = -
5.55, p < .001) significantly mediated the relationship between materialism and positive 
emotional well-being. In addition, need satisfaction (z = -7.10 p < .001) and need 
frustration (z = -5.84, p < .001) also significantly mediated the association between 
materialism and life-satisfaction. Moreover, need satisfaction (z = 6.72, p < .001) and 
need frustration (z = 7.29, p < .001) significantly mediated the relationship between 
materialism and negative emotional well-being. Finally, need satisfaction (z = 4.52, p 
< .001) and need frustration (z = 6.91, p < .001) significantly mediated the association 
between materialism and negative physiological symptoms.  
. 
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Figure 1. 4: Model 3. Structural multigroup model for the associations between materialism, basic psychological need satisfaction (BPNS), basic psychological need 
frustration(BPNF) and well-being in the UK and Chile. 
Note: Coefficients shown are standardized paths in the constrained model. Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms are not shown to enhance visual clarity. MVS = Materialism Values 
Scale; E/I = Extrinsic relative to intrinsic life goals; WB = well-being; PEWB = positive emotional WB; NEWB = negative emotional WB; LS = life satisfaction; NPS = negative physiological 
symptoms; Pi = parcel i; PA = positive affect; Vit = vitality; NA = negative affect; Dep = depressive symptoms. * p < .05   ** p < .01 *** p < .001. Dotted lines = non-significant paths in both 
countries; solid lines = significant paths in both countries.  
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Within this final model, materialism no longer significantly predicted any of the 
well-being indicators in the UK and in Chile with just one, marginal, exception (Figure 
1.4). In the Chilean sample, the path from materialism to negative physiological 
symptoms remained marginally significant (β = .11, p < .08). Although our invariance 
test had shown a significant difference between samples in the path from materialism to 
positive emotional well-being, this path did not reach significance in its own terms in 
either sample. Thus, need satisfaction and need frustration together largely accounted 
for the links between materialism and all well-being outcomes in both cultures, showing 
the important additional role played by need frustration especially in predicting the 
negative well-being indicators 
Discussion 
In the current research, using relatively large samples of adults from two very 
different societies, and more comprehensive measures than employed for previous 
studies, we extended previous findings into the link between materialism and well-being 
in four ways.  
 First, supporting H1, a stronger materialistic value was associated with 
lower levels of positive psychological well-being as well as higher levels of negative 
well-being. Our results replicated earlier findings about the well-being outcomes 
associated with materialism  (Dittmar, 2008; Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996, Richins & 
Dawson, 1992), but also demonstrated that this effect is present not just in mass 
consumer societies such as the UK, but also in a developing South American country: 
Chile. The average size of these relationships (mean│β│ = .24) was comparable to the 
average disattenuated correlation of .19 between materialistic values and various 
indicators of lower well-being reported in the recent meta-analysis by Dittmar and 
colleagues (in press). As expected, in both samples, materialism was linked with 
affective, cognitive, and health dimensions of personal well-being, suggesting that a 
consumer culture orientation may have more wide-ranging negative consequences for 
adults than previously acknowledged.  This effect presumably emerges because the 
meaning attached to the materialistic strivings in Chilean participants was no different 
from the meaning assigned by UK citizens. That is, materialism stands in the service of 
boosting one’s self-worth and is believed to represent a pathway to success and life 
satisfaction. Similar results were reported by Chen, Van Assche, Vansteenkiste, 
Soenens, and Beyers (2013), who showed that even the attainment of materialistic 
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strivings in a very poor Chinese rural-to-urban migrant workers related negatively to 
well-being. Yet, in this same poor sample, the experience of financial security, which 
was argued to stand in the service of basic survival, related positively to well-being. 
Second, supporting H2, the association of materialistic values with lower levels 
of positive psychological well-being and higher levels of negative well-being was 
mediated by basic psychological need satisfaction. To our knowledge, this is the first 
research to examine either SDT or materialistic values in Chile. Our results showed that 
the higher the materialistic value orientation, the lower the need satisfaction and, as 
result, the lower the positive and the higher the negative well-being in the UK and in 
Chile. Searching for material rewards takes time and energy away from fulfilling basic 
psychological needs. Non-fulfilment of these needs leads to diminished motivation and 
personal well-being, causing psychological problems such as depression, negative affect 
and physical illness, but also decreasing satisfaction with life and positive affect (Deci 
& Ryan, 2000; Sheldon et al., 2001). 
Third, supporting H3, and extending the work of Sheldon and Gunz (2009), we 
demonstrated with CFA that a lack of need satisfaction can be distinguished empirically 
from need frustration, and thus we suggest that both variables can be modelled 
separately in future research.  Our results supported recent claims that it is necessary to 
distinguish between the lack of fulfilment of basic needs and the experience of need 
frustration because both lower need satisfaction and higher need frustration can be 
detrimental to psychological well-being (Bartholomew et al., 2011; Vansteenkiste & 
Ryan, 2013).  
In support of H3, we also found that need frustration played an incremental 
explanatory role in the links between materialism and well-being, above and beyond the 
role of need satisfaction. Specifically, the higher the materialistic value orientation, the 
higher the need frustration and, in turn, the lower the positive and the higher the 
negative well-being in the two samples. This is a key finding for SDT, and perhaps the 
most novel contribution of our research. The frustration of basic psychological needs 
relates to psychological problems which can produce severe costs for personal well-
being (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Therefore, these findings support the claims of SDT 
regarding the role of need frustration as a separate construct from low satisfaction. 
Finally, it was also shown that need satisfaction and need frustration together could 
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completely account for the link between materialism and both positive and negative 
well-being in the UK and Chile.  
Our results also supported the prediction of SDT (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013) 
that, whereas the satisfaction of psychological needs might primarily foster positive 
forms of well-being, the frustration of the psychological needs may especially lead to 
ill-being. Even though we found significant crossover paths (shown in Figure 1.4), 
results showed that need satisfaction was generally more strongly associated to positive 
outcomes (positive emotional well-being and life-satisfaction) than need frustration, 
whereas need frustration was more strongly associated to negative outcomes (e.g., 
negative physiological symptoms) than need satisfaction. This finding also extends 
Bartholomew et al.’s (2011) claims, demonstrating among adult participants in two 
different cultures that, whereas need satisfaction is more strongly predictive of positive 
well-being, need frustration is more strongly associated with maladjustment and ill-
being. 
Fourth, and finally, we demonstrated that the negative link between materialism 
and well-being and the mediation of need satisfaction and need frustration did not differ, 
in general, across national contexts, when we compared the UK—an established mass 
consumer society—with Chile—a fast-growing new economy. Our main findings in the 
UK were replicated in the Chilean population showing that a stronger materialistic 
value orientation is linked to lower positive well-being and to higher negative well-
being through the mediation of basic need satisfaction and basic need frustration. In 
Models 2 and 3, the effects sizes of basic needs on well-being were substantially larger 
than the effect sizes of materialism on well-being in Model 1. This is to be expected 
because materialistic values are just one variable among many others that might be 
expected to influence well-being, whereas many different influences on well-being 
might be expected to have their effects through need satisfaction and need frustration 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000). The fact that most of the paths in our models did not differ even 
in size across samples provides fairly convincing evidence for the generality of the 
proposed need mechanisms central to SDT, at least among the graduate populations that 
we sampled.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Given that our participants were all university graduates, we should be cautious 
about generalizing these findings to poorer and less educated groups. Nonetheless, 
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several studies suggest that the link between materialism and well-being is not restricted 
to wealthy samples. Chen et al. (2013) found a negative association between 
materialism and well-being even in a poor Chinese sample. In addition, Kasser, Ryan, 
Zax, and Maneroff (1995) found that the most materialistic American teenagers were 
those who grew up in more deprived economic environments.  Finally, in a recent meta-
analysis (Dittmar et al., in press) examining the association between materialism and 
personal well-being, although the link was stronger in wealthier countries, the negative 
association was robust across a variety of studies, samples, and economic conditions. 
Finally, despite the strong evidence regarding the link between materialism and 
well-being, one important limitation of the present research involves its correlational 
design, which does not allow one to infer causality. Although higher materialism may 
produce lower well-being due to the mediating role of need satisfaction (Kasser & Ryan, 
1993, 1996; Ryan & Deci, 2000), it is also possible that unhappy people seek 
materialistic ways with which to improve and overcome their problems (Dittmar, 2008). 
For example, research has found that when people perceive threats to their existence, 
they respond with various strategies. Terror Management Theory states that when 
reminded of their own mortality, people often seek out mechanisms of enhancing their 
self-esteem (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). As a result of this threat, a 
common strategy for self-protection is to endorse self-enhancing, materialistic values 
(Crompton & Kasser, 2009). In other words, when people’s well-being is diminished, a 
strategy could be to engage in a materialistic value orientation. Therefore, further 
longitudinal research needs to be carried out in order to evaluate the directionality of the 
link between materialism and well-being over time.  
Such longitudinal research may also help to shed light on the mechanisms that 
intervene in the relation between extrinsic, relative to intrinsic, goals and experiences of 
need satisfaction and need frustration. Although it is maintained within SDT that 
intrinsic goals create opportunities for need satisfaction, while extrinsic goal-contents 
interfere with need satisfaction and may even elicit need frustration, the intervening 
processes in these associations have received little attention (Vansteenkiste et al., 2008). 
Thus, apart from the more global mechanisms of need satisfaction and need frustration, 
more specific mechanisms should be examined. For instance, extrinsic and intrinsic 
goal-contents may, respectively, preclude or foster task-absorption, which, respectively, 
hampers or contributes to competence development (Vansteenkiste et al., 2004). 
Further, a focus on extrinsic goals may relate to more frequent and different forms of 
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interpersonal comparisons (Sebire, Standage, Gillison, & Vansteenkiste, 2013), which 
may be socially alienating, stressful, and produce a sense of incompetence. Gaining 
more exact insight in these intervening processes may help to set up and test 
intervention programs in which adults are trained to become resilient against the 
negative effects of being exposed to a mass-consumer culture.  
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Abstract 
Self-determination theory (SDT) is a theory of eudaimonic well-being. A 
substantive body of research from SDT has shown through a variety of research designs 
that the satisfaction of the needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness is linked 
with higher personal well-being. However, previous research has failed to establish the 
causal direction of these links. We used a cross-lagged longitudinal design to investigate 
theorized causal links between need satisfaction and well-being among adults from two 
different cultures, the UK and Chile. We also used separate measures of need 
satisfaction and need frustration to explore longitudinally the differential roles of these 
constructs in predicting positive and negative well-being. We found that in both 
countries, total need satisfaction was a positive prospective predictor of well-being. 
Moreover, in the UK, higher well-being was a positive prospective predictor of total 
need satisfaction. When we split need satisfaction in its three needs, only relatedness 
reached statistical significance in the UK. In Chile, none of the three needs was an 
individually significant prospective predictor of well-being. We also found that need 
satisfaction was a significant prospective predictor of positive well-being in both 
countries, whereas need frustration was a significant prospective predictor of negative 
well-being in the UK. Finally, we found a bi-directional positive link between need 
satisfaction and subjective well-being. Our results point towards a better integration of 
research into hedonic and eudaimonic well-being.  
Introduction 
The study of well-being has been characterized by two traditions: the hedonic 
approach and the eudaimonic one (Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2001). 
To date, hedonic well-being theories have formed the more extensively studied 
approach (Gallagher, Lopez, & Preacher, 2009). The hedonic view defines well-being in 
terms of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Subjective well-
being (SWB) is the most studied construct of hedonic well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001) 
and reflects what would normally be called “happiness” in normal daily life. SWB 
“refers to people’s sense of wellness in their lives, in both thoughts and feelings” 
(Diener & Tay, 2012, p.1) and includes satisfaction with life as well as higher positive 
affect and lower negative affect (Diener, 1984). 
However, according the eudaimonic point of view, well-being does not consist 
only of happiness and pleasure, or the absence of pain. True well-being should reflect 
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the actualization of human potentials, meaning and self-realization (Ryan & Deci, 2001). 
Following this reasoning, the eudaimonic approach defines well-being in terms of being 
humanly fully functioning (Gallagher et al., 2009; Keyes et al., 2002; Ryan & Deci, 
2001).  
Ryff and Keyes (1995; Ryff, 1989) explored the concept of eudaimonic well-
being in terms of what makes people flourish. Drawing on Aristotle and on human and 
existentialistic traditions, the authors developed an eudaimonic theory of psychological 
well-being (PWB) through a multidimensional approach (Keyes et al., 2002; Ryan & 
Deci, 2001). They presented a PWB model which consist of six components: autonomy, 
environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with others, purpose in life, 
and self-acceptance. This PWB model has been extensively used in eudaimonic research 
(Gallagher et al., 2009). 
Although the two traditions conceptualizing well-being – hedonic and 
eudaimonic approaches – have evolved separately, attention is increasingly being given 
to how both approaches are connected (Keyes et al., 2002). For example, from the PWB 
approach (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995) significant and positive correlations have 
consistently been found between the components of each construct (Keyes et al., 2002). 
Ryff and Keyes (1995) also found several significant positive associations between the 
six PWB sub-scales and the measures of SWB, showing that adults who tended to report 
higher (or lower) levels of PWB also tended to report feeling more (or less) positive 
affect, less (or more) negative affect and better (or worse) life evaluations. Therefore, it 
seems that SWB and PWB are related but distinct aspects of positive psychological 
functioning. Supporting this reasoning, Gallagher et al. (2009) showed that eudaimonic 
behaviours were associated with improved hedonic well-being, and claimed that SWB 
and PWB scales strongly covary across time together. However, Keyes et al.  (2002) 
found that even though SWB and PWB may complement each other, they may also 
compensate for each other. When they are at the same level (for instance, both higher or 
both lower), SWB and PWB may complement each other, thereby providing a sense of 
self-congruency. Yet, SWB and PWB may also compensate for each other. A higher 
SWB may help to maintain positive feelings when PWB is low, or vice-versa.  
Although research has shown that PWB and SWB tend to be positively 
associated, Ryan and Deci (2001) stated that this may not be always the case. For 
example, conditions that promote SWB do not necessarily lead to higher levels of 
eudaimonic well-being. Moreover, some aspects of positive functioning (e.g. purpose in 
68 
life) require effort and discipline that may go against the search for short-term happiness 
and pleasure. These issues raise questions about the true direction of the link between 
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Further, it would be necessary not only to 
understand the causes, consequences and dynamics of both SWB and PWB, but also to 
find out how they are related to each other (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff, & Keyes, 1995). 
According to Keyes et al. (2002), all these arguments open an important area of 
research in terms of how PWB and SWB might influence each other. The authors 
hypothesized that PWB could be an antecedent or a consequence of SWB, and 
emphasized the need for new research exploring cause-effect patterns. Therefore, 
longitudinal designs are needed in order to understand how SWB and PWB are related  
(Keyes et al., 2002), and in particular to clarify the causal direction of the relationships 
between these constructs that have been found in numerous previous correlational 
studies (Gallagher et al., 2009).  
Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci  & Ryan, 2000) is another eudaimonic 
theory of well-being which aims to explain what makes a life worth living. Following 
Deci and Ryan's (2000) original ideas, just as plants need essential nutrients – such as 
water, sunlight and minerals – for survival, so people need psychological nutrients for 
healthy growth and well-being (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000). SDT 
states that human beings have three basic needs – autonomy, competence and 
relatedness – which would function as the necessary psychological nutrients for well-
being, motivation and optimal functioning. Autonomy refers to feeling that our 
behaviour is volitional and meaningful, that we are the initiator of our own actions, that 
our actions are in accordance with our own values and that the behaviour is endorsed at 
the highest level of reflection; competence refers to feeling effective and efficient in our 
behaviour, as well as being able to successfully manage difficult challenges; relatedness 
refers to feeling that we are connected, appreciated and understood by others who are 
important to us through intimate relationships (Reinboth & Duda, 1996; Sheldon & 
Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006). Therefore, people need to feel that they are 
able to decide what to do and that these actions are valuable and enjoyable for them 
(autonomy); that they are good at their daily activities (competence); and that they have 
meaningful and deep relationships with others who are important to them (relatedness) 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon & Krieger, 2007). 
According to Ryan & Deci (2001), SDT has both similarities and differences 
with the PWB eudaimonic approach developed by Ryff and Keyes (1995). First, the 
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concept of autonomy, competence and relatedness have similar meanings in both SDT 
and PWB approaches. For example, autonomy refers to having a sense of self-
determination and personal authority; relatedness refers to developing and maintaining 
warm and trusting interpersonal relationships, and competence refers to shaping our 
environment in order to meet our personal needs and desires (Keyes et al., 2002). 
Second, both approaches understand well-being in terms of being fully functioning. 
However, an important difference between these two approaches is that whereas the 
SDT theory see its three needs as the main factors influencing well-being, the PWB 
model employs them to define well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Nonetheless, all in all, 
both theories may be conceptualized as theories of human flourishing and eudaimonic 
well-being. 
The Link between Basic Need Satisfaction and Well-being 
According to SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000), the three basic psychological needs 
(autonomy, competence, and relatedness) would be the three key types of nutrients 
essential to on-going personal growth, integrity and well-being. However, when these 
nutrients are unavailable or blocked, people may face dangerous functional costs in 
terms of their quality of life (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000; 
Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013).  
Supporting the claims of SDT, a substantial body of empirical research has 
shown that the needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are significantly 
associated with personal well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006). 
These results have been found by using different research designs (Sheldon & Niemiec, 
2006). For example, people tend to report more positive affect, less negative affect, and 
more vitality on days when these needs are fulfilled (Reis et al., 2000; Ryan, Bernstein, 
& Brown, 2010; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996; Verstuyf, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, 
Boone, & Mouratidis, 2013), as well experiencing events that satisfy these needs as 
more satisfying (Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006). 
These results have been obtained in different domains such in sport contexts (e.g., 
Gagné, Ryan, & Bargmann, 2003; Reinboth & Duda, 2006), in law schools (Sheldon & 
Krieguer, 2007), in the health domain (Williams, McGregor, Zeldman, Freedman, & 
Deci, 2004), in the workplace (Ryan et al., 2010; Van den Broeck, Vansteenkiste, De 
Witte, Soenens, & Lens, 2010), and in the education field (e.g., Vlachopoulos, Katartzi, 
& Kontou, 2011), as well across the life span (Kasser & Ryan, 1999; Niemiec, Lynch, 
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Vansteenkiste, Bernstein, Deci, & Ryan, 2006). Notably, the link between need 
satisfaction and well-being has been found in several different cultures (e.g., Chirkov, 
Ryan, & Willness, 2005; Deci, Ryan, Gagné, Leone, Usunov, & Kornazheva, 2001; 
Sheldon et al., 2001; Taylor & Lonsdale, 2010).  
Despite the substantial amount of research exploring the link between need 
satisfaction and well-being, the great majority of previous studies have employed 
correlational designs, which do not allow inferences about cause-effect relations. Only a 
few studies have tried to tackle this important problem through longitudinal designs, but 
most of these have still not used designs that are sensitive to establishing causal 
precedence. Below we will present a brief summary of the relevant literature.  
Concurrent designs. Several studies in SDT have measured concurrent 
associations between within-person changes in need satisfaction and changes in well-
being over time. For example, using a diary study methodology among US 
undergraduates, Sheldon , Ryan, & Reiss (1996) examined the link between the needs 
for competence and for autonomy and daily well-being across 14 days during an 
academic term. They found that, on days when participants reported higher competence 
fulfilment, they also tended to report higher overall well-being, as well higher positive 
affect, lower negative affect, and higher vitality. Similarly, higher autonomy satisfaction 
was associated over time with higher overall well-being, as well with higher positive 
affect and lower negative affect.  
Among US university students, Reis et al. (2000) explored to what extent daily 
variation in the satisfaction of the three needs would predict daily variations in well-
being (moods, vitality and symptoms). Participants provided daily reports for 14 days 
on well-being and need satisfaction (autonomy, competence and relatedness). Through 
hierarchical linear models (HLM) across 2 weeks of daily activity, the authors found 
that on the day level (which controlled for both average levels of wellbeing and the 
prior day’s outcomes), the composite well-being measure related significantly to all the 
three needs. Moreover, higher levels of competence and relatedness satisfaction were 
associated with higher positive affect and vitality.  
Gagné et al. (2003) studied young US female gymnasts between the ages of 7 to 
18, and explored how variations in experiences of autonomy, competence and 
relatedness in gymnastics affected changes in well-being. In order to do so, they 
recorded day-to-day experiences of need satisfaction and well-being for a total of 15 
practices that spanned a period of 4 weeks. Using HLM, they found that increases in 
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daily need satisfaction predicted increases in daily positive affect, vitality and self-
esteem, but not in negative affect.  
Among US university students and using a short-period longitudinal design (3 
months), Sheldon and Niemiec (2006) explored the associations between well-being 
(positive and negative affect, life satisfaction and happiness) and need satisfaction. In 
Study 3, the authors examined their hypotheses using a daily diary methodology where 
participants rated the need satisfaction and wellbeing that they experienced during the 
previous 24 hours at eight different times during a college semester. It was found that 
all three needs had significant relations to day-level fluctuations in well-being.  
Ryan et al. (2010) explored the effects of weekend versus weekday and work 
versus non-work experiences on several well-being indicators (positive and negative 
affect, vitality, physical symptoms) among a sample of working adults. Participants 
monitored their experiences 3 times daily for 21 consecutive days. It was found that the 
link between weekend and non-work activities and well-being was mediated by the 
satisfaction of the needs for autonomy and relatedness. For example, autonomy and 
relatedness together fully mediated the ‘weekend effect’ on negative affect; autonomy 
and relatedness together only partially mediated the weekend effect on both positive 
affect and vitality; and autonomy alone partially mediated the weekend effect on 
physical symptoms.  
Finally, using a daily diary methodology among Belgian adolescents, Verstuyf 
et al. (2013) explored whether the daily satisfaction and frustration of the basic 
psychological needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness is associated with daily 
binge eating symptoms over a 14-day period. Within-person analysis revealed that need 
frustration had a significant positive association with binge eating symptoms, whereas 
need satisfaction was unrelated. After splitting the need frustration composite score into 
its subcomponents, it was found that frustrations of the relatedness, autonomy and 
competence needs were all associated positively with binge eating symptoms. However, 
need frustration one day did not predict an increase in binge eating symptoms the next 
day and binge eating symptoms on one particular day did not predict increases in need 
frustration the next day.  
The studies reviewed above have shown that people tend to report more positive 
affect, less negative affect, and more vitality on days when their needs are fulfilled (Reis 
et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2010; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006; Sheldon et al.,1996; Verstuyf 
et al., 2013) highlighting the association between higher need satisfaction and higher 
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well-being. However, for the most part these studies have tested only contemporaneous 
relationships between need satisfaction and well-being, which does not allow one to 
determine causality between the core variables. Therefore, research using prospective 
designs is needed in order to disentangle the correct direction of these links. 
Prospective designs. A few studies have tested whether higher need satisfaction 
at a given time-point is a prospective predictor of higher well-being at a later time-point. 
For example, Sheldon & Elliot (1999) developed a self-concordance model to 
understand how autonomy relates to well-being. They asked US undergraduates 
students to complete measures of well-being (positive and negative affect and life 
satisfaction) at the beginning and at the end of an academic semester. In addition, 
students were asked to complete a baseline measure of need satisfaction at the 
beginning of the semester, as well as to rate their on-going experiences of autonomy, 
competence and relatedness three times during the academic term. The authors found 
that the link between goal attainment and well-being was mediated by daily activity-
based experiences of autonomy, competence and relatedness that the students 
accumulated during the period of striving. It was therefore concluded that the 
accumulation of these three needs over time would lead to an increase in longitudinal 
well-being. However, an important limitation arises in this research. The authors 
conducted regression and SEM models in which all three accumulative needs (measured 
during the semester) were entered together, along with well-being measured at the 
beginning of the term, as predictors of well-being at the end of the semester. Yet, the 
authors did not measure well-being at the same time as the accumulative need 
experiences, and therefore this variable was not controlled for—which is a key 
requirement for appropriate prospective studies (Schlueter, Schmidt, & Wagner, 2008).  
Reinboth and Duda (1996) conducted a field correlational longitudinal design 
among a sample of British university athletes in order to explore the link between 
changes in well-being (vitality and physical symptoms) and changes in need satisfaction 
over the course of 5 months of sport practices. Data were collected at two time points: 
earlier in the season and a few weeks before the end of the seasons. The authors found 
that the satisfaction of the internal perceived locus of causality component of the need 
for autonomy and coach relatedness across the course of the season were significant 
predictors of increased feelings of subjective vitality during daily activities. Despite its 
important findings, the study was conducted only in a specific sport context, and using 
only measures of mental and physical health for assessing well-being.  
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Among US students, Sheldon and Niemiec (2006) conducted a short-term 
longitudinal design to assessed well-being both at the beginning and at the end of a 
college semester and attempted to predict changes in well-being during that period. 
However, none of the three needs was an individually significant prospective predictor 
of well-being in the change analyses. 
Gagné et al. (2013) explored prospectively the effects of young athletes’ 
perceptions of support from coaches and parents on their need satisfaction, motivation, 
and well-being. The authors tested how variations in the satisfaction of the three needs 
affected changes in well-being from before to after a practice over a 4-week period. It 
was found that increases in daily need satisfaction predicted increases in positive affect, 
vitality, and self-esteem. However, need satisfaction did not affect negative affect. 
Finally, through a 3-year prospective study in a specific setting among law 
students, Sheldon and Krieger (2007) explored the relationships between well-being 
(positive and negative affect and life satisfaction), values and motivation of US 
university students. Using hierarchical regression, the authors found that changes in 
need satisfaction of the needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness significantly 
predicted subsequent changes in subjective well-being.  
All the previous mentioned prospective designs have shown important findings. 
However, most of them are using changes in need satisfaction to predict future changes 
in well-being, which do not allow to test the causal direction between the core variables. 
Moreover, none of them has been able to report a successful cross-lagged model where 
need satisfaction is represented as a causal antecedent and/or consequence of well-being, 
which is a key requirement for the establishment of cause-effect associations (Finkel, 
1995; Schlueter et al., 2008) 
Therefore, SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000) has tried to establish cause-effect patterns 
between the satisfaction of the three need satisfaction (three aspects of eudaimonic well-
being) and different aspects of well-being such as SWB and mental and physical health. 
However, previous SDT studies do not allow one to infer causality between these core 
variables. A common limitation in SDT studies is to assume that need-satisfying (or 
frustrating) experiences precede well-being (or ill-being). Nonetheless, the causality 
may be the reverse (Verstuyf et al., 2013). Thus, the possible bi-directional link between 
need satisfaction and well-being has not yet been explored in detail. To date, only one 
longitudinal paper (Verstuyf et al., 2013) has explored the bi-directional  link, but only 
in a specific eating behaviour context in a student sample. In our paper we aim to fill 
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these research gaps by using a cross-lagged longitudinal design that is better suited to 
disentangling the correct causal direction of these links. 
To sum up, by studying the longitudinal relationship between need satisfaction 
(three different aspects of eudaimonic well-being) and well-being, we will be able to 
disentangle the correct statistical direction of the link. It will also allow us to integrate 
hedonic and eudaimonic approaches consistently.  
The Additional Role Played by Basic Psychological Need Frustration 
Very recently, it has been argued that people’s tendencies towards both well-
being and ill-being may not be explained by basic psychological need satisfaction alone. 
Need frustration can play a key negative role by being extremely harmful. To continue 
with the SDT metaphor, Vansteenkiste and Ryan (2013) argue that if plants do not 
receive their nutrients (low need satisfaction), they will die over time. However, if salt 
water is thrown onto plants (need frustration), they will die sooner. Further, the lack of 
need fulfilment does not necessarily entail the experience of need frustration, but need 
frustration does imply that the fulfilment of the needs becomes blocked because the 
later would involve a more active obstruction of the psychological needs (Unanue, 
Dittmar, Vignoles, & Vansteenkiste, 2013). In fact, a number of studies have found that 
lower levels of need satisfaction were unrelated to negative well-being outcomes 
(Cordeiro, Paixão, Lenes, & Silva, 2013; Gagné et al., 2003). Importantly, research has 
shown that need satisfaction and need frustration represent distinct factors (e.g., 
Sheldon & Gunz, 2009; Sheldon & Hilpert, 2012).  
Although most studies in the SDT literature so far tap into the satisfaction of 
basic needs, increasing empirical attention has been given in recent years to the topic of 
need frustration (Unanue et al., 2013; Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). For example, 
Sheldon and Gunz (2009) explored need satisfaction and need frustration in relation to 
need-relevant motivations. The authors found that the frustration of the psychological 
needs is associated with a higher desire to reduce need frustration, but that need 
satisfaction does not reduce the desire to satisfy the needs. Sheldon, Abad, & Hinsch 
(2011) studied the association between the use of Facebook, and the satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction of the basic psychological needs. It was found  that more frequent 
Facebook usage correlates with more relatedness satisfaction and with more relatedness 
frustration. Sheldon (2011) explored the role of need satisfaction and need frustration on 
the behavioural-motive and experiential-reward aspects of needs. The authors found that 
need satisfaction and need frustration tap into two different constructs and correspond to 
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the separable behavioural-motive and experiential-reward aspects of needs. 
Bartholomew, Ntoumanis, Ryan, & Thogersen-Ntoumani (2011) found that need 
satisfaction related especially to positive outcomes whereas need frustration related to 
maladaptive ones. Stebbings, Taylor, Spray, & Ntoumanis (2012) replicated these 
findings among sports coaches. Employing an objective marker of psychobiological 
functioning, Bartholomew, Ntoumanis, Ryan, Bosch, & Thøgersen-Ntoumani (2011) 
found that need frustration (but not need satisfaction) was related to higher levels of 
immunological problems. Verstuyf, Vansteenkiste, and Soenens (2012) showed that 
need frustration could account for the link between dieting to achieve physical 
attractiveness and bulimic symptoms. Finally, Verstuyf et al. (2013) showed that the 
daily fluctuation in psychological need frustration but not in need satisfaction was 
associated with daily variation in negative well-being (assessed in terms of bulimic 
symptoms), but not with positive outcomes.  
Therefore, this still small but growing body of literature seems to show that need 
satisfaction would be associated with more positive outcomes and need frustration with 
more negative outcomes (Verstuyf et al., 2013). Following these ideas, Vansteenkiste 
and Ryan (2013) hypothesized that it would be possible to find stronger paths from need 
satisfaction to positive well-being and from need frustration to negative well-being, but 
also weaker cross-paths.  
In our research, we aim to extend this small body of literature by examining the 
unique roles of psychological need satisfaction and need frustration in predicting both 
positive and negative well-being, using longitudinal data from two different adult 
samples from the UK and Chile. To date, according to our knowledge, there are no 
longitudinal studies that have distinguished need satisfaction and need frustration when 
exploring causality between these core variables. We used a need satisfaction/need 
frustration balanced scale (Sheldon & Gunz, 2009) to test longitudinally our core 
associations. According to Sheldon and Hilpert (2012), an appropriate need satisfaction 
scale needs to be balanced in terms of the numbers of questions for the three needs as 
well as requiring the inclusion of a similar number of positively and negatively worded 
items.  Yet, in most of the previous studies, need-satisfaction has been measured in a 
variety of different ways and contexts without paying attention to this issue (Sheldon & 
Hilpert, 2012). Considering these measurement problems, Sheldon and Gunz (2009) 
built an alternative measure, the Balanced Measure of Psychological Needs, which 
addresses the methodological shortcomings mentioned above. Notably, only one of the 
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previous longitudinal studies exploring longitudinally the link between need satisfaction 
and well-being (Verstuyf et al., 2013) employed a balanced scale, which means that the 
remaining previous studies did not tackle possible response and method artefacts 
(Sheldon & Hilpert, 2012).  
The Present Research  
As stated previously, longitudinal research on the link between need satisfaction 
and well-being has some important gaps. The most important one is that most of the 
previous studies do not allow causality between the core variables to be inferred. In our 
research, we explored the bi-directional links between need satisfaction/need frustration 
and well-being through a more comprehensive longitudinal cross-lag model, in order to 
disentangle the causal direction of the associations, and thus help to integrate insights 
from hedonic and eudaimonic approaches to well-being. We tested our predictions 
among graduate adults from two different cultures – the UK and Chile – over a three-
year period, assessing more comprehensive well-being measures than research so far. 
Moreover, we used a balanced need satisfaction/need frustration scale (Sheldon & Gunz, 
2009) to test longitudinally our core predictions.  
Hypotheses 
Based on the literature presented above, we tested the following hypotheses for 
the UK and Chile:  
 (H1) Basic psychological need satisfaction is a prospective predictor of higher 
well-being.  
(H2) Well-being is a prospective predictor of higher basic psychological need 
satisfaction. 
(H3) The satisfaction of the needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness are 
unique prospective predictors of higher well-being. 
(H4) Well-being is a prospective predictor of higher satisfaction of the needs for 
autonomy, competence and relatedness. 
 (H5) Basic psychological need satisfaction is a prospective predictor of higher 
positive well-being  
(H6) Basic psychological need satisfaction is a prospective predictor of lower 
negative well-being. 
(H7) Basic psychological need frustration is a prospective predictor of lower 
positive well-being.  
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 (H8) Basic psychological need frustration is a prospective predictor of higher 
negative well-being. 
(H9) Positive well-being is a prospective predictor of both higher basic 
psychological need satisfaction and lower basic psychological need frustration. 
(H10) Negative well-being is a prospective predictor of both lower basic 
psychological need satisfaction and higher basic psychological need frustration. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Data were obtained through a three-wave longitudinal survey (2010, 2011 and 
2012). In 2010 (Wave 1), UK and Chilean citizens were invited to participate in a 
research project by completing an online survey.  Respondents were sent an 
introductory email containing a brief description of the study along with a web link to 
the survey. There were also informed that the project was part of a longitudinal study 
and their consent for future surveys (Waves 2 and 3) was sought. Subsequent e-mails 
were sent only to those who had agreed to continue participating.  
Among the British sample, 461 adults (48.12% of time 1; 59% female) ranging 
in age from 20 to 77 years (Mean = 45.14; SD = 14.06) completed all 3 waves. Nine-
hundred and fifty eight UK participants completed Wave 1, 594 completed Wave 2 and 
610 completed Wave 3. Among the Chilean sample, 76 adults (29.6% of time 1; 47% 
female) ranging in age from 22 to 71 years (Mean = 36.87; SD = 10.21) completed all 3 
waves. Two-hundred and fifty seven participants completed Wave 1, 115 completed 
Wave 2 and 114 completed Wave 3. Using full maximum likelihood estimation in all 
our analyses, 958 participants from the UK and 257 participants from Chile were 
included.  
The study was conducted according to BPS and APA guidelines. All participants 
provided their written consent and were informed that they could withdraw from the 
study at any point. The purpose of the research was described in broad terms (hence no 
deception was involved), and respondents were given the opportunity to receive a 
summary of the research findings.  
The questionnaire was translated into Spanish for the Chilean participants, and 
equivalence of meaning with the English version was checked through established back-
translation procedures (Brislin, 1970). 
Measures 
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Basic need satisfaction and basic need frustration. Following Verstuyf et al. 
(2013) we used a balanced measure developed by Sheldon and Gunz (2009) to assess 
need satisfaction and frustration. This scale consisted of 18 items; that is, 6 items per 
need, 3 of which tapped into satisfaction and 3 of which tapped into frustration of the 
relevant need. Psychometric properties, as well as distinctiveness between satisfaction 
and frustration, were demonstrated by Sheldon and Hilpert (2012) and Cordeiro et al. 
(2013). Participants rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (6) whether they felt their needs for autonomy (e.g., “My choices 
expressed my “true self” or “There were people telling me what I had to do”), 
competence (“I was successfully completing difficult tasks and projects” or “I 
experienced some kind of failure, or was unable to do well at something”) and 
relatedness (“I felt a sense of contact with people who care for me, and whom I care for” 
or  “I was lonely “) were satisfied or frustrated. Reliabilities were measured at Wave 1, 
Wave 2 and Wave 3 and for each separate need as well as for the aggregated measures 
of need satisfaction and need frustration and for the total need satisfaction score 
(including both the satisfaction and frustration items). The composite total need 
satisfaction scale had reliabilities of .86, .87 and .88 in the UK and .83, .81 and .88 in 
Chile in each wave respectively. Cronbach’s alphas for the measure of need satisfaction 
(only satisfaction items) had reliabilities of .84, .86 and .85 in the UK and .81, .83 
and .89 in Chile in each wave respectively. Cronbach’s alphas for the measure of need 
frustration (only frustration items) had reliabilities of. 81, .82 and .82 in the UK 
and .79, .74 and .80  in Chile in each wave respectively. The individual needs (including 
both the satisfaction and frustration items) for autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
had the following reliabilities in each wave respectively: autonomy, .77, .78, .79 (UK) 
and .68, .69, .77 (Chile); competence, .76, .77,.78 (UK) and .69, .56, .75 (Chile); 
relatedness, .75, .77, .78 (UK) and .60, .61, .72 (Chile). Although most measures had 
sufficient reliability, the effects of the three needs in Chile should be interpreted with 
some caution as Cronbach’s alpha revealed low internal consistency on some waves. 
Well-being. We employed six scales assessing a wide array of well-being 
dimensions, including measures typically used to assess subjective well-being (life 
satisfaction, positive affect and negative affect), as well as mental (depression and 
subjective vitality) and physical health measures.  
Satisfaction with life. We used the 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale developed 
by Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin (1985) to measure the cognitive component of 
79 
subjective well-being. Examples items are In most ways my life is close to my ideal and 
The conditions of my life are excellent. Participants rated these statements on a 6-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). Cronbach’s 
alphas for the three waves were .87, .87 and .90 in the UK and .87, .87 and .92  in Chile 
respectively. 
Positive and negative affect. We used the 10-item measure International 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (I-PANAS-SF; Thompson, 2007), 
which includes separate subscales measuring positive affect (5 items) and negative 
affect (5 items). Example items asked participants how frequently they have felt 
inspired, alert, upset and nervous during the last month. Participants rated these 
questions on a 5-point scale ranging from never (1) to always (5). Cronbach’s alphas for 
positive affect were .79, .80 and .81 in the UK and .72, .73 and .71 in Chile respectively. 
The internal reliability for negative affect were .77, .76 and .76 in the UK and .72, .62 
and .73 in Chile respectively. 
Vitality. We employed the Subjective Vitality scale (Ryan & Frederick, 1997), a 
7-item measure developed to evaluate how alive and alert people have been feeling 
during the last month. Participants rated their agreement with statements such as I feel 
alive and vital and I don't feel very energetic, on a 7-point response scale from not at all 
true (1) to very true (7). Cronbach’s alphas for the three waves were .91, .91 and .92 in 
the UK and .87, .87 and .92  in Chile respectively. 
Depressive symptoms. We employed a slightly shortened version (16 items) of 
the Centre for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Inventory (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) 
measure, designed to obtain an individual global depression score in non-clinical 
samples. Example items are: I did not feel like eating, My appetite was poor, and I felt 
that I couldn’t stop feeling down even with help from my family or friends. Participants 
rated these statements on a 4-point scale ranging from rarely or none of the time (0) to 
most or all of the time (3).  Cronbach’s alphas for the three waves were .89, .90 and .90 
in the UK and .89, .88 and .93  in Chile respectively. 
Physical symptoms of ill-health. We employed seven items from the General 
Health Questionnaire developed by Goldberg et al (1997) to obtain a measure of 
participants’ global health. For the purpose of this study, only part A (7 items) of the 
original scale was used, in order to focus on physical symptoms. Participants responded 
to questions such as how often they had recently been feeling in need of a good tonic or 
feeling run down and out of sorts on a 5-point scale from never (1) to always (5). 
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Cronbach’s alphas for the three waves were .84, .83 and .84 in the UK and .81, .82 
and .81  in Chile respectively. 
Results 
All the constructs of interest were measured at T1 (2010), T2 (2011) and T3 
(2012). Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for all the study variables are shown 
in Appendix 2 (Table 2.1, UK; Table 2.2, Chile). We used autoregressive cross-lagged 
models (Finkel, 1995) for testing our causal hypotheses, where each construct was 
regressed on both its own lagged score as well as on the lagged scores of the other 
constructs.  
In initial analyses, we controlled for age and gender in the UK
3
. However, 
including these variables did not significantly affect either the structural relationships 
between the latent constructs or the results of the main predictions. Therefore, for 
simplicity, we reported our results without these control variables.  
Plan of analysis 
We employed structural equation modelling  (Mplus 6.0) to assess our main 
hypotheses. Our predictions were tested in three phases. Firstly, we explored the link 
between total basic psychological need satisfaction and well-being. Secondly, we 
explored the differential hypothesized role played by psychological need satisfaction 
and psychological need frustration in both positive and negative well-being. Finally, we 
explored the bi-directional link between total need satisfaction and subjective well-
being, aiming to integrate hedonic and eudaimonic approaches.  
Phase 1: The link between basic psychological need satisfaction and well-
being. First, in Model 1 we explored the association between need satisfaction and well-
being. We modelled both constructs as latent variables. In order to proceed, we created 
a total latent variable measure for assessing total basic need satisfaction, using 
autonomy, competence and relatedness needs as indicators. Each indicator was built by 
averaging its satisfaction mean score and its frustration mean score (reversed).  For 
example, the autonomy indicator was built by averaging autonomy satisfaction and 
autonomy frustration (reversed). We also created a latent variable for personal well-
being, using its six indicators (life satisfaction, positive affect, negative affect, 
depressive symptoms, vitality and physical symptoms of ill-health). In Model 2, we 
                                                 
3 Due to the smaller Chilean sample size, this model caused problems in estimation, and so it was not 
possible to control for these variables in Chile. 
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decided to split the total need satisfaction measure into its three distinctive needs and 
modelled our constructs as observed variables
4
. In Model 2 we created a total well-
being indicator. Following the logic of well-being research and several studies in the 
SDT field (Reis et al., 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Krieger, 2007; Sheldon 
& Niemiec, 2006), this variable was built by standardizing the life satisfaction, the 
positive affect, the vitality, the depressive symptoms (reversed), the negative affect 
(reversed) and the physical symptoms (reversed) scales and then averaging them. 
Therefore, higher scores in this variable imply higher levels of well-being. 
Model 1: The link between total need satisfaction and well-being  
UK sample. In Model 1 (Figure 2.1), we tested our hypothesis about the link 
between total basic psychological need satisfaction and well-being. We started with a 
structural cross-lagged reciprocal model for our core variables. By doing so, we allow 
all the constructs to be represented as causal antecedents and/or consequences of all 
other constructs. In order to control for metric invariance, we constrained all the factor 
loadings to be equal across the waves. We followed the same procedure in all our 
further models. We incorporated auto-correlated error terms for the observed indicators 
of our latent variables as suggested by Jöreskog (1979) and Schlueter et al. (2008). We 
also allowed negative affect and depressive symptoms to covary within T1. 
                                                 
4
 Due to the high correlation between the three needs that may lead to suppression effects if we employ 
latent variables, we decided to model all of them as observed variables. The correlations between 
autonomy and competence were as follows: Wave 1 (UK: r = .46, p < .001; Chile: r = .60, p < .001), 
Wave 2 (UK: r = .51, p < 001; Chile: r = .49, p < 001) and Wave 3 (UK: r = .46, p < .001; Chile: r = .75, 
p < .001). The correlations between autonomy and relatedness were as follows: Wave 1 (UK: r = .47, p < 
.001; Chile: r = .42, p < .001), Wave 2 (UK: r = .55, p < 001; Chile: r = .49, p < 001) and Wave 3 (UK: r 
= .55, p < .001; Chile: r = .56, p < .001). The correlations between relatedness and competence were as 
follows: Wave 1 (UK: r = .47, p < .001; Chile: r = .55, p < .001), Wave 2 (UK: r = .49, p < 001; Chile: r 
= .55, p < 001) and Wave 3 (UK: r = .50, p < .001; Chile: r = .53, p < .001). We will follow the same 
reasoning in Models 3 and 4. 
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Figure 2. 1: Model 1. Structural model for the associations between total basic need satisfaction (including the satisfaction and the frustration items) and well-being in the UK 
and Chile.  
Note: Coefficients shown are standardized paths. Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms, loadings and covariances are not shown to enhance visual clarity. TBNS = total basic need 
satisfaction. Pi = parcel i; LS = Life Satisfaction; Dep = depressive symptoms; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; Vit = vitality; GHQ = Negative Physiological Symptoms . Solid lines = 
significant/marginal paths in both countries. Dotted lines = significant/marginal paths only in one country. Paths are only shown when at least one country reach significance or marginal 
significance. † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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To gain statistical power for our hypothesis tests, and because we did not expect 
differences in the path trajectories across waves, we constrained all the corresponding 
lagged paths to be equal between T1 and T2 and between T2 and T3 within each 
country. Hence, each of our hypotheses is represented by a single parameter test 
representing the combined effect from H1 to H2 and from H2 to H3. We followed the 
same procedure in all further models
5
.  
In Model 1 and in all further models we followed Kline’s (2005) criteria for 
assessing model fit: RMSEA values of  ≤ .05 indicate close approximate fit; values 
between .05 and .08 suggest a  reasonable error of approximation, and values above .10 
are not acceptable. CFI values greater than .90 indicate an acceptable fit and values 
greater than .95 indicate a good fit. 
Model 1 results revealed an acceptable model fit, χ²(305) = 1681.46, p < .001, 
CFI = .90 and RMSEA = .07. All our latent variables had acceptable loadings, ranging 
from .62 to .84 in Wave 1, from .73 to .84 in Wave 2, and from .58 to .85 in Wave 3.  
In the UK, Model 1 results showed that total basic need satisfaction was a 
significant and positive prospective predictor of well-being, β = .31, p < .01. We also 
found that well-being was a significant positive prospective predictor of basic need 
satisfaction, β = .17, p < .05.  
Chilean sample. We replicated the same model and the same procedure in Chile 
(Figure 2.1). The model fit showed a marginally acceptable model fit, χ²(305) = 69.47, p 
< .001, CFI = .88 and RMSEA = .06. All our latent variables in Chile had acceptable 
loadings, ranging from .49 to .71 in Wave 1, from .61 to .82 in Wave 2, and from .62 
to .85 in Wave 3.  
In Chile, Model 1 showed that total basic need satisfaction was a significant 
positive prospective predictor of well-being, β = .52, p < .05, but the reversed effect did 
not reach significance, β = -.11, p = .54.  
Model 2: The link between autonomy, competence and relatedness and well-
being  
UK sample. In Model 2 (Figure 2.2), we explored the unique role played by the 
three needs (autonomy, competence and relatedness) on well-being. First, we set up a 
four-factor cross-lagged model. We allowed our variables to covary within each time 
                                                 
5
 Although the unstandardized paths were constrained to equality, the corresponding standardized paths 
may differ slightly. For simplicity, in the main text we report the standardized paths from T1 to T2. Paths 
from T2 to T3 may be found in the respective figures. 
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point. The results demonstrated an acceptable model fit, χ²(32) = 224.03, p < .001, CFI 
= .95 and RMSEA = .08.  
In the UK, Model 2 showed that only the need for relatedness (β = .08, p < .001) 
was a significant positive prospective predictor of well-being. The needs for autonomy 
(β = .03, p = .18) and the need for competence (β = .01, p = .61) did not reach 
significance.  However, we found that well-being was a significant positive prospective 
predictor of the needs for autonomy (β = .17, p < .001), competence (β = .30, p < .001) 
and relatedness (β = .29, p < .001).  
Chilean sample. We followed the same procedure in the Chilean sample (Figure 
2.2). The results demonstrated an marginally acceptable model fit, χ²(32) = 92.25, p 
< .001, CFI = .90 and RMSEA = .09.  
In Chile, none of the three needs was an individually significant prospective 
predictor of well-being (autonomy, β = .10, p = .15; competence, β = .10, p = .20; 
relatedness, β = -.03, p = .65). However, we found that well-being was a significant 
positive prospective predictor of the need for autonomy (β = .26, p < .001) and a 
marginal positive prospective predictor of the need for relatedness (β = .14, p = .07). 
The link between well-being and the need of competence did not reach statistical 
significance, β = .13, p = .13. 
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Figure 2. 2: Model 2. Structural model for the associations between the needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness (including the satisfaction and  the frustration items) 
and well-being in the UK and Chile 
Note: Coefficients shown are standardized paths. Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms and covariances are not shown to enhance visual clarity. Solid lines = significant/marginal paths 
in both countries. Dotted lines = significant /marginal paths only in one country. Paths are only shown when at least one country reach significance or marginal significance. † p < .10, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Phase 2: The link between basic psychological need satisfaction, basic 
psychological need frustration and positive and negative well-being. In this section, 
we aim to explore the differential hypothesized role played by psychological need 
satisfaction and psychological need frustration in both positive and negative well-being. 
Following Vansteenkiste and Ryan (2013), we predicted that need satisfaction would be 
primarily associated with growth and wellness, and need frustration primarily with 
malfunctioning and ill-being, but we also expect to observe weaker cross-paths. 
Therefore, in Model 3 we tested the differential role played by basic need satisfaction 
and basic need frustration in positive and negative well-being. 
We modelled all constructs in this phase as observed variables
6
. Basic need 
satisfaction and basic need frustration were computed using means of the relevant items. 
To test our expectation that the need satisfaction scale would be more predictive of 
positive well-being outcomes whereas the need frustration scale would be more 
predictive of negative well-being outcomes, we modelled positive and negative well-
being as two different constructs. Following the logic of subjective well-being research 
and several studies in the SDT field (Reis et al., 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon 
& Krieger, 2007; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006), we created an aggregate positive well-
being score by standardizing the life satisfaction, the positive affect and the vitality 
scales and then averaging them (each of the three scales was equally weighted). We 
followed the same procedure to create a negative well-being measure by standardizing 
and then averaging the depressive symptoms, the negative affect and the physical 
symptoms of ill-health standardized scores.  
Model 3: The link between basic need satisfaction, basic need frustration and 
positive and negative well-being 
UK sample. First, we set up a four-factor cross-lagged model (Figure 2.3). We 
allowed our variables to covary within each time-point. The results showed a marginally 
acceptable model fit, χ²(32) = 231.40, p < .001, CFI = .96 and RMSEA = .08.  
In the UK,  Model 3 showed that basic need satisfaction was a significant 
positive prospective predictor of positive well-being, β = .15, p < .001 and need 
                                                 
6 As in Model 2, due to the high correlation between our main constructs that may lead to suppression 
effects if we employ latent variables, we decided to model all of them as observed variables. The 
correlations between positive and negative well-being were as follows: Wave 1 (UK: r = -.63, p < .001; 
Chile: r = -.58, p < .001), Wave 2 (UK: r = -.63, p < 001; Chile: r = -.60, p < 001) and Wave 3 (UK: r = -
.65, p < .001; Chile: r = -.75, p < .001). The correlations between need satisfaction and need frustration 
were as follows: Wave 1 (UK: r = -.43, p < .001; Chile: r = -.47, p < .001), Wave 2 (UK: r = -.46, p < 
001; Chile: r = -.33, p < 001) and Wave 3 (UK: r = -.54, p < .001; Chile: r = -.44, p < .001).  
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frustration was a significant positive prospective predictor of negative well-being, β 
= .10, p < .01. 
We did not find a significant link either between need frustration and positive 
well-being or between need satisfaction and negative well-being.  
We also found that positive well-being (β = .21, p < .001) and negative well-
being (β = -.10, p < .01) were both significant prospective predictors of basic need 
satisfaction.  
Finally, we found that negative well-being was a significant prospective 
predictor of both basic need frustration (β = .29, p < .001) and of positive well-being (β 
= -.09, p < .01). 
Chilean sample. We replicated Model 3 In Chile (Figure 2.3), following the 
same procedure than in the UK. We allowed our variables to covary within each time-
point. We also allowed negative well-being between T1 and T3 and positive well-being 
between T2 and T3 to co-vary. Model 3 showed a marginally acceptable model fit, 
χ²(30) = 93.30, p < .001, CFI = .91 and RMSEA = .09.  
In Chile, Model 3 showed that basic need satisfaction was a significant positive 
prospective predictor of positive well-being, β = .15, p < .05.  Moreover, need 
satisfaction was a significant positive prospective predictor of negative well-being, β = -
.15, p < .05. In addition, need satisfaction was a significant prospective negative 
predictor of need frustration, β = -.19, p < .05. Finally, we found that negative well-
being was a significant prospective positive predictor of need frustration, β = .27, p 
< .05, as well as a significant negative prospective predictor of positive well-being, β = -
.14, p < .05. 
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Figure 2. 3: Model 3. Structural model for the associations between the need satisfaction, need frustration, positive well-being and negative well-being in the UK and Chile.  
Note: Coefficients shown are standardized path. Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms and covariances are not shown to enhance visual clarity. Solid lines = significant/marginal paths 
in both countries. Dotted lines = significant /marginal paths only in one country. Paths are only shown when at least one country reach significance or marginal significance. † p < .10, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Phase 3: The bi-directional link between basic psychological need 
satisfaction and well-being: Integrating hedonic and eudaimonic approaches. 
In our final phase, we explored the hypothesized bi-directional link between 
basic psychological need satisfaction and subjective well-being
7
. We modelled all 
constructs as observed indicators
8
 using the following procedure. First, a total basic 
need satisfaction measure (need satisfaction and need frustration items) was computed 
using its observed means scores. Need frustration score was reversed. Second, we 
created subjective well-being and mental and physical illness measures following 
previous studies in the SWB area (Reis et al., 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & 
Krieger, 2007; Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006). SWB was built by standardizing the positive 
affect, the negative affect (reversed) and the life satisfaction scales and then averaging 
them. Therefore, higher scores imply higher levels of subjective well-being. The mental 
and physical illness measure was created by standardizing and then averaging the 
depressive symptoms, the vitality (reversed) and the physical symptoms of ill-health 
scores. Therefore, higher scores in this variable imply lower levels of mental and 
physical health. 
Model 4: The link between total need satisfaction, subjective well-being and 
mental and physical illness  
UK sample. In Model 4 (Figure 2.4), we aim to integrate hedonic and 
eudaimonic approaches. First, we set up a three-factor cross-lagged model allowing our 
variables to covary within each time-point. We also allowed to covary subjective well-
being between T1 and T3. The results showed an acceptable model fit, χ²(17) = 132.08, 
p < .001, CFI = .97 and RMSEA = .08.  
In the UK, Model 4 shows that basic need satisfaction and subjective well-being 
has a bi-directional link. Basic need satisfaction was a significant positive prospective 
predictor of subjective well-being, β = .13, p < .001, which in turn was a significant 
positive prospective predictor of basic need satisfaction, β = .12, p < .01. We also found 
                                                 
7
 We also tested this reverse causality in phases 1 and 2, but more broadly. In phase 3 we create an 
specific measure for SWB. 
8
 Following the same reasoning than in models 2 and 3 (high correlations between our main constructs 
may lead to suppression effects if we employ latent variables), we decided to model all them as observed 
variables. The correlations between subjective well-being and mental and physical illness were as 
follows: Wave 1 (UK:  r = -.87, p < .001; Chile:  r = -.84, p < .001), Wave 2 (UK:  r = -.88, p < 001; 
Chile:  r = -.86, p < 001) and Wave 3 (UK:  r = -.89, p < .001; Chile:  r = -.92, p < .001). 
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that need satisfaction was a significant negative prospective predictor of mental and 
physical illness, β = -.10, p < .01, which in turn was a significant negative prospective 
predictor  of need satisfaction, β = -.21, p < .001. Finally, mental and physical illness 
was a significant negative prospective predictor of subjective well-being, β = -.16, p 
< .001, which in turn was a significant negative prospective predictor of mental and 
physical illness, β = -.10, p < .01. 
Chilean sample. In Chile, we replicated the same procedure than in the UK. We 
allowed our variables to covary within each time-point, as well as mental and physical 
health between T1 and T3 and subjective well-being between T1 and T3. The model 
showed a marginally acceptable model fit, χ²(17) = 52.65, p < .001, CFI = .95 and 
RMSEA = 09.  
In Chile, Model 4 (Figure 2.4) showed that basic need satisfaction was a 
significant positive prospective predictor of subjective well-being, β = .16, p < .001, and 
that subjective well-being was a marginally significant positive prospective predictor of 
basic need satisfaction, β = .21, p = .09. Moreover, mental and physical illness was a 
marginal negative prospective predictor of subjective well-being, β = -.18, p = .06 
which in turn was a marginal negative prospective predictor of mental and physical 
illness, β = -.18, p = .08.
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Figure 2. 4: Model 4. Structural model for the associations between total need satisfaction (including the satisfaction and the frustration items), subjective well-being and 
mental and physical illness in the UK and Chile. 
Note: Coefficients shown are standardized paths. Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms and covariances are not shown to enhance visual clarity. Solid lines = significant/marginal paths 
in both countries. Dotted lines = significant/marginal paths only in one country. Paths are only shown when at least one country reach significance or marginal significance. † p < .10, * p < .05, 
** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
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Discussion 
Research on the link between need satisfaction (three different aspects of 
eudaimonic well-being) and well-being has some important gaps. An especially 
important one is that most of the previous studies do not allow causality between the 
core variables to be implied. In our research, through a more comprehensive 
longitudinal cross-lagged among adults from two different cultures, the UK and Chile, 
we extended previous studies on the link between need satisfaction and well-being 
aiming to integrate hedonic and eudaimonic approaches. We tested our assumptions in a 
general life setting, over a three-year design, assessing more comprehensive well-being 
measures than research so far. Moreover, we used for the first time a balanced need 
satisfaction/need frustration balanced scale (Sheldon & Gunz, 2009) to test 
longitudinally our core associations. Our main contribution is to show how need 
satisfaction and well-being and how hedonic and eudaimonic well-being are related 
across time.  
Model 1 showed that higher need satisfaction was a significant positive 
prospective predictor of well-being in the UK and Chile. Moreover, Model 1 also 
showed that higher well-being was a significant positive prospective predictor of higher 
need satisfaction in the UK. 
When we split total need satisfaction into the three basic psychological needs, 
Model 2 showed that in the UK, only the need for relatedness prospectively predicted 
higher levels of well-being. Our results highlighted the key importance of feeling 
connected, appreciated and understood by others who are important to us through 
intimate, meaningful and deep relationships, supporting previous studies showing that 
relatedness is often at or very near the top of the factors influencing well-being (Ryan 
and Deci, 2001). In Chile, none of the three needs reached statistical significance.  
Model 2 also showed that in the UK, well-being was a significant positive 
prospective predictor of the three needs, supporting the hypothesized reversed link from 
well-being to need satisfaction. In Chile, well-being was a significant positive 
prospective predictor of the need for autonomy and a marginal positive predictor of the 
need for relatedness. 
When we split total need satisfaction into its sub-scales (need satisfaction and 
need frustration) and well-being into positive and negative well-being, our results 
supported theoretical predictions arguing that people’s tendencies towards both well-
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being and ill-being may be explained not only by basic psychological need satisfaction, 
but also by need frustration (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013). For example, Model 3 
showed that basic need satisfaction was a significant positive prospective predictor of 
positive well-being in the UK and Chile. In addition, Model 3 also found that need 
frustration was a significant positive prospective predictor of negative well-being in the 
UK. These results show that higher basic need satisfaction significantly predicts higher 
positive well-being, but, as expected, need frustration does not. Moreover, need 
frustration significantly predicts higher levels of negative well-being, but need 
satisfaction is unrelated with it. Therefore, these results supported previous claims 
arguing that the lack of need fulfilment does not necessarily entail the experience of 
need frustration, as each of them has a distinctive effect on people’s positive and 
negative well-being (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 2013).  
Finally, our paper also allows us to integrate hedonic and eudaimonic research. 
We specifically tested the bi-directional link between need satisfaction (as a measure of 
psychological/eudaimonic well-being) and hedonic well-being (as indexed as subjective 
well-being). Our results from Model 4 showed that despite the fact that both constructs 
tap in different factors (Keyes et al., 2002; Ryff, 1989), they are closely related through 
a bi-directional link in the UK and Chile. In fact, basic need satisfaction was a positive 
prospective predictor of subjective well-being and vice versa (although in Chile the 
reverse link reached marginal significance). Therefore, extending previous correlational 
findings exploring the associations between both constructs, we showed that in both 
countries SWB and need satisfaction complement each other reciprocally, thereby 
providing a sense of self-congruency, as stated by psychological well-being research 
(Keyes et al., 2002). Our key results thus show how both eudaimonic and hedonic 
constructs are related over time. 
We should acknowledge some limitations of the current research. First, all 
measures were self-reported, and objective evaluations of well/ill-being would be 
desirable. Second, given that our participants were all university graduates, we should 
be cautious about generalizing these findings to poorer and less educated groups. Third, 
our research may reflect only two countries characterizations (the UK and Chile) and, 
possibly, middle- and upper class socio-economic status. That is a key reason to 
understand why different samples and cultures need to be explored in further research. 
Fourth, we only employed three scales for measuring PBW, those studied from the SDT 
perspective. Future research should explore the link between hedonic and eudaimonic 
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approaches using a wider variety of PWB indicators (Ryff, 1989). Fifth, despite the 
strong causal evidence for the link between need satisfaction and well-being, our 
longitudinal design does not rule out the possibility of a third, unmeasured variable that 
influences both constructs. Nonetheless, our cross-lagged results significantly 
strengthen the case for a causal link between the core variables, because they 
established temporal precedence.  
In summary, our results support the view that total basic psychological need 
satisfaction provides the experiential nutrients for people’s well-being (Sheldon & 
Krieger, 2007). However, it seems that at least in this research, only the need for 
relatedness is driving this effect. Importantly, need satisfaction may start a reverse 
process where well-being may also foster satisfaction of the psychological needs 
(different aspects of eudaimonic well-being), leading to a virtuous circle of growth and 
flourishing. However, when the needs are not fulfilled (or are frustrated), the process 
may lead to a vicious circle of vulnerabilities and defensiveness (Vansteenkiste & Ryan, 
2013). All in all, our key results point to an integration of hedonic and eudaimonic 
approaches. 
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Abstract 
We explored the link between intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals and 
environmentally responsible behaviour using correlational (Study 1) and longitudinal 
(Study 2) data from adult participants in a mass consumer society (UK) and a fast 
developing nation (Chile). Study 1 showed that, in both countries, a higher relative 
importance attached to intrinsic life goals was associated with higher levels of 
environmentally responsible behaviour, over and above environmental worldviews and 
environmental identification. Study 2 showed that life goals prospectively predicted 
environmentally responsible behaviour over a three-year period, whereas environmental 
worldviews and environmental identification did not. These results support arguments 
that focusing on intrinsic life goals (self-development, community involvement, 
relationships) rather than extrinsic life goals (money, fame, image) may be important 
not only for personal well-being, but also for the well-being of future generations.  
Introduction 
A substantial body of research has shown a link between people’s life goals or 
aspirations and their personal well-being. People pursuing more intrinsic rather than 
extrinsic (or materialistic) life goals tend to show higher life satisfaction (e.g., 
Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002; Kasser, 2002; Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & Duriez, 2008), 
self-actualization (e.g., Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996), positive affect (e.g., Christopher, 
& Schlenker, 2004), vitality (e.g., Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002), and happiness (e.g., 
Burroughs & Rindfleisch, 2002), as well as lower negative affect (e.g., Christopher, 
Kuo, Abraham, Noel, & Linz, 2004), alcohol and substance use (e.g., Williams, Cox, 
Hedberg, & Deci, 2000), physical problems (e.g., Kasser & Ryan, 1996), and depressive 
symptoms (Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006). These associations have been 
confirmed in a recent meta-analysis (Dittmar, Bond, Kasser, & Hurst, in press).  
A few studies have suggested that life goals might also have implications for the 
natural environment. For example, people who attach a higher importance to extrinsic 
values and life goals may tend to engage in more damaging environmental behaviour 
(Banerjee & McKeage, 2004; Brown & Kasser, 2005; Richins & Dawson, 1992; 
Sheldon & McGregor, 2000). However, the existing evidence has been limited to a 
small number of cross-sectional studies, conducted mostly among students and other 
young people in a few Western nations, and it remains unclear to what extent intrinsic 
(versus extrinsic) life goals are causally implicated in environmentally responsible 
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behaviour, over and above the effects of other likely predictors such as a pro-
environmental worldview and a sense of identification with the natural environment. 
Here, we explored whether intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals would predict 
environmentally responsible behaviour, over and above any effects of environmental 
worldviews and environmental identification, among adults in the UK and Chile, using 
both cross-sectional and longitudinal data, in order to provide evidence for the causal 
direction of the relationships observed. 
Life Goals and their Link to Environmentally Responsible Behaviour 
Climate change and global warming are the biggest human challenges of the 
21st Century (United Nations Development Programme, 2007). The future of the 
environment is in serious danger, mainly due to human consumption activity (Brown & 
Kasser, 2005; Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 2002; Crompton & Kasser, 
2009). In this process, peoples’ life goals and aspirations are thought to have played a 
key negative role that needs to be deeply understood in order to protect the well-being 
of future generations (Crompton & Kasser, 2009; Tanner, 1999). 
In recent years, several correlational studies have explored the link between 
extrinsic life goals (or materialistic values) and environmentally damaging behaviour. 
Richins and Dawson (1992) found, in a sample of US households, that more 
materialistic people were less likely to buy used goods or to use bicycles instead of cars, 
but also had a lower ecological awareness, such as recycling and contributing to 
ecological organizations. In a study of UK households, Gatersleben, White, Abrahamse, 
Jackson, and Uzzell (2009) found that the people scoring higher in materialism attached 
greater importance to possessions associated with high energy use, such as TVs, mobile 
phones and cars, attached less importance to energy-conserving processes, and showed 
less willingness to change a range of ecologically irresponsible behaviour. In samples of 
US adolescents and adults, Brown and Kasser (2005) found that ecologically 
responsible behaviour was positively associated with an intrinsic (versus extrinsic) 
value orientation. Studying common social dilemmas among young students in the US, 
Sheldon & McGregor (2000) explored the association between life goals and harvesting 
strategies, finding that more extrinsically oriented students would consume limited 
ecological resources at more unsustainable rates. In a sample of American students, 
Banerjee & McKeage (1994) found that environmentally-friendly consumption was  
negatively related to materialism. Furthermore, in a recent nation-level analysis across 
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20 wealthy nations, Kasser (2011) found that countries placing a higher priority on the 
value of harmony (intrinsic) versus the value of mastery (extrinsic), tended to have 
lower CO2 emissions, after controlling for effects of national wealth.  
Although these studies provide supportive evidence for a link between life goals 
or values and environmental behaviour, they are all based on one-shot correlational 
designs, making it impossible to untangle the causal direction between these two 
variables. Do intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life-goals lead to more ecologically responsible 
behaviour, or does ecologically responsible behaviour lead to more intrinsic life-goals. 
We are aware of just one study to date that has used an experimental design to address 
this question: Sheldon, Nichols, & Kasser, (2011) found that American students 
recommended smaller ecological footprints when they were prompted to think of 
intrinsic values as characteristically American. However, their dependent measure 
involved participants’ responses to a highly imaginary scenario, and the authors did not 
measure whether their manipulation affected participants’ everyday behaviour. Hence, 
we believe there is an urgent need for systematic longitudinal research to help 
disentangle the causal relationship between people’s life goals and their everyday 
behaviour.  
In summary, previous studies have associated a higher focus on extrinsic (versus 
intrinsic) life goals with several anti-ecological behaviour that negatively affect the 
well-being of the Earth, suggesting that an intrinsic value orientation would be more 
beneficial for the sustainability of the planet. However, as confirmed by a recent meta-
analysis (Hurst, Dittmar, Bond, & Kasser, 2013), there are still three important research 
gaps in the field that we aim to address: 
First, to date, there are no longitudinal studies exploring the relationship 
between life goals and everyday environmental behaviour. Therefore, longitudinal 
evidence is necessary to disentangle the correct direction of the link. 
Second, although research has suggested that environmental behaviour may be 
affected by life goals, environmental worldviews and environmental identification, 
these variables have never been studied together (Gatersleben, Murtagh, & Abrahamse, 
2012). Therefore, we know little about their combined impact on environmental 
behaviour, nor how these variable are related to each other. Crucially, it seems 
important to know whether life goals add variance to predictions of environmentally 
responsible behaviour, over and above the possible effects of these other predictors. 
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Third, most of the research so far has been conducted among students and other 
young people in the western world. To date, there is still very little research among 
adult samples. However, there is empirical evidence showing that environmental 
behaviour might differ significantly between adults and younger generations (Grouzet et 
al., 2005; Hurst et al., in press; Sparks et al., 2014). 
Notably, adults may have more freedom and economic resources to make 
decisions that may affect the environment, whereas students may have more of these 
decisions made for them. That is mainly because students normally do not have a 
regular salary. They depend on their parents’ decisions. Moreover, according to our 
knowledge, all published research studying the link between intrinsic (versus extrinsic) 
life goals and self-report of actual environmental behaviour has conducted in western 
nations, which is a very small part of the world population (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2010). The case of Chile, a South American country, is 
especially interesting to study. Its fast economic growth has led to higher GDP per 
capita (United Nations Development Programme, 2010) which in turn may provide new 
opportunities for a larger number of people in the country to follow the dangerous 
messages of global consumer culture and thus to make choices that damage the natural 
environment (Brown & Kasser, 2005).  
These arguments show the need for a detailed exploration of the associations 
between environmental behaviour, life goals, environmental worldviews and 
environmental identification in a more comprehensive model, employing adult samples 
across different cultures, and using a longitudinal design to help disentangle the causal 
links between the constructs. 
Alternative Predictors of Environmentally Responsible Behaviour 
Research has consistently shown that a pro-environmental worldview is 
associated with more environmentally responsible behaviour (Gatersleben, Murtagh, et 
al., 2012; Gatersleben, White, Abrahamse, Jackson, & Uzzell, 2010; Steg & Vlek, 
2009).  These findings have been confirmed through meta-analysis (Hines, Hungerford, 
& Tomera, 1987; Bamberg & Möser, 2007) and longitudinal research (Kaiser, Wölfing, 
& Fuhrer, 1999).  
Because we live in times of disengagement from the natural environment, and 
people’s sense of disconnection with it may lead to detrimental consequences for our 
planet (Sparks et al., 2014), research has shown an increasing interest in the study of 
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environmental identification  and its link to environmental behaviour (Mayer & Frantz, 
2004; Schultz, 2001). Basically, the concept of environmental identification (an 
example of an extended self) reflects a person’s sense of connection to nature, and 
therefore, it may affect the ways in which people perceive the natural world (Crompton 
& Kasser, 2009). 
Some scholars have stated that environmental identification may motivate 
environmentally responsible behaviour: If people see themselves as environmentally 
friendly, they may tend to show higher levels of pro-environmental behaviour in terms 
of, for example, waste, transport and buying behaviours (Gatersleben, Murtagh, et al., 
2012). Some research has supported these claims. For example, Whitmarsh & O’Neill 
(2010) found that environmental identitification was positively associated with several 
pro-environmental behaviour, and Nigbur, Lyons, & Uzzell (2010) reported that pro-
environmental self-identity related positively not only to pro-environmental intentions, 
but also to self-reports of pro-environment behaviour.  
Therefore, it seems likely that intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals, 
environmental worldviews and environmental identification will each be significantly 
associated with pro-environmental behaviour. However, we sought to show 
additionally, using a longitudinal research design that would be sensitive to temporal 
sequencing, the extent to which each of these variables would be a unique prospective 
predictor (i.e. an antecedent) of environmentally responsible behaviour, while 
controlling for effects of the other two variables. 
Contexts for the Present Research: the UK and Chile 
Extrinsic and materialistic life goals have been present in developed countries 
and long-established mass consumer societies – e.g. UK and US – for many years 
(Twenge & Kasser 2013). Moreover, some research has explored these constructs in 
developing countries such Russia (Ryan, Chirkov, Little, Sheldon, Timoshina, & Deci, 
1999), India (Dittmar & Kapur, 2011) and Chile (Unanue, Dittmar, Vignoles, & 
Vansteenkiste, 2013). In the current study, we collected data from adult participants in 
the UK and Chile. 
Chile and the UK differ in several respects such as geography, economic wealth 
and consumer culture penetration (United Nations Development Programme, 2010), and 
thus it seems important to test our hypotheses among participants in these two very 
different national contexts. Indeed, Gatersleben, Jackson, Meadows, Soto, & Yan (2012) 
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have found that the link between materialistic values and environmental outcomes did 
not appear to be universal and might be culturally specific: they found that materialism 
was a significant predictor of environmental worldviews and ecologically responsible 
behaviour intentions in the UK and in Spain, but not in China. Such findings raise the 
question as to what extent intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals may yield similar or 
different results in the UK and Chile, especially since no previous research has explored 
these relationships in a South American context. No previously published research has 
examined the relationship between life goals and the environment in non-Western 
countries using a broad measure of extrinsic (versus intrinsic) aspirations such as the 
employed by Kasser and Ryan (1996). The only study to date (Gatersleben, Jackson et 
al., 2012) that has explored these issues outside the Western world, used a much 
narrower measure of materialistic values (Richins & Dawson, 1992). Moreover, they 
measured environmental behaviour intentions instead of asking participants to report on 
their actual behaviour. Therefore, analysing the link between life goals and self-reports 
of actual behaviour in the UK, a mass established consumer society, and Chile, a South 
American country in fast economic transition, is of much interest. As mentioned before, 
Chilean’s fast economic growth (United Nations Development Programme, 2010) may 
provide new opportunities for a larger number of people in the country to do more 
damage to the environment, making this an especially important context in which to 
study these processes.  
The Present Research 
Despite some research showing significant associations between intrinsic 
(versus extrinsic) life goals and environmentally responsible behaviour, there is still 
relatively little evidence to support the idea, and there are important research gaps – 
mentioned above – that need to be addressed. In the current research, among samples of 
UK and Chilean adults, we sought to extend previous findings into the link between 
intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals and environmentally responsible behaviour in the 
following three ways.  
First (Study 2), we employed a longitudinal design to disentangle the correct 
temporal sequence in the link between intrinsic (relative to extrinsic) life goals and 
environmentally responsible behaviour. 
Second (Study 1 and Study 2), because it has been shown that environmental 
behaviour is associated with pro-environmental worldviews and environmental 
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identification, as well as with intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life-goals, we studied for the 
first time all these key variables together, in order to increase our understanding of their 
relative impact on environmental behaviour. 
Third (Study 1 and Study 2), we tested whether the paths in our model are 
moderated by national context, comparing the UK – an established mass consumer 
society – with Chile – a fast-growing new economy employing adult samples. 
In summary, we tested the following hypotheses in our UK and Chilean samples 
(see Figure 1):  
(H1) A stronger importance attached to extrinsic (relative to intrinsic) life goals 
will predict lower environmentally responsible behaviour both 
contemporaneously (Study 1) and prospectively (Study 2).  
 
(H2) Stronger environmental worldviews will predict higher environmentally 
responsible behaviour both contemporaneously (Study 1) and prospectively 
(Study 2).  
 
(H3) A stronger environmental identification will predict higher 
environmentally responsible behaviour both contemporaneously (Study 1) and 
prospectively (Study 2).  
 
Study 1 
Method  
Participants and procedure. British and Chilean graduates took part in a 
research project on materialism, personal well-being and environmental worldviews, 
attitudes and behaviour where the core measures for the present paper were collected 
(see also Unanue et al., 2013). The British sample consisted of 958 adults living in the 
UK, ranging in age from 20 to 77 years (Mean = 44.68; SD = 13.98). Respondents (59% 
female) were former graduates, recruited through the alumni office of a university in the 
South East of England. The Chilean sample consisted of 257 adults living in Chile, 
ranging in age from 19 to 71 years (Mean = 34.81; SD = 10.54). Respondents (53% 
female) were also all former graduates, recruited mostly through the alumni office of a 
university in Santiago, but also through personal contacts of the first author. Participants 
were sent an introductory email containing a brief description of the study along with a 
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web link to the survey. The UK participants were offered entry into a prize draw for 
university memorabilia. In Chile, the same instructions were sent but participants were 
not offered entry into a prize draw.  All participants provided written consent and were 
informed that they could withdraw from the study at any point. The purpose of the 
research was described in broad terms (hence, no deception was involved), and 
respondents were given the opportunity to receive a summary of the research findings. 
The first page of the survey contained a brief description of the study, and the second 
page informed participants of their right to withdraw at any time, as well as assuring 
their anonymity and confidentiality with regards to their responses. Then, participants 
were asked to complete the core measures for the present research: materialism, pro-
environmental worldviews, environmentally responsible behaviour and environmental 
identification. Some other measures were collected but they are not relevant for the 
present research (see Unanue et al., 2013). The final section of the survey assessed 
demographic details, including (among others), age and gender. This project used 
various scales, the majority of which are known to have good psychometric properties. 
The questionnaire was translated into Spanish for the Chilean participants, and 
equivalence of meaning with the English version was checked through established back-
translation procedures (Brislin, 1970). 
Measures. We modelled all constructs as latent variables using three indicators 
per factor. Following the recommendations of Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman 
(2002), we created item parcels for each measure except for environmental 
identification, as described below.  
Intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals. This variable was modelled as a latent 
variable, using a shortened, 30-item version of the Aspiration Index (AI; Kasser & Ryan, 
1993, 1996) to assess the importance of different life goals.  We used six categories of 
aspirations with five specific items within each category. Aspirations are either extrinsic 
(money, image, fame) or intrinsic (self-development, community involvement and 
affiliation). We asked people to rate how important each goal is to them personally. 
Example items are To be a very wealthy person (money), To have my name known by 
many people (fame), To successfully hide the signs of aging (image), To grow and learn 
new things (self-development), To have good friends that I can count on (affiliation), 
and To work for the betterment of society (community involvement). To obtain the 
relative importance placed on extrinsic aspirations compared to intrinsic ones, we 
followed Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, and De Witte (2007). First, an individual’s 
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overall mean score was subtracted from each individual item. Second, the intrinsic 
items were reversed and an overall extrinsic versus intrinsic (E/I) value score was 
computed by averaging the extrinsic and the (reversed) intrinsic scales. Cronbach’s 
alpha was good in the UK (α = .73, Mean = -1.51, SD = .42) and in Chile (α = .82, 
Mean = -1.40, SD = .36). Positive (negative) scores reflect a tendency to prefer extrinsic 
(intrinsic) rather than intrinsic (extrinsic) values. Third, and finally, we created three 
parcels, each employing one extrinsic and one (reversed) intrinsic scale to be used as 
indicators.  
Pro-environmental worldviews. We used the New Ecological Paradigm scale 
(NEP; Dunlap et al., 2000), a 15-item Likert-type scale designed to measure 
environmental worldview
9
, concerns and beliefs towards the environment. Examples 
items are “We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support” 
and “Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs” 
(reversed). Participants rated these statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The internal reliability of the scale was good, both in the UK (α = .80) and in 
Chile (α = .70). We combined the items into three different parcels.  
Environmental identification. We used the Environmental Identity scale (Hinds 
& Sparks, 2008), a 3-item Likert-type measure designed to evaluate an individual’s 
identification with the natural environment. An example item is “For me, engaging with 
the natural environment gives me a greater sense of who I am”. Participants rated each 
item from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The internal reliability of the scale 
was good, both in the UK (α = .87) and in Chile (α = .83). We modeled environmental 
identification using its 3 single items. 
Environmentally responsible behaviour.  We created an Environmentally 
Responsible Behaviour index using the General Ecological Behaviour questionnaire 
(GEB; Kaiser & Wilson, 2004), a scale designed to measure different kinds of friendly 
and unfriendly ecological behaviour. Examples are “I drive my car in or into the city, 
even when there are other forms of transport” or “I boycott companies with an 
unecological background”. For our index, the original scale was adapted following the 
recommendations of Kaiser et al. (1999). First, the authors recommended that 
environmental behaviour should be measured more generally rather than specifically. 
                                                 
9
 Researchers in the field have often labeled this scale as “pro-environmental attitudes”. However, 
following the original scale authors, we believe that the items of this scale are better interpreted as 
measuring environmental worldviews than attitudes. 
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Second, they suggested that any environmental behaviour measurement approach 
should select which behaviour to measure according to their difficulty. Following this 
advice, we created an environmental behaviour measure focusing on behaviour of an 
average difficulty level. A group of graduate students and faculty from the School of 
Psychology at a university in the South East of England ranked from 1 (never) to 5 
(always) how often they are were used to performing 50 environmental behaviour. We 
asked them “For the following 32 behaviour, please indicate how often you perform 
them” or “For the following 18 behaviour, please indicate whether you perform them 
or not”. Then, we excluded those behaviour that were regularly and easily followed 
(more that 65% of responses), but also those behaviour that were most difficult to 
follow (less than 35% of responses). Thus, in order to focus on behaviour with average 
difficulty we chose the 10 behaviour (e.g., energy conservation, mobility and 
transportation, waste avoidance, consumerism, recycling, social behaviour toward 
conservation) that were followed with average difficulty (around 50% of responses). We 
modelled ecologically responsible behaviour by combining these behaviour into three 
different parcels. 
Environmental knowledge. We also developed an environmental knowledge 
measure using the Environmental Knowledge Scale originally developed by Frick, 
Kaiser, and Wilson (2004) and following the suggestions of Kaiser et al. (1999). 
Example items are “Global warming also has an effect on the Gulf Stream that will 
affect Europe. What is this effect?”  Or “To travel 1 km (1 mile), how much more energy 
is consumed per person by car as compared to by train?”. In building this measure, we 
followed the same procedure as we used for our pro-environmental behaviour measure 
described above.  
Results 
We employed structural equation modelling (SEM, AMOS 18.0) to assess the 
hypothesized associations between intrinsic (versus extrinsic) life goals, environmental 
worldviews, environmental identification and environmentally responsible behaviour, 
both in the UK and Chile. Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for all the study 
variables are shown in Table 3.1. In all analyses (Study 1 and Study 2), we assessed 
model fit based on the recommendations of Hu and Bentler (1999) and Kline (2005). 
According to these authors, RMSEA values ≤ .06 indicate close approximate fit and 
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values between .06 and .08 suggest reasonable error of approximation. CFI values 
greater than .90 indicate acceptable good fit. 
 
Table 3. 1: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in the UK and Chile (Study 
1) 
 
Measurement models. First we tested a four-factor multigroup measurement 
model for both countries in which no constraints were imposed. We allowed all 
variables to covary. The results demonstrated a good model fit, χ²(96) = 238.041, p 
< .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .04. 
To test for metric invariance, we constrained all the factor loadings in our 
measurement model to be equal across the two groups, and then we compared this 
model to the baseline model where no constraints were imposed. The model fit 
remained acceptable: χ² (104) = 287.54, p < .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .04. According 
to Cheung and Rensvold (2002), the assumption of invariance is tenable if the reduction 
in CFI when constraints are imposed is less than .01. Here, the reduction in CFI met this 
criterion (ΔCFI = -.008). Therefore, we considered it acceptable to assume that the 
pattern of factor loadings was invariant across the countries, and so we maintained these 
constraints in the structural models reported below.  
Structural models. We now created a structural model to test our different 
hypotheses (see Figure 3.1). In initial analyses, we controlled for environmental 
knowledge, age and gender in both samples, allowing all these variables to covary and 
to predict environmentally responsible behaviour . However, including these control 
M SD 2 3 4 5 6
UK participants
1. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals (E/I) -1.48 0.60 -.22** -.36** -.28** -.16** -.12**
2. Environmental worldviews 3.74 0.55 .39** .40** .13** .07*
3. Environmentally responsible behaviour 3.54 0.56 .38** .19** .02
4. Environmental identification 3.79 0.92 .18** .12**
5. Gender (female percentage)   -.13**
6. Age 44.70 13.98
Chilean participants
1. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals (E/I) -1.34 0.67 -.10 -.24 -.02 -.19** -.11
2. Environmental worldviews 3.80 0.47 .29** .43** .16** .04
3. Environmentally responsible behaviour 3.02 0.63 .36** .17** .03
4. Environmental identification 4.03 0.88 .11 .11
5. Gender (female percentage)   -.09
6. Age 34.81 10.54
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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variables did not affect our main results. Therefore, for simplicity, we have excluded 
them from the analyses reported here. 
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Figure 3. 1: Structural model for the hypotheses about the links between extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life 
goals, environmental worldviews, environmental identification and environmentally responsible 
behaviour in the UK and Chile.  
 
To test our hypotheses, we set up a multigroup model in which extrinsic (versus 
intrinsic) life goals, pro-environmental worldviews and environmental identification 
were allowed to predict environmentally responsible behaviour. We allowed the three 
predictor variables to covary. Initially, we allowed all the structural paths to freely vary 
across the two national samples. This structural model was statistically equivalent to the 
measurement model, and so fit indices were identical. Results are shown in Figure 3.2. 
Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals was a significant and negative predictor of 
environmentally responsible behaviour in the UK, β = -.33, p < .001 and in Chile, β = -
.28, p < .001, giving empirical support to our first hypothesis.  
Pro-environmental worldview was a significant and positive predictor of 
environmentally responsible behaviour in the UK, β = .31, p < .001 and marginal in 
Chile, β = .19, p < .10, giving empirical support to our second hypothesis.  
Environmental identification was a significant and positive predictor of 
environmentally responsible behaviour in the UK, β = .22, p < .001, and in Chile, β 
= .35, p < .01, giving empirical support to our third hypothesis. 
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Figure 3.2: Structural multigroup model for the associations between extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals, environmental worldviews, environmental identification and 
environmentally responsible behaviour in the UK and Chile.  
Note: Coefficients shown are standardized paths. Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms are not shown to enhance visual clarity. E/I = Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals; EWV = 
Pro-Environmental worldviews; EId= environmental identification; ERB = environmentally responsible behaviour; Pi = parcel (i); † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Additionally, extrinsic (versus intrinsic)  life goals were negatively correlated 
with pro-environmental worldviews, significantly in the UK (β = -.29, p < .001) and 
marginally in Chile (β = -.14, p < .10). Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals were 
negatively correlated with environmental identification in the UK: β = -.35, p < .001, 
but not in Chile: β = -.03, p = .72. Pro-environmental worldviews were positively 
correlated with environmental identification in the UK: β = .45, p < .001 and in Chile: β 
= .54, p < .001.  
Finally, we tested a model where we constrained the corresponding paths from 
our three predictors to environmentally responsible behaviour to be equal across 
cultures. This model continued to show acceptable fit: χ²(107) = 290.82, p < .001, CFI 
= .96, RMSEA = .04. Moreover, the constrained model did not show a significant loss 
of fit compared to the unconstrained model, Δχ²(3) = 3.28, p = .35. Therefore, it may be 
concluded that culture did not significantly moderate the structural relationships 
between our core variables. 
Discussion 
Results from Study 1 supported our expectation that more extrinsically-oriented 
people would tend to show lower levels of environmentally responsible behaviour in 
both countries. Importantly, we showed that life goals significantly predicted 
environmentally responsible behaviour while controlling for the effects of 
environmental worldviews and environmental identification. Our results support the 
claim that a higher focus on external (materialistic) rewards is detrimental for limited 
natural resources. Being focused on extrinsic life goals would conflict with being 
interested in other people’s welfare and with the future of nature, which in turn may 
lead to lower environmentally responsible behaviour.  
Our data also supported our hypothesis in the UK and marginally in Chile about 
the positive link between both pro-environmental worldviews and environmentally 
responsible behaviour, replicating previous findings (Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Hines et 
al., 1987; Steg & Vlek, 2009). Furthermore, in both countries there was a positive link 
between environmental identification and pro-environmental behaviour (Gatersleben, 
Jackson, et al., 2012; Gatersleben, Murtagh, et al. 2012; Nigbur et al., 2010; Whitmarsh 
& O’Neill, 2010).  
In summary, Study 1 showed that a relative higher importance attached to 
extrinsic life goals correlates negatively with environmentally responsible behaviour 
111 
above and beyond the effects of pro-environmental worldviews and environmental 
identification, suggesting that the materialistic messages of our consumer cultures may 
have wide-ranging negative consequences for the planet. Our key results were found not 
only in the UK, with a long-established mass consumer culture, but also in Chile, a 
developing nation which has never been studied using this framework, suggesting that 
the negative consequences of attaching a higher importance to material and external 
rewards may be found across nations.  
Despite the important results provided by Study 1, a key limitation is its cross-
sectional design, which does not allow us to infer causal direction. Hence, we sought to 
rectify this in Study 2, using a longitudinal design with three waves of data collection 
over two years. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and procedure. In 2010 (Study 1, T1), participants were told that 
the project was part of a longitudinal study and were asked for their consent for future 
surveys (T2 and T3). Subsequent e-mails were sent to those who had agreed to continue 
participating. Therefore, data were obtained for a three-wave longitudinal survey (T1 = 
2010, T2 = 2011 and T3 = 2012). We employed the same procedure as in Study 1 to 
collect the data for the three waves. Among the British sample, 461 adults (48.12% of 
time 1; 59% female) ranging in age from 20 to 77 years (Mean = 45.14; SD = 14.06) 
completed all three waves. 594 UK participants completed T2 and 610 completed T3. 
Among the Chilean sample, 76 adults (29.6% of time 1; 47% female) ranging in age 
from 22 to 71 years (Mean = 36.87; SD = 10.21) took part in all three waves. 115 
Chilean participants completed T2 and 114 completed T3. 
Measures. We collected the same variables that we used in Study 1 and we 
modelled all constructs as they were modelled in Study 1. Cronbach’s alphas in the 
three waves were good for all our measures. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals ranged 
from .71 to .74 in the UK and from .81 to .82 in Chile. Pro-environmental worldviews 
ranged from .79 to .80 in the UK and from .67 to .72 in Chile. Environmental 
identification ranged from .84 to .87 in the UK and from .80 to .83 in Chile.  
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Results 
All the constructs of interest were measured at T1, T2 and T3. Descriptive 
statistics and inter-correlations for all the study variables are shown in Table 3.2. We 
employed structural equation modeling (SEM, AMOS 18.0) to assess our main 
hypotheses. We employed an autoregressive cross-lagged model (Finkel, 1995) for 
testing our causal hypotheses. Each construct was regressed on both its own lagged 
score as well as the other constructs’ lagged scores. As in Study 1, we modelled the 
constructs as latent variables with three indicators for each construct, in order to account 
for measurement error (Finkel, 1995; Schlueter et al., 2008). 
Measurement models. First we set up a four-factor multigroup measurement 
model for both countries in which no constraints were imposed. As suggested by 
Jöreskog (1979) and Schlueter et al. (2008), we incorporated auto-correlated error terms 
for the observed indicators. We allowed all our variables to covary. The results 
demonstrated a good model fit, χ²(1040) = 1642.31, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .02. 
In order to test for metric invariance, we constrained all the factor loadings to be equal 
across the waves and across the groups, and then we compared this model to the 
baseline model where no constraints were imposed.  The model fit remained good: χ² 
(1056) = 1680.04, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .02. Following Cheung and Rensvold 
(2002), as the reduction in CFI was less than .01, it was safe to assume that the pattern 
of factor loadings was invariant over time and across countries. Hence, we maintained 
these constraints in all further structural models reported below.  
Cross-lagged models. We now set up our main structural model to test our 
hypotheses. We started with a structural cross-lagged reciprocal model for our core 
variables (see Figure 3.3). By doing so, we allow all the constructs to be represented as 
causal antecedents and/or consequences of all other constructs. To gain statistical power 
for our hypothesis tests, and because we did not expect differences in the path 
trajectories across waves, we constrained all the corresponding lagged paths to be equal 
between T1 and T2 and between T2 and T3 within each country. Hence, each of our 
hypotheses H1 to H3 is represented by a single parameter test representing the 
combined effect from H1 to H2 and from H2 to H3. The model fit remained good: χ² 
(1088) = 1721.07, p < .001, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .03, and this model did not show a.
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Table 3. 2: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in the UK and Chile (Study 2) 
 
M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
UK participants
1. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals (E/I) T1 -1.48 0.60 .83** .76** -.22** -.26** -.18** -.36** -.37** -.32** -.28** -.25** -.28** -.16** -.12**
2. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals (E/I) T2 -1.53 0.59 .84** -.19** -.23** -.18** -.33** -.37** -.33** -.25** -.27** -.28** -.15** -.10*
3. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals (E/I) T3 -1.54 0.57 -.18** -.23** -.20** -.32** -.31** -.31** -.22** -.25** -.28** -.16** -.08*
4. Environmental worldviews T1 3.74 0.55 .77** .77** .39** .36** .33** .40** .41** .38** .13** .07*
5. Environmental worldviews T2 3.72 0.57 .80** .38** .35** .30** .33** .41** .35** .07 .03
6. Environmental worldviews T3 3.72 0.55 .38** .36** .32** .33** .40** .41** .05 .02
7. Environmentally responsible behaviour T1 3.54 0.56 .82** .75** .38** .38** .35** .19** .02
8. Environmentally responsible behaviour T2 3.62 0.55 .83** .36** .39** .36** .16** .00
9. Environmentally responsible behaviour T3 3.60 0.53 .28** .31** .29** .13** .01
10. Environmental identification T1 3.79 0.92 .69** .67** .12** .12**
11. Environmental identification T2 3.81 0.95 .76** .12** .10*
12. Environmental identification T3 3.82 0.94 .01* .15**
13. Gender (female percentage) T1   -.13**
14. Age T1 44.68 13.98
Chilean participants M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 16
1. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals (E/I) T1 -1.44 0.69 .65** .78** -.10 -.16 -.08 -.24** -.30** -.35** -.02 -.10 -0.12 -.19** -.11
2. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals (E/I) T2 -1.46 0.66 .87** -.09 -.31** -.07 -.23* -.33** -.30** -.10 -.15 -0.17 -.17 -.07
3. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals (E/I) T3 3.79 0.47 -.08 -.24* -.17 -.18 -.33** -.29** .05 -.13 -0.16 -.11 -.16
4. Environmental worldviews T1 3.78 0.46 .62** .52** .29** .41** .31** .43** .25** .31** .16** .04
5. Environmental worldviews T2 3.72 0.50 .54** .25** .38** .39** .36** .34** .32** .06 .01
6. Environmental worldviews T3 3.02 0.64 0.13 .31** .24** .26** .38** .45** .09 .00
7. Environmentally responsible behaviour T1 3.31 0.69 .67** .74** .36** .32** .31** .17** .03
8. Environmentally responsible behaviour T2 3.25 0.72 .76** .31** .41** .46** .27** .00
9. Environmentally responsible behaviour T3 4.03 0.89 .36** .44** .33** .07 .15
10. Environmental identification T1 4.05 0.79 .63** .60** .11 .11
11. Environmental identification T2 3.98 0.84 .69** .01 .32
12. Environmental identification T3 0.53 0.5 -.02 .15
13. Gender (female percentage) T1   -.09
14. Age T1 37.96 10.44
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Figure 3. 2: Cross-lagged multigroup model for the associations between extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals, environmental worldviews, environmental identification and 
environmentally responsible behaviour in the UK and Chile.  
Note: Coefficients shown are standardized paths. Chilean coefficients are in brackets. Error terms and items loadings are not shown to enhance visual clarity. Factor loadings were all acceptable 
ranging from .60 to .92 in the UK and from .55 to .94 in Chile. Covariances between our core variables in T1 and covariances between the residuals terms of the latent variables in T2 and T3 are 
also not shown to enhance visual clarity. Paths are only shown when we found significant paths in at least one country. E/I = Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals; EWV = Environmental 
worldviews; EId= environmental identification; ERB = environmentally responsible behaviour; ti = wave time (T1 = wave 2010; T2 = wave 2011; and T3 = wave 2012); Pi = parcel (i); † p < 
.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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significant decrease in fit compared to a model where all structural paths were estimated 
freely, Δχ²(32) =  41.03, p = .13. Results are shown in Figure 3.310. 
We found that extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals were a significant and 
negative predictor of environmentally responsible behaviour in the UK, β = -.07, p < .01. 
In Chile, the corresponding effect was of similar magnitude, although it only reached 
marginal significance, β = -.09, p = .09. In contrast, pro-environmental worldviews did 
not significantly predict environmentally responsible behaviour either in the UK (β 
= .01, p = .80) or in Chile (β = .06, p = .25). Unexpectedly, environmental identification 
was a marginally negative predictor of environmentally responsible behaviour in the 
UK (β = -.04, p = .09) and non-significant in Chile (β = -.09, p = .16). Thus, the results 
supported H1, but not H2 or H3. 
Results also showed that, in the UK only, environmentally responsible 
behaviour positively predict pro-environmental worldviews, β = .07, p < .01, and that 
pro-environmental worldviews in turn positively predict environmental identification, β 
= .08, p < .01. In contrast, in Chile, we found that environmental identification 
positively predicted pro-environmental worldviews, β = .20, p < .05. No other 
prospective paths were significant. 
Finally, we tested a model where we constrained the three predictors of 
environmentally responsible behaviour (extrinsic relative to intrinsic life goals; 
environmental worldviews and environmental identification) to be equal across the 
waves and cultures. This model continued to show a good fit: χ²(1091) = 1722.55, p 
< .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .02. Moreover, the constrained model did not show a 
significant loss of fit compared to the model with only loadings constrained, Δχ²(35) = 
42.51, p = .18. Therefore, it may be concluded that culture did not significantly 
moderate the structural relationships between our main core variables. 
Discussion 
Using cross-lagged models, Study 2 extended previous research by testing, for 
the first time, the prospective relationship over time between extrinsic (versus intrinsic) 
life goals and environmentally responsible behaviour. Our most important result is to 
show that a higher relative importance placed on external (relative to intrinsic) rewards 
was a negative antecedent of environmentally responsible behaviour, whereas the 
                                                 
10
 Although the unstandardized paths were constrained to equality, the corresponding standardized paths 
may differ slightly. For simplicity, in the main text we report the standardized paths from T1 to T2. Paths 
from T2 to T3 may be found in Figure 3.3. 
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reverse direction was not supported. Importantly, this link was held while controlling 
for the effects of environmental worldviews and environmental identification. Indeed, 
perhaps surprisingly, life goals were the only significant prospective predictor of 
environmentally responsible behaviour, whereas the other two predictors did not reach 
significance in either country.  
Unexpectedly, we found among our UK participants that higher environmentally 
responsible behaviour predicted higher pro-environmental worldviews, which in turn 
predicted higher environmental identification. Two possible explanations may help us to 
understand these findings. First, self-perception theory (Bem & McConnell, 1970) 
suggests that “Individuals come to ‘know’ their own attitudes, emotions, and other 
internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt 
behaviour and/or the circumstances in which this behaviour occurs” (p. 23). Therefore, 
people may base their self-concepts and worldviews in part on observing their own 
behaviour in order to determine what kind of person they are.  Second, the theory of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1964) states that when a person becomes aware of their 
own attitudes or identifications (e.g. their worldviews or environmental identification) 
that are not psychologically consistent with one another (e.g., their environmental 
behaviour), he or she will try different options to make them more consistent with their 
internal psychological processes. For example, in order to feel that their behaviour is 
consistent with their attitudes and identities, people may sometimes change their 
attitudes and identities to fit the behaviour. Thus, it could be that people see themselves 
behaving pro-environmentally and because of that they form worldviews and identities 
to match their behaviour. Alternatively, it could be that people see themselves behaving 
anti-environmentally, and thus they move towards an anti-environmental worldview 
and identity that rationalizes their behaviour.  
Finally, in Chile we found that environmental identification positively predicted 
pro-environmental worldviews. These finding support previous claims arguing that 
environmental identification reflects whether or not people indicate that the 
environment is a central part of who they are and therefore may motivate or reduce their 
attitudes and behaviour toward the environment (Gatersleben, Murtagh, et al., 2012). 
However, it is notable that this effect was not replicated in our much larger UK sample. 
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General Discussion 
The world is facing one of the biggest challenges of the 21st Century: climate 
change and global warming (United Nations Development Programme, 2007). The 
future of the environment is in serious danger, partly due to human over-consumption 
activities (Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 2002). If this trend continues, 
global temperatures will increase significantly over the coming years, which would have 
serious implications for the well-being of current and future generations. Therefore, 
public policies and political campaigns urgently need to reduce our unfriendly 
environmental behaviour, in order to protect the future of the world. To achieve this, 
policy makers firstly need to understand as deeply as possible the different factors 
influencing people’s environmentally unfriendly behaviour.  
Social psychologists have conducted valuable research regarding how we see, 
act and behave toward our natural environmental, in order to discover how to change 
unfriendly ecological behaviour. However, most of the previous studies have focused on 
environmental attitudes, worldviews, and studies have often measured behavioural 
intentions (e.g., Gatersleben, Jackson et al. 2012; Gatersleben, Murthagh et al. 2012) or 
responses to imaginary scenarios (e.g., Sheldon et al., 2011), instead of measuring 
actual everyday behaviour. Therefore, if the world aims to tackle the current ecological 
crisis, better individual predictors influencing actual behaviour need to be understood. 
That was the main goal of our current paper. Crucially, our research has shown that life 
goals or aspirations are a more robust predictor of everyday environmental behaviour 
than environmental worldviews or environmental identification. This may help policy 
makers to create new intervention strategies seeking to modify environmentally 
unfriendly behaviour.  
We should acknowledge several limitations of the present research. First, our 
measure of environmentally responsible behaviour was self-reported, and it would be 
desirable to complement this with observational data. Nonetheless, the behaviour 
measured in our index were all relatively concrete, making it easier for participants to 
give reasonably objective responses. Moreover, if participants’ self-reports were 
substantially biased by self-enhancement, one might expect that bias to be closely 
linked to environmental identification; yet, the effects of life goals were observed here 
while controlling for environmental identification. Second, given that our participants 
were all university graduates, we should be cautious about generalizing these findings to 
poorer and less educated groups. Nonetheless, understanding the antecedents of 
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environmentally unfriendly behaviour among relatively affluent individuals is 
especially important, given that these individuals have the greatest resources to allow 
them to engage in over-consumption of natural resources. Third, despite showing strong 
evidence that extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals are a temporal antecedent of 
environmentally responsible behaviour rather than vice versa, our longitudinal design 
still does not rule out the possibility of a third, unmeasured variable that influences both 
constructs. Nonetheless, the results considerably strengthen the case for a causal path 
from life goals to environmentally responsible behaviour, not only because they 
established temporal precedence but also by controlling for the possible influence of 
two key competing predictors: pro-environmental worldviews and environmental 
identification.  
Our current consumer culture tells us every day that material rewards and 
extrinsic life goals are the pathway to happiness and well-being. However, extending 
previous research showing that a higher relative importance attached to extrinsic life 
goals is negative for people’s well-being (reviewed by Dittmar et al., in press), we have 
shown that this materialistic way of living is also dangerous for the future of our natural 
world. Through correlational (Study 1) and longitudinal (Study 2) evidence, we found 
support for arguments that attaching a higher importance to the pursuit of extrinsic 
(relative to intrinsic) life goals has more wide-ranging negative consequences than 
previously acknowledged. Extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals not only affect 
negatively people’s well-being, but also lead to more environmentally unfriendly 
behaviour. Indeed, the effect of life goals turned out to be more robust than those of two 
highly plausible alternative predictors: environmental worldviews and environmental 
identification. Therefore, policy makers need to pay special attention to the role of our 
current consumer culture in order to protect the future of the globe, encouraging people 
to live a more intrinsic and meaningful life (Brown & Kasser, 2005). Contemporary 
societies need to change from a materialistic way of living to a more sustainable way of 
living. We hope this research helps to develop public policies that teach people how to 
live in harmony with nature and how to protect our natural world for the benefit of 
future generations.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
General Conclusions 
Despite the enormous economic and technological progress the world has seen 
in recent decades, our current model of development has reached its limits, leading us to 
ecological, social and economic crises that are putting at risk the future of humankind 
and the planet (Sachs, 2012; SNDP, 2013). Poverty, inequalities, mental and physical 
health problems and the ecological crisis are putting at risk the survival of humanity and 
the planet. In these problems, the persistent creation of new material “wants” through 
our current consumer culture has played a negative key role (Dittmar, 2008; Kasser & 
Kanner, 2004; Sachs, 2012).  
Fortunately, there is a growing consensus on the need and urgency for a model 
of sustainable development which would help to protect the future of our natural 
environment, as well as leading societies and people to flourish (Diener, Lucas, 
Schimmack, & Helliwell, 2009; Seligman, 2011; Stiglitz, Sen, Fitousi, 2010; United 
Nations, 2011).  
This new sustainable development model is closely linked to the search for 
happiness (Layard, 2011; Sachs, 2012). In fact, it has been shown (Diener & Tay, 2012) 
that happier people tend to be more sociable, friendlier, and more cooperative. 
Moreover, people scoring higher in subjective well-being (SWB) tend to have better 
social relationships, higher levels of trust and community involvement, and greater 
willingness to support people in need. Therefore, happier people are more likely to fight 
harder against poverty and inequalities, to have better physical and mental health and to 
protect their communities. In addition, individuals higher in SWB tend to report higher 
environmentally responsible behaviour, which shows that happiness and sustainability 
may actually be complementary (Brown & Kasser, 2005). 
Thus, a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms that lead people to 
be happier and to be more environmentally friendly is a key issue for research and for 
public policies. This is the main reason why I decided to start the research that is 
reported in this thesis. 
There are several factors that influence happiness and well-being. Among them, 
values and life goals play a key role (Layard, 2011; Layard, Clark, & Senik, 2012). For 
example, it has been found that materialistic values are associated with lower levels of 
happiness and SWB (Dittmar, Bond, Kasser, & Hurst, in press). Moreover, materialism 
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has also been associated with lower environmentally friendly behaviour. However, 
previous research studying the link between materialism and well-being and the link 
between materialism and environmental behaviour still present several important gaps. 
Regarding the link between materialism and well-being, there are four important 
research gaps. First, previous studies on materialism, need satisfaction and well-being 
have failed to take the potential mediational role of need frustration explicitly into 
account. Second, previous studies were grounded only in the SDT tradition, and thus 
were limited by relying on intrinsic-extrinsic goal measures. Third, there has been a lack 
of research into these constructs and processes in South American countries (Dittmar et 
al., in press). Fourth, and finally, most previous studies on the link between need 
satisfaction and well-being have employed methods that do not allow inferences about 
cause-effect relations.  
Regarding the link between materialism and environmental behaviour, the 
existing evidence has been limited to a relatively small number of cross-sectional 
studies, and until now it has remained unclear to what extent intrinsic (versus extrinsic) 
life goals are causally implicated in environmentally responsible behaviour. 
Hence, in my research for this thesis I decided to focus on materialism and its 
links with need satisfaction, need frustration, well-being and environmental behaviour. 
My results contribute to a better understanding of the effect of materialistic values and 
extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals on people’s well-being, but also on the future of the 
natural environment. The results of this thesis may help not only to increase scientific 
knowledge about these psychological processes, but also to assist policy makers to 
create public policies in order to tackle the major challenges that the world is currently 
facing. 
It is important to notice that despite the great interest in the study of materialism 
across history, the way that different scientific disciplines have conceptualised this 
construct tends to differ significantly. In my research, I decided to conceptualise 
materialism from a psychological approach, measuring it at the individual level. The 
advantage of this approach is that both the scales I used fully capture the influence of 
the consumer culture, the shared meaning of materialism, and the differences in the 
extent to which individuals endorse materialistic values in a nation or in a society 
(Dittmar, 2008).  
Results reported in Paper 1 highlighted the role that materialism may play in 
positive and negative well-being in both the UK – a mass consumer society – and in 
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Chile – a country in fast transition. I found that higher levels of materialism were 
associated with lower need satisfaction and higher need frustration, which in turn were 
associated with lower positive and higher negative well-being respectively. These 
results were held across both cultures, giving support to SDT postulates (Deci & Ryan, 
2000). This suggests that, if societies and policy makers desire to increase human 
happiness in order to tackle the current world’s problems, they need to give special 
attention to the materialistic values that our current consumer culture is transmitting.  
The most prominent theoretical explanations for the negative link between 
materialism and well-being has been developed by SDT through the hypothesized 
mediation of the three basic psychological needs. However, most of previous studies on 
the link between need satisfaction and well-being do not allow inferences about cause-
effect relations. Therefore, studying the correct direction of this link is crucial for 
understanding the possible mediation role played by need satisfaction in the link 
between materialism and well-being. Paper 2 approach this issue, focusing in detail on 
one part of the broader structural model tested in Paper 1—namely the relationship 
between basic psychological needs and well-being. 
Paper 2 highlighted the key role of basic psychological need satisfaction and 
frustration in people’s well-being and happiness. I found that in both countries, total 
need satisfaction was a positive prospective predictor of well-being. However, when I 
split need satisfaction in its three needs, only relatedness reached statistical significance 
in the UK. In Chile, none of the three needs was an individually significant prospective 
predictor of well-being. These results may question the hypothesized direction of the 
link from materialism to well-being through the mediation of need satisfaction. 
However, more research is needed employing all of these constructs together. Finally, I 
found a bi-directional positive link between need satisfaction and subjective well-being. 
These results point towards a better integration of research into hedonic and eudaimonic 
well-being.  
The results of Paper 3 extended previous key findings on values and behaviour 
(Stern & Dietz, 1994; Schwartz, 1992, 2006). To date, previous research has shown that 
materialistic values are negatively associated to pro-environmental behaviour. However, 
according to my knowledge, the main explanations about these negative associations are 
often based on either Schwartz’s (1992) or on Stern and Dietz (1994) work. However, 
neither Schwartz (1992) nor Stern and Dietz (1994) measured materialism directly 
leaving an important research gap. Moreover, their measures of general values did not 
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capture the influence of our current consumer culture on the environment. Our paper 
extends their results by measuring materialism directly from a social psychological 
approach that fully captures the influence of our consumer culture on environmental 
behaviour. Our results highlight the importance of promoting intrinsic values in order to 
protect the well-being of the future generations. 
It also extended previous research by showing that a higher relative importance 
placed on external (versus intrinsic) rewards was a negative antecedent of 
environmentally responsible behaviour. Importantly, this predictive effect was shown 
while controlling for the effects of environmental worldviews and environmental 
identification. This key result was found not only in the UK, but also in Chile. 
Analyzing the link between life goals and self-reports of actual behaviour in the UK, a 
mass established consumer society, and Chile, a South American country in fast 
economic transition, is of much interest. Chilean’s fast economic growth (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2010) may provide new opportunities for a larger 
number of people in the country to do more damage to the environment, making this an 
especially important context in which to study these processes. Our results suggest that 
the negative consequences of attaching higher importance to material and external 
rewards may be found across nations. 
Values and life goals may be transmitted mainly by parents, educators, mass 
media, and different organizations in society. So far, consumer culture has mainly 
transmitted extrinsic and materialistic values which have negatively  affected people’s 
well-being and happiness, as well as the sustainability of our natural environment 
(Brown & Kasser, 2005; Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 2002; Crompton 
& Kasser, 2009; Sachs, 2012; SNDP, 2013). Therefore, there is a key role for societies, 
governments and policy makers in systematically teaching intrinsic values in order to 
decrease the negative effects of our current consumer culture (Helliwell, Layard and 
Sachs, 2012). People across the world urgently need to start giving more emphasis to 
the promotion of intrinsic values and life goals. By doing so, we may be able to foster 
greater happiness and well-being, which in turn may help to reduce poverty, inequalities, 
social exclusion, and mental and physical problems. Moreover, by promoting intrinsic 
values, we have a direct path to reducing unfriendly ecological behaviour, which in turn 
may help to halt our current environmental crisis. 
Possible Limitations and Future Directions 
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I should acknowledge several limitations of the present thesis. First, given that 
all participants were university graduates in both countries, we should be cautious about 
generalizing these findings to poorer and less educated groups. Moreover, our research 
was conducted in just one Western European and one South American nation, which is 
why different samples and cultures need to be explored in further research. However, a 
recent meta-analysis (Dittmar et al., in press) examining the association between 
materialism and personal well-being across 216 independent samples, showed that the 
negative association was robust across a variety of studies, samples and economic 
conditions, at least cross-sectionally. Moreover, understanding the antecedents of 
environmentally unfriendly behaviour among relatively affluent individuals is 
especially important, given that these individuals have the greatest resources to allow 
them to engage in over-consumption of natural resources.  
Second, despite the strong evidence regarding the link between materialism and 
well-being, one important limitation of Paper 1 involves its correlational design, which 
does not allow one to infer causality. Although higher materialism may produce lower 
well-being due to the mediating role of need satisfaction and need frustration (Kasser & 
Ryan, 1993, 1996; Ryan & Deci, 2000), it is also possible that unhappy people seek 
materialistic ways in which to improve their situation and overcome their problems 
(Dittmar, 2008). The bi-directional link between total need satisfaction and well-being 
found in Paper 2 (UK) provides initial evidence for there being more than just a 
unidirectional pathway from aspirations through basic need satisfaction to well-being. 
However, further longitudinal research needs to be carried out in order to evaluate the 
directionality of the link whole between materialism, need satisfaction and well-being 
over time.  
Third, method variance might play a role in Paper 1 and in Paper 2. For example, 
method effects may be driving the observed associations between the need satisfaction – 
positive well-being effect and the need frustration – negative well-being effect. 
Therefore, further research needs to include a range of different informants to overcome 
this problem (e.g., parents, teachers, etc.).  
Fourth, despite showing some evidence that need satisfaction is a temporal 
antecedent of people’s well-being (and vice versa), and clear evidence that extrinsic 
(versus intrinsic) life goals are a temporal antecedent of environmentally responsible 
behaviour, our longitudinal designs still do not rule out the possibility of a third, 
unmeasured variable that may influence our constructs. Nevertheless, our cross-lagged 
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results significantly strengthen the case for the proposed causal links between the core 
variables, because they established temporal precedence.  
Fifth, in all the studies, all my measures were all self-reported, and it would be 
desirable to complement this with observational data. Nonetheless, in the case of Paper 
3, the behaviours measured in our index were all relatively concrete, making it easier for 
participants to give reasonably objective responses.  
Sixth, and finally, I did not analyse to what extent the different materialism sub-
scales/sub-constructs are differently related to the outcomes variables. This is a key 
issue, especially in the case of the Aspiration index. For example it would be important 
to study which specific goals are driving the main effects in terms of need satisfaction, 
need frustration, well-being and environmental behaviour. Therefore, further research is 
needed to explore this issues. 
 
In terms of future directions, I think there is an important role to be played by media 
analysis in future research. For example, as explained in my thesis, materialism may 
reside not only at the individual level, but also at the societal level due that the cultural 
environment may have a key influence on our materialistic values. However, if this 
assumption is true, an important question raised by Tim Kasser become a key issue to 
explore. If the whole of society has been exposed to the same cultural messages, why do 
not all of us internalise materialistic values in the same way? Kasser (2002) states that 
maybe it is due to the fact that not all of us are exposed to the same consumer culture 
messages. For example, “people are likely to be materialistic if they watch a great deal 
of television and if their parents value materialistic goals” (p. 27). Thus, some people 
may learn this attitude because of the environment (Kasser, 2002). This hypothesis has 
been confirmed in Dittmar et al’s. (in press) recent meta-analysis. The authors found 
that at the cultural level, the negative associations between materialism and well-being 
is amplified when people live in a culture where it is possible to observe frequent 
exposure to consumer culture’s ideologies. Later arguments lead to conclude that there 
is an important role for media analyses. Studying the influence of the media on 
materialism could be an important tool for researchers. Media exposure studies and 
multilevel cross-cultural studies using many different cultural samples, could be used to 
unpack the differential effects of being a materialistic individual and of living in a 
materialistic context. 
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Finally, future research using “environmental identification” measures requires 
more critical attention. As mentioned in my thesis, there is a growing interest in the 
study of a “connection to, engagement with, or identification with the natural 
environment” (Sparks et al., 2014, p. 167). However, there are still important 
ambiguities in the field. Thus, the way I conceptualised my environmental identification 
measure requires more critical attention because three important questions arise. First, 
what is its relationship between what I measured in terms of “identification” and 
“connectedness”? To what extent is my identity measure a pure measure of 
identification or it is a mix of identification and connectedness items? In fact, Sparks et 
al. (2014) developed a measure of connectedness where identification was a key 
element. Therefore, further research should help to clarify these ambiguities still present 
in the field. Moreover, my scale assesses both cognitive and affective elements. 
However, the research is not clear yet about the role that both should have on an 
environmental identification scale. For example, is it really important to make a clear 
distinction between cognitive and affective elements? If yes, maybe it would be useful 
to carry out factor analysis to analyse how different the implications of each dimension 
are. For example, would it be possible that affective processes mediate the link between 
cognitions and behaviour as hypothesised by Sparks et al. (2014)? Second, following 
Hinds and Sparks (2008), the measure I used in my thesis reflects a more personal than 
social form of identification of identification with the natural environmental. Therefore, 
it may be interesting for further research to explore the same constructs explored in 
Paper 3, but using a more social or role-based identity approach. That is because it has 
been hypothesised that the inclusion of other forms of identity may help to increase the 
explained variance in the models (Hinds & Sparks, 2008). Third, and finally, it has also 
been stated that the strength of an environmental identification measure is related to 
how close participants have been physically connected to the natural environment 
(Hinds & Sparks, 2008). For example, Hinds and Sparks (2008) argue that the exposure 
to the natural environment may increase the identification with it. In fact, it has been 
found that environmental identity increased significantly for marginalized adolescents 
after an immersed experience in woodlands (Hinds, 2011). Similarly, Manzo (2003) 
hypothesised that our relationships (identifications) to the outside world – such as the 
natural environment – reflect, at least in part, people’s collected experiences of the 
outside world. However, I did not control for this factor in my thesis. Therefore, further 
research should check the degree to which participants have been exposed to the natural 
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environment. In summary, all these ambiguities point out the need for more research in 
the field of environmental identification. 
Final Conclusion 
Through the analyses that I have presented in this thesis, I have shown that 
materialistic values and extrinsic (versus intrinsic) life goals are negatively linked to 
well-being through the mediation of need satisfaction and need frustration. Secondly, I 
have shown that higher need satisfaction and lower need frustration prospectively 
predict higher well-being and vice versa. Finally, I have demonstrated that extrinsic 
(versus intrinsic) life goals are associated, both correlationally and longitudinally, with 
lower environmentally friendly behaviour. These results highlight the importance of 
public policies that promote intrinsic values and life goals in order to decrease the 
negative effects of our current consumer culture and to foster people’s subjective well-
being and mental and physical health. By making people happier, public policies may 
help to reduce poverty, inequalities and mental and physical problems, and to protect 
our natural environment for the benefit of future generations.  
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APPENDIX 1 
The questionnaire below was reproduced from the original online version. The 
data were employed for the studies reported in Papers 1, 2 and 3. 
 
International Research Project on Consumer Culture, Environment, Life Goals, 
and Well-Being in the UK and Chile 
 
Information Sheet 
This research project examines people's personal views about topics of current 
concern and debate: consumer culture, personal aspirations and motivations, 
environmental behaviours and attitudes, as well as well-being. There are no right or 
wrong answers; we are interested in your personal views. This is an important research 
area: we need a better understanding of factors that can have an impact on our well-
being. 
Your responses will be anonymous, all data will be kept confidential, and will 
only be used for academic purposes related to this study. You are free to withdraw from 
participating in this research project at any time. However, your personal views are very 
important to us, and we hope that you will find it interesting to reflect on contemporary 
consumer culture and your place within in. The questionnaire takes about 20-25 minutes 
to complete. 
For further information on this topic and/or if you wish to obtain the results of 
the study, you can contact me, the researcher, at wu20@sussex.ac.uk. 
We are grateful to the Alumni offices at both universities, University of Sussex 
and Universidad Adolfo Ibanez Business School which have made it possible for us to 
contact you. We hope you will welcome the opportunity to take part in an important 
research project at your own university. 
 
Your participation is invaluable.  
If you complete the survey within 3 days, you will be entered into a prize draw for 
University of Sussex memorabilia.  
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Your help is very much appreciated 
Wenceslao Unanue (Researcher)  
Participant Consent Form 
Name of Investigator: Wenceslao Unanue 
 
1. I agree to take part in the “International Research Project on Consumer Culture, 
Environment, Life Goals, and Well-Being in the UK and Chile” University of 
Sussex research project. I have had the project explained to me and I have read 
and understood the Information Sheet, which I may print for records. 
 
2. I authorise the investigator to use the questionnaire referred to under (1) above. 
 
3. I acknowledge that: 
 
a. I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any 
time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied, before 
or after the close of the project; 
b. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without giving reason 
or incurring any subsequent penalties; 
c. The project is for the purpose of research and/or teaching; 
d. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide 
will be safeguarded, and that all personal information provided by myself 
will remain confidential. No information that identifies me will be made 
publicly available. 
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this 
research study.  I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential 
and handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Please click on “Continue” if you agree with all the above points to start the 
study.  
[consent button]
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In this section we are interested in different aspects of your personal well-being 
 
1. Please indicate the extent to which you (dis)agree with each of the statements below, 
using the following scale.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Disagree 
a little 
Agree a 
little 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
a. ___In most ways my life is close to my ideal.  
b. ___The conditions of my life are excellent.  
c. ___I am satisfied with my life. 
d. ___So far I have gotten the important things in my life. 
e. ___If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.  
 
2. Please indicate how often you have felt or behaved in each of the following ways 
during the past week using the scale below.  
 
Rarely or none of 
the time (less than 
1 day) 
Some or a little of 
the time (1-2 days) 
Occasionally or a 
moderate amount of 
time (3-4 days) 
Most or all of the 
time (5-7 days) 
0 1 2 3 
 
a. ____ I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor 
b. ____ I felt that I couldn’t stop feeling down even with help from my family or friends 
c. ____ I felt that I was just as good as other people 
d. ____ I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing 
e. ____ I felt depressed 
f. ____ I felt that everything I did was an effort 
g. ____ I felt hopeful about the future 
h. ____ I thought my life had been a failure 
i. ____ My sleep was restless 
j. ____ I was happy 
k. ____ I talked less than usual 
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l. ____ I felt lonely 
m. ____ I enjoyed life 
n. ____ I had crying spells 
o. ____ I felt sad 
p. ____ I felt that people disliked me 
 
3. We would like to know how often you have felt different feelings and emotions 
during the last month. Using the scale below, please indicate how frequently you 
have felt each.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always 
 
a. ___Upset  
b. ___Hostile  
c. ___Alert  
d. ___Ashamed  
e. ___Inspired  
f. ___Nervous  
g. ___Determined  
h. ___Attentive  
i. ___Afraid  
j. ___Active  
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4. Please respond to each of the following statements by indicating the degree to which 
the statement is true for you (or not) over the past month.  Please answer from 1 to 
7 (1 = not at all true, 4 = somewhat true, 7 = very true). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all 
true 
  Somewhat 
true 
  Very true 
 
a. ___I feel alive and vital. 
b. ___I don't feel very energetic. 
c. ___Sometimes I feel so alive I just want to burst. 
d. ___I have energy and spirit. 
e. ___I look forward to each new day. 
f. ___I nearly always feel alert and awake.  
g. ___I feel energized. 
 
5. We are interested in your health over the past month. Please indicate, using the 
scale below, whether have you recently...  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
a. ___been feeling perfectly well and in good health? 
b. ___been feeling in need of a good tonic? 
c. ___been feeling run down and out of sorts? 
d. ___felt that you are ill? 
e. ___been getting any pains in your head? 
f. ___been getting a feeling of tightness or pressure in your head? 
g. ___been having hot or cold spells? 
 
6. Now we would like to ask you about your happiness11. 
 
                                                 
11
 This question was asked only in waves 2 and 3. 
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Taking all things together, how happy are you? Please rate your answers from 0 
(extremely unhappy) to 10 (extremely happy) where 5 indicates that you are neither 
unhappy nor happy. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
7. Please rate your (dis)agreement with each of the following statements, thinking 
about the last month.  Please use the scale below. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Disagree a 
little 
Agree a 
little 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
a. ____ I felt a sense of contact with people who care for me, and whom I care for. 
b.  ____ I was lonely.  
c.  ____ I felt close and connected with other people who are important to me. 
d.  ____ I felt unappreciated by one or more important people. 
e.  ____ I felt a strong sense of intimacy with the people I spent time with. 
f.  ____ I had disagreements or conflicts with people I usually get along with.   
g.  ____ I was successfully completing difficult tasks and projects.  
h.  ____ I experienced some kind of failure, or was unable to do well at something. 
i.  ____ I took on and mastered hard challenges. 
j.  ____ I did something stupid, that made me feel incompetent.  
k.  ____ I did well even at the hard things.   
l.  ____ I struggled doing something I should be good at. 
m.  ____ I was free to do things my own way.    
n.  ____ I had a lot of pressures I could do without. 
o.  ____ My choices expressed my “true self.” 
p.  ____ There were people telling me what I had to do.   
q.  ____ I was really doing what interests me. 
r.  ____ I had to do things against my will.   
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I. In this section we are interested in your identity and in how you think and 
feel about yourself 
 
This section asks you about the ideals you have for yourself, but it is a little 
different from a typical questionnaire. We use a novel format because we would like 
you to put your ideals into your own words.  
Take a minute to think about something that you would like to change, or 
improve a little, about yourself and your life. It could be anything at all. 
Please complete each of the sentences below by writing any word or words 
describing how you are at the moment, under ‘I am…' and then your ideal, how you 
would ideally like to be, under ‘but would like to be…'.  
Then, after completing the sentences, please indicate for each:  
A) how different you are from the way you would ideally like to be (1=a little 
different, 6=extremely different). In other words, we are asking you how big is 
the gap between how you see yourself and the way you would like to be. 
 
B) how important this difference is to you, (1=not at all important 6=extremely 
important). How concerned are you about this difference? Do you think about it 
a lot? 
 
Please complete this procedure four times. Each of the four sentences represents 
something that you would like to change, or improve a little, about yourself and your 
life. 
 
  How different How Important 
I am… but would like.. 1  2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
              
              
              
              
              
 
150 
II. In this section we are interested in different aspects of the consumer culture 
and in your personal life goals 
 
8. Everyone has long-term goals or aspirations of what they hope to accomplish over 
the course of their lives. In this section, you will find different life goals, presented 
one at a time. Please rate how important each goal is to you personally (1 = not at all, 
4 = moderately, 7 = very). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all   Moderately   Very 
 
a. ___To be a very wealthy person. 
b. ___To grow and learn new things. 
c. ___To have my name known by many people. 
d. ___To have good friends that I can count on. 
e. ___To successfully hide the signs of aging. 
f. ___To work for the betterment of society.  
g. ___To have many expensive possessions. 
h. ___At the end of my life, to be able to look back on my life as meaningful and 
complete. 
i. ___To be admired by many people. 
j. ___To share my life with someone I love. 
k. ___To have people comment often about how attractive I look. 
l. ___To assist people who need it, asking nothing in return. 
m. ___To be financially successful. 
n. ___To choose what I do, instead of being pushed along by life. 
o. ___To be famous. 
p. ___To have committed, intimate relationships. 
q. ___To keep up with fashions in hair and clothing. 
r. ___To work to make the world a better place.  
s. ___To be rich. 
t. ___To know and accept who I really am. 
u. ___To have my name appear frequently in the media. 
v. ___To feel that there are people who really love me, and whom I love. 
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w. ___ To achieve the "look" I've been after. 
x. ___ To help others improve their lives. 
y. ___ To have enough money to buy everything I want. 
z. ___ To gain increasing insight into why I do the things I do. 
aa. ___ To be admired by lots of different people. 
bb. ___ To have deep enduring relationships. 
cc. ___ To have an image that others find appealing. 
dd. ___ To help people in need. 
 
9. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements, using 
the scale below.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Disagree a 
little 
Agree a 
little 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
 
 
a. ___I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes (Success) 
b. ___The things I own say a lot about how well I'm doing in life (Success) 
c. ___I like to own things that impress people (Success) 
d. ___I try to keep my life simple, as far as possessions are concerned (Centrality) 
e. ___Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure (Centrality) 
f. ___I like a lot of luxury in my life (Centrality) 
g. ___My life would be better if I owned certain things I don't have (Happiness) 
h. ___I'd be happier if I could afford to buy more things (Happiness) 
i. ___It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't afford to buy all the things I'd 
like (Happiness). 
 
III. In this section we are interested in your views about the environment. 
 
10. Please read through all the statements below first. Once you have done this, for each 
statement, please indicate the extent to which you agree with them, using the scale 
below.  
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1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Mildly 
disagree 
Unsure Mildly 
agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
a. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. 
b. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. 
c. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences. 
d. Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unliveable. 
e. Humans are severely abusing the environment. 
f. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them. 
g. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 
h. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern 
industrial nations. 
i. Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature. 
j. The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated. 
k. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. 
l. Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. 
m. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 
n. Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control 
it. 
o. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major 
ecological catastrophe. 
p. I see myself as someone who empathises with the natural environment. 
q. For me, engaging with the natural environment gives me a greater sense of who I 
am. 
r. I identify with the natural environment. 
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11. For each of the following behaviours, please indicate how often you engage in it, 
using the scale below.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always 
 
 
a. I drive my car in or into the city, even when there are other forms of transport. 
b. I ride a bicycle or take public transportation to work or school. 
c. If I am offered a plastic bag in a store, I take it. 
d. I kill insects with a chemical insecticide. 
e. I buy convenience foods. 
f. I talk with friends about problems related to the environment. 
g. I boycott companies with an unecological background. 
h. In hotels, I have the towels changed daily. 
i. In the winter, I keep the heat on so that I do not have to wear a sweater. 
j. I put dead batteries in the garbage. 
 
12. In the following section we are interested in your environmental knowledge. There 
are is only one correct answer to each question
12
. 
 
a. Global warming also has an effect on the Gulf Stream that will affect Europe. What 
is this effect? 
 
The Gulf Stream will possibly lead to additional warming of the climate. 
The Gulf Stream will possibly collapse, which will lead to a strong cooling of the 
climate. 
 
b. If all ozone-destroying emissions were eliminated right now, how long would it take 
for almost complete regeneration of the ozone layer? 
                                                 
12
 This question was asked only in Wave 1. 
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10 years 
100 years 
1000 years 
 
c. The world population today is 6 billion. What will the world population be in the 
year 2025, approximately? 
 
6.5 billion 
2. 8 billion 
3.12 billion 
 
d. Oranges from Israel is environmentally harmful because… 
 
Climatic conditions are disadvantageous for growing oranges in Israel 
Too much packaging material is used 
Air transport consumes excessive amounts of energy 
 
e. If ozone warnings are issued in the summer time, you should not drive because… 
 
Summer smog will be produced 
Otherwise, the ozone hole will increase 
Due to the warm weather, the engine will give off more pollutants 
 
f. True or false? In organic farming, no chemical or synthetic pesticides are used 
whatsoever. 
 
True 
False 
 
g. True or false? Incineration of waste is generally preferable to landfilling of waste. 
 
True 
False 
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h. Meat as compared to vegetables (in amounts containing the same number of 
calories) is… 
 
Twice as damaging to the environment 
Ten times as damaging to the environment 
 
i. To travel 1 km (1 mile), how much more energy is consumed per person by airplane 
as compared to by train? 
 
Twice as much energy per person by airplane 
Ten times as much energy per person by airplane 
 
j. To travel 1 km (1 mile), how much more energy is consumed per person by car as 
compared to by train? 
 
Twice as much energy per person by car 
Ten times as much energy per person by car 
 
13. Thank you so much for your participation in this online survey. All we need now is 
some general information about you. This is simply to ensure that we are getting 
responses from a wide range of different people. All details given are completely 
confidential. 
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1. Gender    male___        female___ 
2. Age (in years)_____ 
3. Ethnic background____________________ 
4. Occupation __________________________ 
5. Height (cm)___ 
6. Weight (Kg)___ 
 
7. Personal gross annual salary___ 
 
1 = < 20,000 
2 = 20,000 – 29,999 
3 = 30,000 – 39,999 
4 = 40,000 – 60,000 
5 = > 60,000 
 
8. Relationship status 
 
___Single 
___Married 
___Divorced 
___Co-habiting 
___Separated 
___Widow/Widower 
___Civil partnership 
 
157 
Thank you again for your time and help! 
 
Your participation is invaluable for us. Please enter your email address again here so 
that we can send you feedback about the results of this research (email addresses will be 
linked to questionnaires only through a code number to protect anonymity). In addition, 
your email address is extremely important to analyse your anonymous answers over the 
time. Please don’t forget to include it correctly. 
E- mail: 
______________________________ 
Please confirm your email address: 
______________________________ 
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APPENDIX 2 
Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in the UK and Chile 
Table 2. 1: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in the UK 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
UK participants                         
1. Total Basic Need satisfaction T1 1.00*** .63*** .62*** .82*** .56*** .57*** -.87*** -.51*** -.52*** .81*** .51*** .50*** 
2. Total Basic Need satisfaction T2   1.00*** .69*** .56*** .84*** .58*** -.52*** -.87*** -.62*** .50*** .84*** .58*** 
3. Total Basic Need satisfaction T3     1.00*** .52*** .59*** .86*** -.54*** -.60*** -.89*** .49*** .60*** .83*** 
4. Basic Need satisfaction T1       1.00*** .66*** .61*** -.43*** -.31*** -.33*** .62*** .42*** .41*** 
5. Basic Need satisfaction T2         1.00*** .64*** -.32*** -.46*** -.40*** .41*** .67*** .47*** 
6. Basic Need satisfaction T3           1.00*** -.38*** -.38*** -.54*** .44*** .49*** .67*** 
7. Basic Need Frustration T1             1.00*** .55*** .55*** -.73*** -.45*** -.44*** 
8. Basic Need Frustration T2               1.00*** .65*** -.44*** -.76*** -.53*** 
9. Basic Need Frustration T3                 1.00*** -.42*** -.56*** -.78*** 
10. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T1                   1.00*** .53*** .52*** 
11. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T2                     1.00*** .66*** 
12. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T3                       1.00*** 
M 4.26 4.29 4.35 4.34 4.34 4.40 2.81 2.76 2.70 4.05 4.07 4.12 
SD 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.81 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.96 
 
 
Note: Significance effects of correlations coefficients were marked with: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2. 1: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in the UK 
  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
UK participants                         
1. Total Basic Need satisfaction T1 .80*** .48*** .46*** .81*** .56*** .56*** .58*** .52*** .51*** -.73*** -.55*** -.54*** 
2. Total Basic Need satisfaction T2 .51*** .80*** .53*** .52*** .82*** .58*** .49*** .58*** .53*** -.59*** -.74*** -.58*** 
3. Total Basic Need satisfaction T3 .48*** .50*** .79*** .53*** .58*** .84*** .45*** .47*** .55*** -.57*** -.55*** -.74*** 
4. Basic Need satisfaction T1 .68*** .44*** .41*** .68*** .51*** .47*** .53*** .55*** .46*** -.55*** -.44*** -.40*** 
5. Basic Need satisfaction T2 .46*** .71*** .46*** .50*** .69*** .51*** .48*** .58*** .49*** -.51*** -.62*** -.50*** 
6. Basic Need satisfaction T3 .45*** .41*** .68*** .50*** .52*** .76*** .45*** .50*** .54*** -.50*** -.47*** -.63*** 
7. Basic Need Frustration T1 -.67*** -.38*** -.40*** -.69*** -.44*** -.49*** -.44*** -.35*** -.42*** .67*** .49*** .52*** 
8. Basic Need Frustration T2 -.41*** -.67*** -.45*** -.39*** -.71*** -.49*** -.37*** -.41*** -.44*** .51*** .64*** .51*** 
9. Basic Need Frustration T3 -.40*** -.46*** -.70*** -.45*** -.50*** -.71*** -.35*** -.33*** -.44*** .51*** .50*** .66*** 
10. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T1 .46*** .29*** .27*** .47*** .41*** .40*** .48*** .42*** .39*** -.53*** -.43*** -.42*** 
11. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T2 .33*** .51*** .36*** .37*** .55*** .45*** .40*** .47*** .44*** -.45*** -.61*** -.47*** 
12. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T3 .29*** .34*** .46*** .39*** .42*** .55*** .36*** .38*** .44*** -.41*** -.42*** -.57*** 
13. Composite Competence Satisfaction T1 1.00*** .55*** .53*** .47*** .37*** .38*** .40*** .36*** .39*** -.56*** -.41*** -.42*** 
14. Composite Competence Satisfaction T2   1.00*** .54*** .33*** .49*** .37*** .34*** .41*** .35*** -.47*** -.54*** -.44*** 
15. Composite Competence Satisfaction T3     1.00*** .35*** .41*** .50*** .31*** .29*** .39*** -.45*** -.41*** -.58*** 
16. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T1       1.00*** .58*** .57*** .51*** .49*** .46*** -.66*** -.49*** -.47*** 
17. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T2         1.00*** .61*** .48*** .55*** .52*** -.55*** -.67*** -.54*** 
18. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T3           1.00*** .44*** .48*** .53*** -.54*** -.53*** -.67*** 
19. Life satisfaction T1             1.00*** .68*** .62*** -.57*** -.50*** -.45*** 
20. Life satisfaction T2               1.00*** .66*** -.50*** -.60*** -.48*** 
21. Life satisfaction T3                 1.00*** -.48*** -.52*** -.57*** 
22. Depressive Symptoms T1                   1.00*** .68*** .68*** 
23. Depressive Symptoms T2                     1.00*** .67*** 
24. Depressive Symptoms T3                       1.00*** 
25. Panas Positive Affect T1                         
M 4.24 4.25 4.35 4.50 4.55 4.58 4.10 4.12 4.14 .71 .65 .62 
SD 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.93 1.03 1.05 1.05 0.52 0.52 0.48 
Note: Significance effects of correlations coefficients were marked with: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2. 1: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in the UK 
  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
UK participants                             
1. Total Basic Need satisfaction T1 .58*** .46*** .46*** -.58*** -.45*** -.50*** .66*** .51*** .53*** -.51*** -.40*** -.40*** -.01 .21*** 
2. Total Basic Need satisfaction T2 .43*** .58*** .48*** -.50*** -.62*** -.56*** .51*** .68*** .54*** -.43*** -.55*** -.41*** .01 .20*** 
3. Total Basic Need satisfaction T3 .41*** .44*** .55*** -.47*** -.48*** -.63*** .49*** .53*** .68*** -.46*** -.41*** -.52*** -.02 .22*** 
4. Basic Need satisfaction T1 .64*** .55*** .49*** -.38*** -.30*** -.33*** .66*** .54*** .51*** -.34*** -.26*** -.25*** .04 .16*** 
5. Basic Need satisfaction T2 .50*** .68*** .54*** -.33*** -.40*** -.38*** .53*** .70*** .55*** -.32*** -.42*** -.29*** .05 .14**  
6. Basic Need satisfaction T3 .48*** .49*** .63*** -.33*** -.30*** -.45*** .51*** .56*** .70*** -.33*** -.30*** -.38*** .02 .16*** 
7. Basic Need Frustration T1 -.36*** -.26*** -.32*** .59*** .46*** .53*** -.48*** -.35*** -.41*** .50*** .41*** .43*** .04 -.19*** 
8. Basic Need Frustration T2 -.25*** -.32*** -.31*** .51*** .65*** .58*** -.35*** -.48*** -.40*** .41*** .52*** .41*** .03 -.20*** 
9. Basic Need Frustration T3 -.25*** -.29*** -.36*** .49*** .53*** .64*** -.36*** -.38*** -.50*** .46*** .41*** .52*** .05 -.23*** 
10. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T1 .41*** .29*** .32*** -.43*** -.36*** -.40*** .52*** .38*** .40*** -.44*** -.36*** -.36*** -.04 .26*** 
11. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T2 .30*** .41*** .38*** -.38*** -.53*** -.47*** .39*** .55*** .45*** -.34*** -.48*** -.35*** -.03 .24*** 
12. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T3 .28*** .31*** .40*** -.38*** -.39*** -.52*** .37*** .41*** .52*** -.38*** -.35*** -.42*** -.03 .29*** 
13. Composite Competence Satisfaction T1 .55*** .44*** .43*** -.48*** -.38*** -.39*** .55*** .43*** .45*** -.36*** -.29*** -.30*** -.02 .14*** 
14. Composite Competence Satisfaction T2 .42*** .55*** .42*** -.43*** -.50*** -.43*** .44*** .57*** .43*** -.36*** -.45*** -.30*** .01 .12**  
15. Composite Competence Satisfaction T3 .39*** .40*** .50*** -.41*** -.40*** -.52*** .41*** .42*** .57*** -.34*** -.29*** -.40*** -.06 .11*   
16. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T1 .43*** .41*** .38*** -.48*** -.37*** -.43*** .53*** .43*** .43*** -.42*** -.32*** -.31*** .05 .11*** 
17. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T2 .35*** .46*** .39*** -.41*** -.51*** -.48*** .43*** .57*** .46*** -.36*** -.44*** -.35*** .05 .13**  
18. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T3 .33*** .38*** .47*** -.38*** -.40*** -.51*** .42*** .47*** .58*** -.39*** -.37*** -.45*** .05 .14**  
19. Life satisfaction T1 .42*** .37*** .35*** -.38*** -.36*** -.39*** .51*** .41*** .40*** -.33*** -.29*** -.27*** .06*   .10**  
20. Life satisfaction T2 .39*** .45*** .42*** -.32*** -.37*** -.38*** .44*** .53*** .43*** -.28*** -.33*** -.23*** .10*   .08†  
21. Life satisfaction T3 .33*** .37*** .40*** -.36*** -.34*** -.43*** .42*** .45*** .52*** -.29*** -.31*** -.33*** .06 .10*   
22. Depressive Symptoms T1 -.51*** -.45*** -.46*** .67*** .50*** .58*** -.65*** -.51*** -.54*** .60*** .48*** .49*** .02 -.19*** 
23. Depressive Symptoms T2 -.36*** -.51*** -.45*** .48*** .63*** .55*** -.45*** -.65*** -.51*** .45*** .58*** .42*** .01 -.15*** 
24. Depressive Symptoms T3 -.35*** -.39*** -.56*** .49*** .48*** .68*** -.48*** -.50*** -.68*** .46*** .42*** .55*** .02 -.15*** 
25. Panas Positive Affect T1 1.00*** .65*** .63*** -.31*** -.24*** -.27*** .72*** .56*** .56*** -.34*** -.25*** -.25*** .04 .19*** 
 
Note: Significance effects of correlations coefficients were marked with: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2. 1: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in the UK 
 
  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
UK participants                             
26. Panas Positive Affect T2  1.00*** .64*** -.30*** -.30*** -.25*** .60*** .76*** .56*** -.33*** -.34*** -.27*** .04 .14*** 
27. Panas Positive Affect T3    1.00*** -.30*** -.26*** -.32*** .59*** .61*** .77*** -.30*** -.26*** -.32*** -.02 .19*** 
28. Panas Negative Affect T1      1.00*** .65*** .67*** -.43*** -.35*** -.35*** .48*** .41*** .38*** .09**  -.22*** 
29. Panas Negative Affect T2        1.00*** .70*** -.32*** -.42*** -.34*** .38*** .49*** .36*** .12**  -.19*** 
30. Panas Negative Affect T3          1.00*** -.38*** -.34*** -.45*** .48*** .43*** .49*** .10*   -.21*** 
31. Vitality T1            1.00*** .69*** .67*** -.50*** -.38*** -.37*** .01 .16*** 
32. Vitality T2              1.00*** .71*** -.40*** -.51*** -.38*** .00 .12**  
33. Vitality T3                1.00*** -.42*** -.38*** -.50*** .01 .15*** 
34. General Health T1                  1.00*** .61*** .61*** .13*** -.17*** 
35. General Health T2                    1.00*** .60*** .18*** -.13**  
36. General Health T3                      1.00*** .11**  -.14*** 
37. Gender                        1.00*** -.13*** 
38. Age T1                          1.00*** 
M 3.59 3.52 3.53 2.14 2.10 2.05 4.30 4.21 4.24 2.01 1.99 2.05  44.68 
SD 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.62 0.62 1.25 1.31 1.26 0.74 0.71 0.74  13.98 
 
 
Note: Significance effects of correlations coefficients were marked with: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2. 2: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in Chile 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
CH participants                         
1. Total Basic Need satisfaction T1 1.00*** .62*** .62*** .79*** .41*** .57*** -.86*** -.59*** -.49*** .82*** .49*** .56*** 
2. Total Basic Need satisfaction T2   1.00*** .60*** .64*** .80*** .55*** -.43*** -.83*** -.39*** .54*** .82*** .53*** 
3. Total Basic Need satisfaction T3     
1.00*** .55*** .50*** .85*** -.50*** -.47*** -.84*** .51*** .51*** .90*** 
4. Basic Need satisfaction T1 
  
    
1.00*** .58*** .63*** -.37*** -.46*** -.30**  .63*** .44*** .49*** 
5. Basic Need satisfaction T2 
  
      
1.00*** .62*** -.16†  -.33*** -.14 .39*** .62*** .45*** 
6. Basic Need satisfaction T3           
1.00*** -.35*** -.28*   -.44*** .47*** .44*** .75*** 
7. Basic Need Frustration T1 
  
          
1.00*** .53*** .50*** -.72*** -.38*** -
.45*** 
8. Basic Need Frustration T2 
  
            
1.00*** .49*** -.48*** -.71*** -
.41*** 
9. Basic Need Frustration T3 
  
            
  1.00*** -.38*** -.36**  -
.79*** 
10. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T1 
  
                
1.00*** .53*** .51*** 
11. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T2                     
1.00*** .52*** 
12. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T3                         
M 4.39 4.57 4.57 4.60 4.63 4.63 2.82 2.48 2.49 4.26 4.48 4.42 
SD 0.69 0.60 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.90 0.91 0.76 0.87 0.85 0.77 0.92 
 
Note: Significance effects of correlations coefficients were marked with: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2. 2: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in Chile 
  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
CH participants                         
1. Total Basic Need satisfaction T1 .87*** .48*** .58*** .79*** .56*** .48*** .51*** .34*** .53*** -.67*** -.36*** -.53*** 
2. Total Basic Need satisfaction T2 .56*** .81*** .43*** .37*** .84*** .51*** .42*** .45*** .43*** -.42*** -.55*** -.32**  
3. Total Basic Need satisfaction T3 .61*** .47*** .89*** .34*** .49*** .80*** .49*** .29*   .63*** -.52*** -.31**  -.72*** 
4. Basic Need satisfaction T1 .71*** .54*** .44*** .61*** .59*** .49*** .53*** .36*** .50*** -.56*** -.31*** -.44*** 
5. Basic Need satisfaction T2 .37*** .68*** .29*   .22*   .68*** .50*** .31**  .34*** .29*   -.23*   -.40*** -.19 
6. Basic Need satisfaction T3 .54*** .43*** .75*** .31**  .49*** .72*** .50*** .19†  .58*** -.39*** -.17 -.57*** 
7. Basic Need Frustration T1 -.73*** -.30**  -.51*** -.68*** -.37*** -.32**  -.34*** -.22*   -.39*** .55*** .30**  .44*** 
8. Basic Need Frustration T2 -.55*** -.64*** -.42*** -.39*** -.69*** -.34**  -.37*** -.39*** -.41*** .45*** .49*** .34**  
9. Basic Need Frustration T3 -.49*** -.32**  -.75*** -.27**  -.27*   -.63*** -.33*** -.27*   -.49*** .49*** .33**  .66*** 
10. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T1 .60*** .38*** .42*** .42*** .41*** .37*** .37*** .20*   .41*** -.47*** -.29**  -.35*** 
11. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T2 .37*** .49*** .37**  .25*   .50*** .35**  .36*** .24*   .38*** -.35*** -.46*** -.25*   
12. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T3 .56*** .37**  .75*** .23*   .40*** .56*** .42*** .27*   .56*** -.40*** -.32**  -.63*** 
13. Composite Competence Satisfaction T1 1.00*** .56*** .62*** .54*** .47*** .40*** .45*** .38*** .44*** -.64*** -.31**  -.52*** 
14. Composite Competence Satisfaction T2   1.00*** .38*** .21*   .55*** .43*** .31**  .40*** .32**  -.37*** -.39*** -.24*   
15. Composite Competence Satisfaction T3     1.00*** .31**  .32**  .53*** .35*** .13 .50*** -.46*** -.10 -.62*** 
16. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T1       1.00*** .45*** .36*** .45*** .23*   .40*** -.55*** -.27**  -.38*** 
17. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T2         1.00*** .48*** .36*** .47*** .34**  -.31*** -.51*** -.30**  
18. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T3           1.00*** .51*** .31**  .56*** -.48*** -.34**  -.62*** 
19. Life satisfaction T1             1.00*** .55*** .74*** -.57*** -.23*   -.44*** 
20. Life satisfaction T2               1.00*** .52*** -.42*** -.52*** -.41*** 
21. Life satisfaction T3                 1.00*** -.58*** -.30**  -.70*** 
22. Depressive Symptoms T1                   1.00*** .50*** .72*** 
23. Depressive Symptoms T2                     1.00*** .52*** 
24. Depressive Symptoms T3                       1.00*** 
25. Panas Positive Affect T1                         
M 4.30 4.53 4.52 4.62 4.71 4.77 4.47 4.66 4.53 .70 .60 .59 
SD 0.84 0.68 0.86 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.92 0.82 1.00 0.51 0.47 0.56 
 
Note: Significance effects of correlations coefficients were marked with: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Table 2. 2: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in Chile 
  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
CH participants                             
1. Total Basic Need satisfaction T1 .45*** .24*   .53*** -.54*** -.40*** -.47*** .56*** .34*** .56*** -.39*** -.32*** -.41*** .10†  .20**  
2. Total Basic Need satisfaction T2 .19*   .45*** .42*** -.46*** -.41*** -.34**  .36*** .51*** .47*** -.26**  -.42*** -.36**  .01 -.05 
3. Total Basic Need satisfaction T3 .30**  .33**  .61*** -.44*** -.32**  -.64*** .48*** .30**  .68*** -.37*** -.32**  -.57*** .08 .16 
4. Basic Need satisfaction T1 .56*** .37*** .53*** -.32*** -.31*** -.44*** .64*** .45*** .57*** -.28*** -.22*   -.30**  .12*   .08 
5. Basic Need satisfaction T2 .24*   .54*** .45*** -.26**  -.20*   -.19 .29**  .51*** .46*** -.18†  -.24*   -.26*   -.03 -.03 
6. Basic Need satisfaction T3 .37*** .37*** .64*** -.28**  -.20†  -.45*** .45*** .30**  .66*** -.25*   -.19 -.38*** .07 .13 
7. Basic Need Frustration T1 -.23*** -.07 -.38*** .55*** .36*** .35*** -.31*** -.16 -.38*** .36*** .30**  .38*** -.06 -.24*** 
8. Basic Need Frustration T2 -.08 -.20*   -.24*   .48*** .46*** .36**  -.29**  -.33*** -.31**  .24*   .44*** .33**  -.03 .06 
9. Basic Need Frustration T3 -.14 -.13 -.38*** .47*** .33**  .64*** -.35*** -.17 -.49*** .39*** .34**  .58*** -.06 -.15 
10. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T1 .34*** .17†  .41*** -.44*** -.44*** -.39*** .43*** .29**  .40*** -.38*** -.35*** -.37*** .12†  .19**  
11. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T2 .08 .33*** .39*** -.42*** -.38*** -.36**  .28**  .37*** .44*** -.27**  -.37*** -.40*** .02 .05 
12. Composite Autonomy Satisfaction T3 .29**  .35**  .52*** -.40*** -.27*   -.64*** .44*** .27*   .61*** -.32*** -.40*** -.51*** .03 .29**  
13. Composite Competence Satisfaction T1 .50*** .28**  .52*** -.52*** -.30**  -.45*** .55*** .33*** .53*** -.34*** -.27**  -.40*** .01 .23*** 
14. Composite Competence Satisfaction T2 .27**  .40*** .36**  -.35*** -.35*** -.20†  .31**  .45*** .33**  -.16 -.33*** -.28*   -.09 -.05 
15. Composite Competence Satisfaction T3 .31**  .20†  .58*** -.41*** -.25*   -.53*** .45*** .21†  .58*** -.33*** -.15 -.49*** .10 .20*   
16. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T1 .28*** .11 .33*** -.37*** -.22*   -.26**  .39*** .18†  .39*** -.25*** -.12 -.18†  .13*   .07 
17. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T2 .13 .37*** .29*   -.36*** -.28**  -.26*   .29**  .45*** .37*** -.21*   -.33*** -.20†  .07 -.13 
18. Composite Relatedness Satisfaction T3 .18†  .25*   .47*** -.34*** -.29*   -.49*** .34*** .26*   .57*** -.31**  -.23*   -.47*** .07 -.09 
19. Life satisfaction T1 .37*** .04 .27**  -.32*** -.13 -.41*** .49*** .15 .49*** -.29*** -.12 -.35*** .17**  .04 
20. Life satisfaction T2 .11 .21*   .00 -.23*   -.18†  -.32**  .29**  .39*** .29*   -.25*   -.27**  -.28*   .16 -.12 
21. Life satisfaction T3 .27**  .21†  .49*** -.28**  -.31**  -.54*** .53*** .28*   .69*** -.28**  -.15 -.43*** .16 .04 
22. Depressive Symptoms T1 -.46*** -.24*   -.49*** .55*** .36*** .53*** -.66*** -.36*** -.60*** .46*** .28**  .52*** .00 -.04 
23. Depressive Symptoms T2 -.03 -.44*** -.17 .36*** .45*** .35**  -.25**  -.60*** -.36**  .29**  .61*** .33**  .02 .15 
24. Depressive Symptoms T3 -.28**  -.36**  -.57*** .46*** .31**  .68*** -.58*** -.39*** -.73*** .36*** .32**  .55*** -.02 .00 
25. Panas Positive Affect T1 1.00*** .44*** .48*** -.17**  -.10 -.23*   .60*** .31**  .47*** -.17**  .04 -.20*   -.04 .08 
 
Note: Significance effects of correlations coefficients were marked with: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 2. 2: Descriptives and Inter-Correlations Between All Study Variables in Chile 
  25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
CH participants                             
26. Panas Positive Affect T2   1.00**
* 
.53*** -.29**  -.29**  -.34**  .46*** .65*** .50*** -.27**  -.34*** -.34**  -.09 .06 
27. Panas Positive Affect T3     1.00**
* 
-.34*** -.30**  -.38*** .59*** .41*** .73*** -.34*** -.09 -.48*** .04 .28**  
28. Panas Negative Affect T1       1.00**
* 
.39*** .50*** -.38*** -.35*** -.36*** .43*** .26**  .39*** .03 -.15*   
29. Panas Negative Affect T2         1.00**
* 
.47*** -.27**  -.45*** -.37*** .30**  .43*** .41*** .04 -.04 
30. Panas Negative Affect T3           1.00**
* 
-.51*** -.27*   -.62*** .40*** .39*** .51*** -.06 -.08 
31. Vitality T1             1.00**
* 
.62*** .75*** -.43*** -.08 -.45*** .02 .07 
32. Vitality T2               1.00**
* 
.57*** -.28**  -.37*** -.34**  -.02 -.09 
33. Vitality T3                 1.00**
* 
-.40*** -.18 -.55*** .01 .13 
34. General Health T1                   1.00**
* 
.48*** .71*** .11†  -.03 
35. General Health T2                     1.00**
* 
.59*** .19†  -.05 
36. General Health T3                       1.00**
* 
.22*   -.18†  
37. Gender                         1.00*** -.09 
38. Age T1                           1.00*** 
M 3.66 3.61 3.54 2.32 2.09 2.11 4.88 4.76 4.68 2.20 2.11 2.13   34.81 
SD 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.62 0.50 0.59 1.16 1.15 1.32 0.72 0.63 0.66   10.54 
 
Note: Significance effects of correlations coefficients were marked with: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
